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Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future
William Boyd
ABSTRACT
Substantial reductions in global power sector emissions will be needed by midcentury
to avoid significant disruption of the climate system. Achieving these reductions will
require greatly increased levels of financing, technological innovation, and policy reform.
In the United States, the scale and complexity of the overall challenge have raised
important questions regarding prevailing regulatory and business models, with much
scrutiny directed at the traditional practice of public utility regulation. Recognizing
the many valid criticisms leveled against public utility regulation and the important
questions raised about the viability of traditional utility business models, particularly in
the face of substantial growth in distributed energy resources, this Article argues that a
revitalized and expanded notion of public utility has a critical role to play in efforts to
decarbonize the power sector in the United States.
In making this argument, the Article looks back to an earlier, more expansive concept
of public utility as articulated by Progressives, legal realists, and institutional economists
in the early twentieth century. This earlier concept of public utility contains valuable
insights for dealing with the current challenges of decarbonization. The Article shows
how this broader concept of public utility was substantially diminished by a confluence
of external challenges and a sustained intellectual assault mounted by economists
and lawyers starting in the 1960s. The narrowed understanding of public utility that
resulted, it is argued, has distorted our views regarding the role of markets and isruptive
technologies in the sector. In fact, basic public utility principles continue to govern a
significant amount of activity across the power sector, including in both wholesale and
retail electricity markets. And there are important unrealized possibilities embedded
within the public utility concept that hold considerable promise for reforming current
regulatory and business models in the face of rapid technological change and growing
decarbonization imperatives.
Such principles and possibilities are particularly important in ongoing efforts to
increase renewable energy and finance large low-carbon generation projects. They
also hold great promise for ongoing efforts to plan for and optimize the integration of
increasingly large amounts of distributed energy resources such as rooftop solar, demand
response, and energy storage. Indeed, when one looks at the overall scale, complexity,
and sequencing of investments needed to decarbonize the power sector over the
coming decades (however it comes to be organized), it is clear that the broad concept
of public utility offers essential tools for planning and coordinating such investments
over the long time horizons contemplated and for managing a system of increasing
complexity. In all of these areas, a more expansive notion of public utility that draws
from earlier understandings of the concept provides a normative foundation for efforts
to govern a power system that is increasingly complex, participatory, and intelligent, and
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for managing the sustained, collective effort to channel investment and behavior in a
manner necessary to realize a low-carbon future.
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INTRODUCTION
Public utility. At one time, the concept was among the most powerful
and evocative in American law-a legal innovation that married private busi-
ness with public regulation to provide the means for building and managing a
series of network industries (railroads, telephone, natural gas, electricity) that
were the envy of the industrialized world. "No task more profoundly tests the
capacity of our government, both in nation and state," wrote Felix Frankfurter,
"than its share in securing for society those essential services which are fur-
nished by public utilities."' A product of the Progressive era, public utility
was a distinctively American approach to the "social control of business"-a third
way between unregulated markets and outright public ownership that promised to
harness the energy of private enterprise and irect it toward public ends.2
Today the concept all too often evokes derision, even scorn, from a range
of critics who see it as an outdated relic of a bygone era that put too much
faith in government control and the fuzzy notion of public interest.3 To be
sure, in some traditional public utility sectors, such as telecommunications,
disruptive technologies and deregulation have dramatically reduced the im-
portance of the basic public utility model.4 But in others, notably electricity,
the model still holds considerable sway. With a pedigree stretching back dec-
ades, the current critique sees the continued importance of public utility in the
electric power sector as one of the last bastions of an early twentieth-century ap-
1. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 81 (1930).
2. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 5 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the "unique" approach of the United States to the
provision of public utility services through regulated private companies); Marshall E.
Dimock, British and American Utilities: A Comparison, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 265 (1933)
("Public utility regulation is preeminently American, although t e public utility concept was
derived from English rather than from American sources."). The phrase "social control of
business" was a common one in early twentieth-century discussions of the proper role of
government in managing the economy. See, e.g., JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL
CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926); see also William J. Novak, LaZw and the Social Control of
American Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 392-99 (2010) (discussing early twentieth-century
literature on the social control of business); Harry M. Trebing, Realism and Relevance in
Public Utility Regulation, 8 J. ECON. ISSUES 209, 209 (1974) ("Public utility regulation was
one of the pioneering areas of study in the social control of industry.").
3. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.E.
4. See generally JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE (2d ed. 2013)
(discussing impacts of changing regulatory frameworks and technological innovation on
various aspects of the telecommunications industry).
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proach to regulation that long ago metastasized into a pathological swamp of
anti-innovation, rent-seeking behavior.
And yet, according to critics and industry observers, it appears that the
forces of disruptive innovation are finally breaking down the barriers that have
insulated electric utilities for so long. New technologies and business models
(smart grids, demand response, distributed generation, the services-oriented
iUtility) are finally shaking up the electricity sector.' Predictions of imminent
demise are common.' "Death spiral" is a favorite phrase.' Even the industry's
own trade association, the Edison Electric Institute, is sounding alarms that
the current conjuncture is different and that the electric utility business model
is in need of serious revision.9
While it may well be the case that we are witnessing a historically unique
set of challenges to the traditional electric utility business model, it is also
clear that regulated utilities continue to play very important roles in the U.S.
electric power sector and, more importantly, that the broader concept of pub-
lic utility continues to inform a great deal of what is happening in the sector.
A few quick facts illustrate this point. In the United States today, regulated
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) serve about 70 percent of the population,
with the remainder served by various retail providers, electric cooperatives,
5. See, e.g., Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business
Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 73 (2012) (discussing the need to rethink the traditional
utility business model).
6. See, e.g., PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID,
AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 34-40 (2010) (discussing impacts of
technological change on utility business models); JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY
ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 164-65 (2011) (advocating
replacement of traditional utility business model with a new, "smarter," services -oriented
"iUtility").
7. See, e.g., Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013, 6:18 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304773104579270362739732266;
Chris Martin et al., Why the US. Power Grids Days Are Numbered, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.businessweektcom/articles/2013-08-22/homegrown-
green-energy-is-making-power-utilities-irrelevant [hereinafter Martin et al., Power Grid];
Richard Martin, Distributed Generation Poses Existential Threat to Utilities, FORBES (Aug.
26, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/pikeresearch/2013/08/26/distributed-
generation-poses-existential-threat-to-utilities ("To the list of industries at risk of complete
obsolescence-which at the moment includes daily newspapers, government postal services,
and men-only barbershops, among others-you can add U.S. power utilities.").
8. See, e.g., Martin et al., Power Grid, supra note 7; see also Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival
for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, at B1 (discussing challenges to utility business
models from rooftop solar and citing the "death spiral" characterization).
9. See EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 11, 13 (2013).
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and publicly-owned utilities.0 Many of these IOUs are vertically integrated;
others, primarily in states that have restructured their retail electricity markets,
provide retail, distribution, and default or "provider of last resort" services.
Most of the transmission and distribution systems across the country are also
owned or operated by regulated utilities. In the organized wholesale power
markets, the regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent
system operators (ISOs) that manage the transmission systems for their
member utilities are themselves regulated as public utilities by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), notwithstanding the fact that their
business model is quite different from the traditional IOUs. The wholesale
power markets that are administered by the RTOs and ISOs are also highly
regulated-more so in some respects than traditional utilities operating under
"rate-of-return" or "cost-of- service" frameworks. In sum, public utility
principles continue to inform and guide a significant amount of activity across
the power sector.
When one considers the challenges involved in decarbonizing the elec-
tric power sector over the next half century, moreover, the concept of public
utility takes on additional salience. The planning, sequencing, and financing
of hundreds of billions of dollars in new investments needed to modernize the
electric power grid and build new low carbon generation will require a level of
certainty regarding cost recovery that markets alone will have difficulty
providing. Similarly, the coordination and systems-operation challenges associat-
ed with increasing levels of intermittent renewable generation and integration
of various distributed energy resources will require a degree of administration
and oversight hat exceeds current systems operation capabilities. Finally, the
10. See AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, 2013-14 ANNUAL DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 30
(2013) (reporting data showing that investor-owned utilities serve 68.2 percent of U.S.
electricity customers, public owned utilities serve 14.6 percent, cooperatives serve 12.9
percent, and power marketers serve 4.3 percent).
11. Providers of last resort are typically incumbent utilities that have been designated by public
utility commissions (PUCs) in states with retail competition to provide service to those
customers who are not served by other retail electricity providers. It is an extension of the
electric utility's duty to serve or universal service obligation. SeeJim Rossi, The Common LaZ
'Duty to Serve" and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility
Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1288-1319 (1998) (discussing different models for
extending duty to serve in competitive retail markets).
12. See, e.g., Lester Lave et al., Deregulation/Restructuring Part I. Reregulation Will Not Fix the
Problems, 20 ELECTRICITYJ. 9, 10, 16 (2007) ("Rather than reduce regulation, restructuring
has imposed two new levels of regulation. . . . If anything, there are more layers of regulation
now. . . . The RTO regulation, especially by the market monitor, is more detailed and
intrusive than any that the industry had under RORR [rate-of-return regulation]."); see also
discussion infra Part II.D (discussing design and regulation ofwholesale power markets).
1618
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pace and scale of policy innovation and the need for commercial- scale
demonstration projects for new technologies (from carbon capture and stor-
age to smart grid deployment and vehicle electrification) will call for sustained
public-private cooperation that goes beyond what is feasible under current
market structures. In all of these areas, a broad concept of public utility pro-
vides important organizing principles and tools for managing the transition to
a low carbon future.
None of which is to say that there are not problems with the traditional
electric utility business model, much less that the sector is not facing challenges
from new technologies and business practices that are substantially different from
those of the past. The concern here, and a premise of this Article, is that the
enthusiasm for technological disruption, which permeates current policy dis-
cussions regarding the electric power sector and seems to be ubiquitous in
contemporary culture, may be deflecting attention from other important
pathways and possibilities. Given the uncertainty about future economic and
technological change, it seems prudent to hedge a bit (in an institutional
sense) and to consider some of the ways in which public utility, broadly un-
derstood, could be a vital part of a low-carbon future. In doing so, it is im-
portant to look not only at how the industry has changed and adapted in the
wake of previous challenges, but also at how the concept of public utility itself
has changed over time, and what lessons, if any, can be learned from these
changes as we confront the challenge of decarbonization.
Such an undertaking requires that we distinguish between the current
IOU business model and the broader concept of public utility. Although often
conflated, they are not the same. As understood here, public utility is first
and foremost a normative effort directed at ensuring that the governance of
essential network industries, such as electric power, proceeds in a manner that
protects the public from the abuses of market power by providing stable, reli-
able, and universal service at just and reasonable rates. Public utility, in this
broader sense, is not a thing or a type of entity but an undertaking-a collec-
tive project aimed at harnessing the power of private enterprise and irecting
it toward public ends. The traditional IOU business model is thus a manifes-
tation of public utility. But it hardly exhausts the category, and it would be a
mistake to presume that there is only one right way to organize and regulate
the power sector within the broad framework of public utility.
This Article investigates the changing understandings of public utility in
the United States over the last century and the implications of these changes
for efforts to decarbonize the power sector. It seeks to recover an earlier un-
derstanding of the concept as it was elaborated by Progressive lawyers, legal
1619
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realists, and institutional economists during the first half of the twentieth
century. Public utility, in their view, was an important and distinctive American
innovation-an example of the "creative force of law" aimed at using government
to guide certain private businesses toward public ends.13 The Article shows
how this broader concept of public utility gave way to a much thinner un-
derstanding in response to a confluence of external challenges (namely, tech-
nological stasis, the energy crisis of the 1970s, and the rise of environmental
concerns) and a sustained intellectual assault mounted by economists and
lawyers, many of them associated with the University of Chicago, starting in
the 1960s. The diminished notion of public utility that resulted has distorted
our views regarding the role of markets and disruptive technologies in the
power sector, particularly in the context of efforts to promote low-carbon
electricity.
Building on this, the Article's normative claim is that a revitalized notion of
public utility-one that sees it less as an obstacle to markets and innovation
and more as an "instrument of the commonwealth"-could play an important
role in the effort to secure a low-carbon future.14 Thus, rather than viewing
the contemporary situation as a stark choice between the power of markets
and disruptive innovation on the one side and ossification and rent seeking on
the other, this Article argues that a broader notion of public utility offers a
possible normative and conceptual frame for moving beyond the false separa-
tion of markets and regulation, beyond the current fascination with disruptive
innovation, to guide the common, collective enterprise of building and elabo-
rating the institutions, regulatory structures, and business models that will be
necessary to realize a low-carbon future.
Part I discusses briefly the substantial contribution of the electric power
sector to U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the distinctive challenges
facing efforts to decarbonize the sector, and the diversity of institutional and
regulatory forms that characterizes the current system. The central claim here
is that when one looks at the overall scale, complexity, and sequencing of invest-
ments needed to decarbonize the electric power sector over the coming decades
(however it comes to be organized), it is clear that the tools and practices of
public utility regulation offer important resources for planning and coordinat-
13. See Novak, supra note 2, at 399; infra Part II.A.
14. Walton H. Hamilton, Price-By Way of Litigation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1034 (1938)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Price-By Way ofLifigation]; see also WALTON HAMILTON, THE POLITICS
OF INDUSTRY 18 (1957) [hereinafter HAMILTON, POLITICS OF INDUSTRY] ("All
industries are, in their several degrees, instruments of the general welfare; where there is
failure in performance, the call is for statecraft.").
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ing such investments over the long time horizons contemplated and for managing
a system of increasing complexity.
Part II traces the major changes in the public utility concept over the last
century. It first discusses the broad understanding of public utility advanced
by Progressives, legal realists, and institutionalists during the early twentieth
century, with particular attention to their views on rate regulation, competition,
and experimentalism in public utility law. It then shows how this earlier un-
derstanding of the concept was narrowed and diminished by a sustained intel-
lectual critique mounted by economists and lawyers starting in the 1960s-a
critique that was further reinforced by the profound challenges facing electric
utilities and public utility regulation in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of ex-
haustion of economies of scale in power generation, the energy crises of the
1970s, and rising environmental concerns. Part II then demonstrates how
the subsequent move to deregulate various segments of the industry in the
1990s, which comported with broader trends toward deregulation that had
been underway for more than a decade, drew directly on this narrowed under-
standing of public utility, reinforcing a sharp but problematic distinction between
regulation and markets in thinking about the new modes of governance for
the power sector.
Finally, Part II shows how the growing attention in the contemporary
context to the potentially disruptive effects of technologies such as distributed
generation and the corresponding threats to the traditional utility business
model depend upon and reproduce a thin conception of public utility-even
though these disruptive technologies have benefited greatly from traditional
forms of public utility regulation and despite the considerable promise that a
revitalized notion of public utility might play in the organization and govern-
ance of a system that includes more active and dynamic participation by con-
sumers. The overall objective of Part II is to show how the thin conception of
public utility that emerged from the economic critique of the 1960s and
1970s has shaped subsequent debates regarding the role of markets and dis-
ruptive technologies in the sector, reinforcing the view that public utility is an
obstacle to be overcome rather than a possible source of new thinking and
new approaches.
Part III draws directly on the historical discussion in Part II and argues
for a more expansive and revitalized understanding of public utility as a key
component of the effort to build a low-carbon future. It claims that a broad
notion of public utility is essential to motivate and organize the planning and
investment needed to decarbonize the power sector by midcentury, to coordi-
nate and administer a grid capable of integrating substantial amounts of in-
1621
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termittent renewable generation and distributed energy resources, and to facilitate
experimentation and innovation at scale. In making this claim, Part III emphasiz-
es the importance of recovering a broad notion of the public in public utility,
arguing that the transition to a low carbon electricity system over the coming
decades can only be realized if it is seen as a collective, political choice that aligns
technologies, business models, and regulatory frameworks in a manner that capi-
talizes upon the positive network effects of an increasingly integrated and
participatory electric power grid.
I. ELECTRIC POWER AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE
The U.S. electric power system is the largest in the world." It has been
described as the most complex machine ever built.6 Organized into three
major grids, or interconnects, (Eastern, Western, and Texas17) it joins a diverse
array of generation assets with high-voltage transmission lines, local distribu-
tion systems, and, increasingly, active demand-side and distributed resources
to deliver a highly reliable service to millions of households and businesses in
a manner that must precisely balance generation (supply) and load (demand)
in real-time. It is also the largest single source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
in the United States, accounting for a third of total U.S. GHG emissions in
2012." It goes without saying that the power sector must be a vital part of any
effort to build a low-carbon future in the United States-a fact that becomes
15. See MIT, THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 1 (2011) ("Hailed as the 'supreme
engineering achievement of the 20' century' by the National Academy of Engineering, the
U.S. electric power grid serves more than 143 million residential, commercial, and industrial
customers through more than 6 million miles of transmission and distribution lines owned by
more than 3,000 highly diverse investor-owned, government-owned, and cooperative
enterprises.") (citations omitted); S. Massoud Amin, Securing the Electricity Grid, 40 THE
BRIDGE 1, 14 (2010) (describing the North American power system as the largest and most
complex machine in the world).
16. PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR
ELECTRIFIED WORLD 1 (2007) ("Taken in its entirety, the grid is a machine, the most
complex machine ever made."); see also THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER:
ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930, at 1 (1983) ("Of the great
construction projects of the last century, none has been more impressive in its technical,
economic, and scientific aspects, none has been more influential in its social effects, and none
has engaged more thoroughly our constructive instincts and capabilities than the electric
power system.").
17. See MIT, supra note 15, at 3 (describing the three major interconnects that make up the U.S.
electric power system).
18. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS: 1990-2012, at ES-23 (2014) (noting that emissions from electricity generation
accounted for the largest portion (32 percent) of US greenhouse gas emissions in 2012).
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even more apparent as efforts to electrify the transportation sector (the second
largest source of U.S. GHG emissions9 ) move forward.
Multiple scenarios have been developed to understand the possible fu-
ture makeup of a decarbonized power sector in the United States. Several of
these identify 80 percent reductions in GHG emissions by 2050 as a benchmark-
a very ambitious target that would require substantial increases in investment
across all aspects of the power sector over the next several decades, regardless
of the ultimate mix of technologies and resources. Some of these studies focus on
the possibility of a power sector composed primarily of renewable technolo-
gies,20 while others look more broadly at a combination of renewables and
other sources of low-carbon energy such as nuclear power and fossil fuel gen-
eration (coal or natural gas plants) with carbon capture and storage. Under
any scenario, however, certain distinctive features of the electric power system
must be kept in mind. This Part discusses some of those key features and
their implications for efforts to decarbonize the power sector over the next
several decades. The central observation is that realizing a low-carbon future
will require greatly enhanced levels of planning, investment, and coordination
across multiple scales.
A. Energy System Momentum and Committed Emissions
Two concepts help to elucidate the challenge of decarbonizing the electric
power sector: energy system momentum and committed emissions. Energy
system momentum recognizes that the long-lived, relation-specific assets involved
in electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, combined with the
institutional and regulatory frameworks that govern the use of these assets,
19. Id. at ES-22 (reporting transportation as second largest source of US greenhouse gas
emissions in 2012).
20. See, e.g, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES
STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii (M.M. Hand et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] (noting that the
analysis presented in the four-volume renewable electricity futures study "assesses a variety of
scenarios with prescribed levels of renewable electricity generation in 2050, from 30% to 90%,
with a focus on 80% (with nearly 50% from variable wind and solar photovoltaic
generation)"); see AMORY B. LOVINS & ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., REINVENTING FIRE:
BOLD BUSINESS SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA 169 (2011) [hereinafter
REINVENTING FIRE] (presenting multiple scenarios for the power sector including 80
percent renewables by 2050).
21. See, e.g., WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, PATHWAYS
TO ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2050, at 14-15 (2005) (presenting U.S. low-carbon
power sector scenario with mix of nuclear, coal with carbon capture and storage, and renewables).
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result in a system with a tremendous amount of inertia. Put another way,
the $1.1 trillion invested in the current electric power system in the United
States, combined with the multi-decade lifetimes of many of these assets, and
a constellation of deeply entrenched political and economic interests, makes
the system very resistant to change.23
The corollary to energy system momentum-the idea of committed
emissions-recognizes that these assets (and the system as a whole) have embed-
ded within them a significant amount of future greenhouse gas emissions.24
That is, if we assume that the current stock of fixed capital that constitutes
our electric power system will live out its useful life (thirty to forty years in the
case of most generation assets), we can derive an estimate of the emissions
that are already baked into the current capital stock.5 While it is possible that
some of these assets will be retired early or retrofitted in a manner that changes
their emissions profile (early retirements of coal plants as a result of cheap
natural gas and new EPA regulations come to mind)," it is clear that there are
22. See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 15-16, 140, 465 (describing the sociotechnical momentum of
developing electric power systems); John P. Holdren, The Energy Innovation Imperative:
Addressing Oil Dependence, Climate Change, and Other 21st Century Energy Challenges, 1
INNOVATIONS 3, 6 (2006) (discussing the inertia of the current energy system that results
from the combined effects of very large investments in fixed capital with long turnover times
and entrenched political and economic interests).
23. The net asset value of the plant in service for all U.S. electric utilities in 2010 was
approximately $1.1 trillion, which includes $765 billion for investor-owned utilities (IOUs),
$200 billion for municipal utilities, and $112 billion for rural electric cooperatives. RON
BINZ ET AL., CERES, PRACTICING RISK-AWARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: WHAT
EVERY STATE REGULATOR NEEDS TO KNOW 14 (2012).
24. See Steven J. Davis et al., Future CO2 Emissions and Climate Change From Existing Energy
Infrastructure, 329 SCIENCE 1330, 1330 (2010) (discussing "committed emissions" in the
current stock of long-lived energy and transportation infrastructure and noting that
"[b]arring widespread retrofitting of existing power plants with carbon capture and storage
technologies or the early decommissioning of serviceable infrastructure, these 'committed
emissions' represent infrastructural inertia, which may be the primary contributor to total
future warming commitment").
25. R.T. Dahowski & J.J. Dooley, Carbon Management Strategies for US Electricity Generation
Capacity: A Vintage-Based Approach, 29 ENERGY 1589, 1591-92 (2004) (estimating future
C02 emissions from U.S. fossil fuel power plants built prior to 2000); Davis et al., supra note
24, at 1330 (discussing "committed emissions" in the current stock of long-lived energy and
transportation infrastructure); Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-in, 28 ENERGY
POL'Y 817, 817 (2000) (discussing carbon lock-in tendencies of current fossil fuel-dominated
energy systems).
26. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, at IF-34-IF-38
(2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014] (discussing accelerated coal plant
retirements). In addition to early retirements, fuel switching, increased biomass co-firing,
and a more general shift of fossil plants from providing energy to providing reserve capacity
and balancing resources for renewables could also change the emissions profile of existing
generation.
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substantial committed emissions in the current system and, more importantly,
that the investment decisions made today will strongly influence the indus-
try's emissions profile for decades to come.
This is particularly important in the current environment, because the
industry is in the midst of a major investment cycle. Over the last five years
(2008-12), IOUs have invested an average of more than $80 billion per year
in new generation, transmission, and distribution assets-a 50 percent increase
over annual investment during the previous five years. One estimate puts
future investment needs in the power sector at roughly $2 trillion over the
next twenty years (an average of $100 billion per year).2 ' And because much
of this capital investment will be in long-lived relation- specific assets-
generating units, high voltage transmission lines, and local distribution systems-
the current investment cycle will likely have a major influence on the shape of
the power sector over the coming decades. In the absence of a substantial de-
valuation of existing utility assets, which is always a possibility, the current in-
vestment cycle is thus creating additional momentum for the future
configuration of the electric power system.29
This leads to the conclusion that careful planning and sequencing of in-
vestments in various segments of the industry (and at multiple scales) will be
necessary to create an electric power system that has a vastly reduced emissions
profile compared to the current system. Even with a price on carbon, moreover,
the wholesale power markets alone may not be able to deliver the proper incen-
tives.30 Waiting for disruptive technologies to emerge and deploy on a large
scale is also problematic given the complexity of the system and the challenges of
rapidly integrating large amounts of renewable energy, demand response, and
distributed generation.
Indeed, despite the many comparisons made between telecommunica-
tions and electricity with respect to the potential for disruptive innovation,
there are limits to how instructive the telecommunications experience is for
electric power.31 For starters, the power sector faces a set of growing carbon
27. See EDISON ELEC. INST., 2012 FINANCIAL REVIEW 18 (2012).
28. See BINZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 19.
29. See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 15-16, 465 (discussing concept of momentum in large socio-
technological systems).
30. As discussed in Part III.A, infra, even a relatively high price on carbon may not be sufficient
to incentivize the required investment in low-carbon technologies at the scale and pace
necessary to significantly decarbonize the power sector by midcentury.
31. See, e.g., Martin et al., Pozoer Grid, supra note 7 (analogizing disruption of current electric
power sector to telecommunications); EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 9, at 14-17
(discussing history of disruption in telecommunications and its implications for the power
sector). But see PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER:
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and environmental constraints that the telecommunications sector has never
faced. Moreover, in contrast to telecommunications, there are no obvious alterna-
tive networks that could take the place of the current electricity grid in the
way that wireless and cable networks have rendered traditional landline tele-
phone service redundant. It also seems unlikely that substantial numbers of
people will soon exit the grid entirely, although the possibility of grid defec-
tion is growing.32 More importantly, even though grid defection may become
an increasingly attractive opportunity for some, it is not optimal from either
an economic or an environmental perspective and it has potentially serious
distributional consequences.33 In short, as discussed in more detail below,
modernizing the electric power grid and making it more responsive to
decarbonization imperatives and more accommodating of various forms of
distributed energy resources offers a more realistic pathway to reducing power
sector emissions by 80 percent or more by midcentury.
B. Distinctive Features of Electric Power
Viewed as a whole, the electric power system is a complex, highly inter-
dependent network that operates on multiple time scales, ranging from milli-
seconds to years.34 Because electricity cannot be stored on any significant
scale, cannot be directed (as in the case of classic switched networks), and because
generation and load must be balanced in real time, sophisticated systems op-
eration capabilities are necessary to ensure continuous delivery of reliable elec-
AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 43 (1983) (discussing differences
between telecommunications and electricity in context of deregulation and noting that
"casual reasoning by analogy produces sound policy only by chance").
32. See PETER BRONSKI ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION: WHEN AND
WHERE DISTRIBUTED SOLAR GENERATION PLUS STORAGE COMPETES WITH
TRADITIONAL UTILITY SERVICE 39 (2014) [hereinafter BRONSKI ET AL., ECONOMICS
OF GRID DEFECTION] ("[S]olar-plus -battery systems will reach grid parity-for growing
numbers of customers in certain geographies, especially those with high retail electricity
prices-well within the 30-year period by which utilities capitalize major power assets.
Millions of customers, commercial earlier than residential, representing billions of dollars in
utility revenues will find themselves in a position to cost effectively defect from the grid if
they so choose.").
33. See id. ("Xhen solar-plus -battery systems are integrated into a network, new opportunities
open up that generate even greater value for customers and the network (e.g., potentially
better customer-side economics, additional sizing options, ability of distributed systems to
share excess generation or storage).").
34. See ALEXANDRA VON MEIER, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: A CONCEPITAL INTRODUCTION
260-68 (2006) (discussing balancing requirements at multiple scales necessary to coordinate
generation and load in electric power systems).
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tric service." The electric power industry has been described, in this respect, as
the ultimate just-in-time system."
These facts make it difficult to design markets for electricity, which require
carefully designed dispatch algorithms and auctions and are distinctly vulner-
able to the exercise of market power." They also pose challenges to the integration
of large amounts of intermittent non-dispatchable renewable resources, demand
response, and other distributed energy resources uch as rooftop solar and
storage. In all of these cases, balancing resources are needed to compensate
for intermittency and to maintain frequency. One of the many promises of a
more intelligent grid (one that encompasses transmission and distribution sys-
tems as well as advanced meters at the utility/customer interface) is to enable
more careful and precise systems operation. Realizing that future will require more
planning and coordination, not less. Simply put, as the complexity of the grid
increases-with more actors buying and selling power, more renewables, more
demand response, more storage, and more distributed generation-the im-
portance of systems operation only grows.
In this respect, it is sometimes useful to think of electricity as less of a
commodity and more of an infrastructure-a system of provisioning that allows
energy services to be made available to those connected to the grid, thereby
35. Electricity is often mischaracterized as the flow of electrons. In fact, it is electric current that
flows through the grid at roughly the speed of light. The electrons in the transmission and
distribution wires simply oscillate in place (in Alternating Current (AC) systems), "shoved"
back and forth in the direction of the electric field. The energy that is transmitted across the
system occurs via the propagation of an electromagnetic wave. See id at 8 ("Conceptually, it
is important to recognize that what is traveling at this high speed is the pulse or signal of the
current, not the individual electrons."). For a good overview of the distinctive features of electric
power systems and their implications for the current grid, see Brief Amicus Curiae of
Electrical Engineers, Energy Economists and Physicists in Support of Respondents at 2, 6-9,
New Yorkv. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 00-568).
36. See Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter US. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33
(2012) ("Electricity is the ultimate just-in-time' manufacturing process, where supply must
be produced to meet demand in real time.").
37. See VON MEIER, supra note 34, at 295 ("The extreme inelasticity of demand and supply as
the system nears its limits makes it vulnerable to the withholding of even small amounts of
generation capacity."); Lave et al., supra note 12, at 17-18 (discussing the vulnerabilities of
restructured markets to withholding and market manipulation); Frank A. Wolak, Regulating
Competition in Wbolesale Electricity Supply, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM:
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? (Nancy L. Rose ed., forthcoming July 2014) (manuscript at
1), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl2567.pdf ("[T]he probability of a costly
market failure in the electricity supply industry, often due to the exercise of unilateral market
power, appears to be significantly higher than in other formerly regulated industries.");
discussion infra Parts II.D, III.A.
1627
1628 61 UCLA L. REv. 1614 (2014)
providing a platform for other forms of economic activity." The increase in
distributed energy resources (distributed generation, demand response, storage)
allows households and businesses to be more active participants in that infra-
structure. This requires significant increases in system-wide flexibility that, if
managed appropriately, could allow for high penetration of variable renewable
sources. It also deepens rather than diminishes the collective nature of the sys-
tem, as passive consumers become more active participants on the grid.
C. Institutional and Regulatory Diversity
The traditional electric power system in the United States was organized
primarily into large, vertically integrated IOUs that owned the generation,
transmission, and istribution assets necessary to provide a bundled retail service
under a cost-of-service regulated franchise model.39 These IOUs managed
38. See Harry M. Trebing, On the Changing Nature of the Public Utility Concept: A Retrospective
and Prospective Assessment, in ECONOMICS BROADLY CONSIDERED: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF WARREN J. SAMUELS 258, 269 (Jeff E. Biddle et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Trebing,
Changing Nature] ("Public utilities are network industries that are an integral part of society's
infrastructure. This infrastructure, in turn, serves as a platform for promoting growth in
productivity and gains in real income. It cannot be assumed that oligopolistic market
structures will automatically culminate in the realization of an optimal infrastructure, the
realization of all network and coordination economies, or the distribution of these gains to all
sectors of the economy."). Trebing and others have also occasionally described the system as
a commons. See, e.g., Edythe S. Miller, Implications for the Social Control of Business of
Competing Economic Visions, in THE INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO PUBLIC
UTILITIES REGULATION 437, 454 (Edythe S. Miller & Warren J. Samuels eds., 2002)
(describing "public utilities and network infrastructure ... as part of the social capital of the
economy-that is, part of the commons-requiring oversight to ensure wide accessibility and
to guard against use as a hostage to fortune"); Harry M. Trebing, Market Failure in Public
Utilities: An Institutionalist Crtique of Deregulation, in INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND
ECONOMIC POLICY 287, 305 (Marc R. Tool & Paul Dale Bush eds., 2003) ( "[A] network
should be envisioned as a commons, composed of a collection of services and activities that
are provided under conditions where pervasive network and coordination economies combine
to lower costs and improve functionality.").
39. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 13-31 (1999)
(describing development and early regulation of electric power system in the United States);
Paul Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electrical
Powoer Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 125, 129
(1989) [hereinafter Joskow, Regulatory Failure] ("The typical utility has traditionally been
vertically integrated, generating electricity and transmitting and distributing it to retail
customers. As distributors, IOUs [investor owned utilities] typically have either a de jure or
de facto exclusive franchise to provide service to the retail customers within their territories.
In return, the rates they charge are subject to regulation by state regulatory commissions.");
HUGHES, supra note 16, at 5-7 (discussing integration of electric power systems during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
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their own systems, engaging in limited power transactions with neighboring
utilities.4 0 Rural cooperatives, municipal utilities, and other forms of public
power operated in various parts of the country, often purchasing electricity
from the large IOUs, but the IOU model dominated.41
Beginning in the early twentieth century, states established independent
public utility commissions (PUCs) to regulate IOUs, creating an obvious and
widening regulatory gap regarding interstate sales of electricity.42 During this
time, regional networks expanded to cover multiple states in order to take ad-
vantage of an increased ability to transmit electricity over large distances and
to procure the benefits of load diversity.43 Vast holding companies were created to
organize, manage, and profit from the activities of local operating compa-
nies.44 While these holding companies emerged in part to facilitate the build-
ing of regional systems, they also provided a means of escaping rate regulation
by states and thus became an object of intense regulatory scrutiny and concern
during the Great Depression as utilities went bankrupt across the country.4 5
40. See Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 129 ("Historically, IOUs owned all the
generation, transmission, and distribution capacity required to serve their retail customers.");
id. at 130-31 (discussing wholesale transactions between utilities for coordination purposes).
41. In 1969, for example, IOUs provided electricity to 78 percent of all retail customers in the
U.S. See Competitive Aspects of the Energy Industry: Hearings on S. Res. 334, Pt.1 Before the
Subcomm. onAntitrustandMonopoly fthe S. Comm. on Judiciary, 91st Cong. 263 (1970).
42. See infra Part II.A (discussing emergence and development of state public utility regulation
during the early twentieth century). The names of these commissions varied across states and
included Public Utility Commissions, Public Service Commissions, Corporation Commissions, and
Railroad Commissions (among others). The term "Public Utility Commission" or PUC is
used throughout this Article to refer to all of these state commissions charged with regulating
public utilities. The regulatory gap regarding interstate transactions was known as the
"Attleboro Gap," in reference to the 1927 Supreme Court case that prohibited states from
regulating interstate sales of electricity under the dormant commerce clause. See Pub. Utils.
Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927) (holding that interstate sale
of electricity was "national in character" and thus could only be regulated "by the exercise of
the power vested in Congress").
43. See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 363-403 (discussing the growth of regional systems); id. at
463 (noting the importance of "load factor" (or load diversity) and "economic mix" of supply-side
resources as factors motivating the expansion of regional power systems).
44. See FED. TRADE COMMN, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. No. 70-92, pt. 72-A, at 882
(1935) (providing a comprehensive overview of the development of public utility holding
companies in the United States, advantages and disadvantages of such holding companies,
and the need for "thoroughgoing reform... in the intercorporate relations within the holding
company groups, in corporate and financial structure, in accounting practice, and in the
extent and methods of public regulation"). The FTC report led to the 1935 Public Utility
Holding Company Act.
45. See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY: ITS
PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION 221 (1932) (concluding that while "the
public utility holding company has been a great factor in the development of efficient
electrical systems throughout the country, . . . its almost complete freedom from regulation
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In 1935, Congress enacted two statutes to deal with the increasingly inter-
state nature of the electricity industry and the abuses of the holding compa-
nies. Part II of the Federal Power Act 46 gave the Federal Power Commission
(the predecessor to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) authority to
regulate wholesale power sales and transmission in interstate commerce.47
The Public Utility Holding Company Act 48 dismantled the holding company
system, allowing only single-level holding companies operating in contiguous
geographic areas.
For the next several decades, the electric utility industry operated in a
fairly stable economic and regulatory environment, enjoying increasing econ-
omies of scale, sustained growth in electricity demand, and declining real
prices.so One historian has ascribed the stability that prevailed during the
middle decades of the twentieth century to a "public utility consensus" forged
among managers, regulators, and technical experts." As discussed in the next
Part, this consensus began to unravel in the 1970s for a variety of reasons,
with a growing chorus of calls to deregulate various components of the sector."
By the 1990s, Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) adopted new laws and regulations to facilitate the rise ofwholesale power
markets, imposing an open-access regime on transmission owners and allowing
has become a major public menace"); see also HUGHES, supra note 16, at 393 (noting that,
contrary to popular opinion at the time, the holding companies were not the creatures of
bankers and stockbrokers but of engineers and managers responding to the problem of capital
formation necessary to finance the increasingly capital-intensive nature of emerging regional
power systems); id at 394-403 (discussing the impacts of the Great Depression on several
major holding companies).
46. Ch. 687, tit. 2, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
47. Id
48. Ch. 687, tit. 1, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (repealed 2005).
49. Id.; see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Public Utility Pyramids, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 38 (2012)
(noting that the Public Utility Holding Company Act "limited holding companies to owning
a single, geographically contiguous operating system and prohibited more than a single
holding company tier atop any operating company").
50. See Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 126 ("During the 1950s and most of the
1960s the electric power industry attracted little attention from public policy makers. It
experienced high productivity growth, falling nominal and real prices, excellent financial
performance, and little regulatory or political controversy. Utilities rarely had to file for rate
increases, there were few formal hearings, and 'voluntary' rate decreases were the norm. The
system worked smoothly.").
51. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 11-54 (discussing creation and consolidation of the "utility
consensus" in the electric power sector during early and middle decades of the twentieth
century).
52. Id at 55-70 (discussing multiples stresses on the utility consensus starting in the 1970s);
Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 149-63 (documenting significant economic and
political challenges facing utilities in the 1970s as a result of economic shocks, higher fuel
costs, and new environmental constraints).
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independent generators and power marketers to participate in the sale of
wholesale electricity.53 During this time, a number of states also introduced
retail choice for electricity consumers. At one point, roughly half of all states
had initiated retail-restructuring efforts.54 After the California electricity crisis in
2000-01 (discussed in Part II.D inf-a) and in the wake of several other problematic
experiences with retail competition, however, many states suspended or aban-
doned their efforts. Today, fifteen states have some form of retail choice.
The overall result, from an institutional and regulatory standpoint, is a
pluralistic system that defies easy generalization. Roughly speaking, three
major models compose the current system: (1) the fully restructured model
(Texas and the Northeast), which combines wholesale power markets man-
aged by independent system operators (ISOs) with retail electric competition
in individual states; (2) the traditional cost-of-service model (the Southeast
and much of the West), in which vertically integrated IOUs provide service to
captive customers through regulated monopoly franchises; and (3) a hybrid
model (the rest of the country), which combines wholesale power markets
managed by ISOs with retail service provided by IOUs through regulated
monopoly franchises.6
One advantage of this diversity is the opportunity for policy innovation.
Contrary to the standard view of utility regulation as static, reactive, and un-
53. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905
(establishing an exemption under PUHCA for "exempt wholesale generators," defined as
entities engaged exclusively in the sale of electricity at wholesale, in order to facilitate the
growth of independent power producers); id. § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915 (amending section
211 of the Federal Power Act to allow wholesale generators to apply to FERC for an order
requiring that transmission owners provide transmission service to applicants); id. § 722, 106
Stat. 2776, 2916 (amending section 212 of the Federal Power Act to require that rates,
charges, terms, and conditions for transmission service provided under section 211 are just
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential); FERC Order No. 888,
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21, 540, 21,541-21,543 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (summarizing final rules designed to require open access non-
discriminatory transmission service in order to promote competitive wholesale power markets).
54. See Paul L. Joskow, The Di/ficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United
States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 32 (Griffin & Puller
eds., 2005) (noting that by 2000 about twelve states had begun to implement retail
competition and another twelve states had announced plans to do so).
55. For a map of states that have adopted some form of retail choice, see Status ofElectricity Restructuring
by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/
restructuring/restructure elect.html.
56. For a map of current regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system
operators (ISOs), see Regional Transmission Organizations, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus -act/rto.asp (last updated Dec. 12, 2013).
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imaginative, both FERC and a number of state PUCs have been quite active
in developing new policies to facilitate various low-carbon technologies and
practices and to modernize the grid in ways that can accommodate more variable-
and distributed-energy resources. PUCs, for example, have used a range of
tools to channel investments across a portfolio of generation resources, in-
cluding low-carbon alternatives; have adjusted tariff structures to facilitate
conservation, efficiency, demand response, and distributed generation; and
have experimented with efforts to modernize local distribution systems." At
the same time, FERC, together with the regional transmission organizations
(RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs), has pursued a number of
important and innovative initiatives in the organized wholesale markets, including
efforts to integrate variable renewable resources, promote demand response,
and facilitate long-term regional transmission planning and cost allocation."
Rather than seeing the diversity of institutional forms and regulatory struc-
tures that currently prevails in the United States as a liability, then, it seems
more productive to view it as a source of new ideas and practices.
D. The Challenge ofDecarbonization
Efforts to decarbonize the electric power sector are proceeding along
multiple pathways, with many possible scenarios regarding the future organi-
zation of the system. Although there is no consensus on what such a system
will or should look like, several recent studies have identified as a benchmark
an 80 percent reduction of power-sector GHG emissions by 2050.5 While
some envision a large build-out of utility-scale renewables and other forms of
low-carbon generation to replace the current fleet of centralized, fossil-generating
57. See discussion infra Part III.
58. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 764, Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg.
41,482 (July 13, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (amending scheduling and
interconnection rules and transmission tariffs to remove barriers to integrating variable
energy resources); FERC Order 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized
Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(amending rules to promote integration of demand response into wholesale power markets);
FERC Order 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug.
11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (amending rules to require regional transmission and
cost allocation processes).
59. See REINVENTING FIRE, supra note 20, at 169 (presenting multiple scenarios for the power
sector including 80 percent renewables by 2050); RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES
STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 27 ("At 80% renewable electricity in 2050,
annual generation from both coal-fired and natural gas-fired sources was reduced by about
80%, resulting in reductions in annual greenhouse gases of about 80% (on a direct
combustion basis and on a full life cycle basis) .... ).
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plants,60 others see a more distributed scenario with both residential and non-
residential customers increasingly embracing rooftop solar and other forms of
distributed generation integrated into the grid through a system of advanced
meters and a more intelligent distribution system.1 Virtually all scenarios fo-
cus on the significant potential of efficiency and demand response to reduce
or flatten out load curves and thus avoid building new generation. And all of
them acknowledge the tremendous challenges of getting from here to there.63
Although speculation about the precise future organization of a low-
carbon power sector is beyond the scope of this Article, it is probably safe to
say that any such future will include a mix of utility-scale generation based on
renewables, nuclear, and fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, together
with increasing penetration of distributed generation, demand response, and
storage.64 However it comes to be organized, it seems fairly obvious that the
60. See, e.g, RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
20, at iii ("The central conclusion of the analysis is that renewable electricity generation from
technologies that are commercially available today, in combination with a more flexible
electric system, is more than adequate to supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generation in
2050 while meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every region of the United
States.").
61. See REINVENTING FIRE, supra note 20, at 202-11 (presenting 2050 power sector scenario
based on extensive penetration of distributed energy resources).
62. See, e.g., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note
20, at 23 (reporting that in the core 80 percent renewable energy by 2050 scenarios, "28-48
GW of demand-side interruptible load were deployed in 2050, compared with just 15.6 GW
deployed in 2009").
63. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Renewable Electricity Futures Study
estimated average annual renewable capacity additions of nineteen to twenty-two gigawatts
per year from 2011-20, rising to a maximum of thirty-two to forty-six gigawatts per year
from 2041-50. This represents a substantial increase over recent renewable electricity
capacity additions of eleven gigawatts in 2009 and seven gigawatts in 2010. See id. at 19.
64. For nuclear power and coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), the basic economics are
extremely challenging in a world of cheap natural gas. See, e.g., Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for
Nuclear Pozwer, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 49-50 (2012) (discussing economic challenges facing
nuclear power in current environment of cheap natural gas); Mathew Wald, With Natural Gas
Plentiful and Cheap, Carbon Capture Projects Stumble, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2013, at B3
(discussing challenges posed by cheap natural gas to carbon capture and storage projects).
According to several recent studies, CCS is still a decade or more away from commercial-
scale deployment and such deployment will likely depend on a relatively high price of carbon.
See Howard J. Herzog, Scaling Up Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, 33 ENERGY ECON.
597, 599-600 (2011) (reviewing recent studies finding that carbon prices of $60-65 per
metric ton of C02 will be needed to make coal fired power plants with carbon capture and
storage economically viable). Both of these technologies, moreover, will likely only be viable
in traditional cost-of-service states with generous rate-based incentives such as construction
work in progress and automatic prudence determinations. See, e.g., Mathew L. Wald, Giant Holes in
the Ground, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/featured
story/421399/giant-holes-in-the-ground ("It is not coincidental that what signs of life the
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complexity associated with efforts to integrate an increasingly diverse, and in
many cases variable, set of resources will only increase. This will reinforce rather
than dispense with the need for careful coordination and planning.65
This is especially true in a scenario of high penetration of low- to medium-
voltage distributed-energy resources, which will require advanced systems to
manage bidirectional power flows across local distribution systems.6 Indeed,
contrary to our intuitions, a more decentralized power system in which con-
sumers play a more active role on both the generation and the load side may
actually require more planning and coordination than one built around large,
centralized, utility-scale systems.7
Building a low-carbon electric power system will also require enormous
investment. Any effective institutional framework for managing this transi-
tion will need to mobilize substantially increased amounts of capital. It also
seems likely that the resulting system will have a higher capital intensity than
the current system. On the generation side in particular, renewables, nuclear
power, and fossil generation with carbon capture and storage are all more capital-
intensive (that is, they have a higher fixed to variable cost ratio) than the current
fleet of coal and gas plants, in which a substantial share of the cost of electrici-
ty is driven by fuel costs. This has significant implications for efforts to finance
such investments. Specifically, it increases the relative importance of the cost
of capital, which puts a premium on stability of future revenues in order to
ensure cost recovery and thereby keep financing charges down. As discussed
industry shows in the United State are mostly in the South, where so-called "cost-of-service"
regulation guarantees some profit.").
65. RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at
22-24 (noting the additional challenges to power system planning and operation that arise in
a high renewable electricity future).
66. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE INTEGRATED GRID: REALIZING
THE FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 28-29 (2014)
(noting the additional systems operation challenges associated with increased penetration of
distributed energy resources and need for more coordination and planning); NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, Staff Report and
Proposal, CASE 14-M-0101 (Apr. 24, 2014), at 22 [hereinafter NY DPS, REFORMING
THE ENERGY VISION] ("The widespread integration of DER [distributed energy resources]
will present new complexities and challenges to the continued reliable supply of electricity.
Relatively predictable, one-way power flows within distribution systems required less
sophisticated system monitoring and power flow management ools. In an enhanced grid,
however, power flow will be bi-directional. Energy supplies will come from multiple new
technologies, and various sources, of varying sizes and capabilities. Such changes will cause
more complex challenges at the local level relating to network power flows, electrical
constraints, voltage fluctuations, and reactive power characteristics.").
67. To be sure, one of the chief advantages of smart grid and related technologies is that they
allow much of the coordination and systems operations needed to integrate more distributed
resources into the grid to be automated. See REINVENTING FIRE, supra note 20, at 206-07.
1634
Public Utility
in more detail below, this raises questions about the viability of current elec-
tricity market designs to incentivize the proper levels of investment.
II. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
Investigating the relevance of the public utility concept for efforts to de-
carbonize the power sector requires an understanding of how the concept has
changed over time. This Part begins with a discussion of earlier conceptions
of public utility, as articulated most forcefully by Progressive lawyers and legal
scholars, legal realists, and institutional economists in the early twentieth cen-
tury. It pays particular attention to the broader normative agenda advanced
by these early proponents of public utility and its potential to generate new
ideas and approaches in the face of new challenges. Key elements of this ear-
lier conception of public utility include the recognition that certain types of
businesses hould be subject to regulation in the public interest, that competi-
tion should be viewed as a tool rather than an end state, and that the entire
undertaking of public utility regulation should be considered experimental
and open to new pathways and possibilities. Most importantly, public utility
was seen as a common, collective enterprise aimed at managing a series of vital
network industries that were too important to be left exclusively to market
forces.
That said, it is also true that the early proponents of public utility were
well aware of the problems manifest in the actual practice of utility regulation.
They recognized that rent seeking, regulatory capture, and overinvestment
posed important challenges to the success of public utility regulation.69 They
bemoaned the lack of adequate resources, the dearth of qualified personnel,
and the ongoing "judicialization" of the utility commissions.70 They also rec-
ognized that competition could be an important tool to discipline certain aspects
of the industry and to advance the public interest within a broader understanding
68. See discussion infra Part III.A.
69. See, e.g., HAMILTON, POLITICS OF INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 59-62 (discussing general
problem of regulatory capture); Robert L. Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30
YALE L.J. 710, 720-21 (1921) [hereinafter Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy] (discussing
problem of "extravagantly incurred costs" in rate regulation).
70. See, e.g.,William E. Mosher, A Quarter-Century ofRegulation by State Commissions, 14 PROC.
ACAD. POL. Sci. 35, 39-45 (1930) [hereinafter Mosher, A Quarter-Century of Regulation]
(discussing problems of underfunding, lack of qualified personnel, and judicialization in state
public utility commissions).
1635
61 UCLA L. REv. 1614 (2014)
of public utility." And they were skeptical of full government ownership of
utilities, recognizing that important gains could come from harnessing the
power of private enterprise toward public ends.72
Although their criticisms anticipated many of those advanced by a later
generation of economists and lawyers writing in the 1960s and 1970s, they
were never intended as a wholesale assault on the concept itself in the manner
of these subsequent critiques. As this Part shows, that critique, along with
the challenges to public utility regulation that stemmed from the exhaustion
of economies of scale in generation, the prolonged energy crisis of the 1970s,
and rising environmental concerns, resulted in a much narrower conception of
public utility. This diminished understanding of public utility in turn provided
much of the conceptual and normative framing for efforts to deregulate the
sector in the 1990s as well as more recent arguments by the proponents of dis-
tributed generation and other potentially disruptive technologies that the
time has come to abandon the traditional utility business model. As noted
above, this narrowed understanding does not comport with the current
makeup and trends in the electric power sector. Nor does it provide an ade-
quate basis for planning and executing substantial decarbonization by
midcentury.
A. Public Utility, Public Interest, and Social Control of Business
The modern usage of "public utility" dates from the late nineteenth cen-
tury, but it was not until the early twentieth century that the term became
embedded in American law.73 The U.S. Supreme Court's famous decision in
71. See CLARK, supra note 2, at 168 ("As a weeder-out of inefficient concerns and methods,
competition works wonders, rendering a service which we should be very slow to undertake to
do without.").
72. See Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy, supra note 69, at 717 (characterizing rate regulation of
public utilities as a "regulatory experiment" that deserved a "fair trial as a substitute for
government ownership and operation"). But see RICHARD THEODORE ELY, STUDIES IN
THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 225-42 (1903) (discussing advantages of
municipal ownership of public utilities over public regulation of private corporations). Ely
was a leading proponent of municipal ownership of public utilities in the early twentieth
century and had an important influence on his student, John R. Commons, who drafted a
"public ownership" provision into the Wisconsin Public Utilities Act of 1907. After evidence
of widespread corruption in municipal governments came to light, however, Ely, along with
other supporters of muncipalization, switched to support regulation by independent
commission. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGE 148-59 (1998) (discussing Ely, Commons, and the early twentieth
century muncipalization movement).
73. See Hamilton, Pnce--By Way ofLitigation, supra note 14, at 1030 n.47 (discussing "etymological
fortunes of the concept 'public utility"). As Hamilton elaborated, "[t]he word 'utility,' of
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Munn v. Illinois74 is generally viewed as the progenitor of modern public utility
law in the United States." Reaching back to Lord Hale's sixteenth- century
treatise on seaports, Munn held that when property is "affected with a public
interest" it is subject to regulation "and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good."6 Applied to the facts of that case, in which a
group of Chicago grain elevators had secured control over much of the Mid-
western grain trade, the Court upheld a Granger-inspired Illinois statute that
set the prices they could charge." In doing so, the Court begged the question
of when other types of property (other businesses) were affected with a "public
interest" sufficient to support price regulation-a question that the Court
struggled with for the next half century."
From the beginning of this long quest, judges and commentators em-
phasized the ambiguous nature of the term "public interest" and the many
challenges of trying to define a category ofbusinesses o "affected with a public in-
terest" that they should be subject to regulation.79 In 1934, the Supreme
course, comes out of economics; the 'public' is the 'public' of the old police power, as in
'public morals,' 'public health,' 'public safety,' and 'public welfare.' As late as the [1870s] it
was used as a correlative of 'the common good.' . . . The law on the subject was long in the
making before it was garnered into the category of public utility. It seems high time for a
restoration of the accent to the first word." Id.; see also MARTIN G. GLAESER, PUBLIC
UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM 195-200 (1957 (discussing origins of public utility
concept in the early church doctrine of a "just price" for certain kinds of goods and services
and in the Medieval notion of "common callings," which referred to certain businesses that
made their services available to all).
74. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
75. Id
76. Id. at 126.
77. Id at 135-36.
78. The standard interpretation of Munn viewed it as a conservative opinion that limited
regulation to only those businesses so "affected with a public interest,"thus inhibiting
regulation of other businesses. Id. at 126. But see Novak, supra note 2, at 401-04 for a
revisionist view of Munn as an expansive and innovative approach to regulation in the public
interest.
79. In his dissenting opinion in a 1923 case involving the possible regulation of movie theatre
ticket prices, Justice Holmes pointed out the futility of such efforts:
[T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest and has been de-
voted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is
disagreeable to the sufferers. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to com-
pensation when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any
business when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it.
Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see also id at 451 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("The phrase 'business
affected with a public interest' seems to me to be too vague and illusory to carry us very far on
the way to a solution."). Prominent legal realists such as Walton Hamilton and Robert Lee
Hale agreed. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept,
22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 212 (1922) ("The advantages which various businesses possess
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Court finally abandoned the effort, extending the possibility of price regula-
tion to all businesses in Nebbia v. New York.so In dispensing with the need to
define which businesses were "affected with a public interest" and thus ame-
nable to rate regulation, Nebbia made clear that distinctions between public
utilities and other businesses no longer served any purpose as a standard for
determining when regulation was appropriate." With the Court finally out
of the business of trying to determine which businesses could be subjected to
price regulation, legislatures were free to move forward in regulating any and
all businesses as long as they could show some rational basis for the regulation."
In the meantime, a robust body of law had developed around the concept of
public utility and the role of public utility commissions (PUCs) in regulating
rates charged by these businesses. Indeed, notwithstanding the doomed ef-
forts of the Supreme Court to define a category of businesses "affected with a
public interest," these public utilities had long been viewed as appropriate for
price regulation because of their overall importance to the economy and their
distinctive economic characteristics. As Felix Frankfurter put it in 1930, "[tjo
think of contemporary America without the intricate and pervasive systems
which furnish light, heat, power, water, transportation, and communication,
is to conjure up another world. The needs thus met are today as truly public
services as the traditional governmental functions of police and justice.""
What was distinctive in an economic sense about these industries were
their high fixed-capital requirements (electric power has long been the most
capital intensive sector of the U.S. economy), substantial economies of scale,
and extensive reliance on a network infrastructure that was expensive to build
cannot be classified into those peculiar to utility companies on the one hand, and those
common to everyone else on the other."); Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation With Public
Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1111 (1930) (arguing against a "categorical approach" to
businesses affected with a public interest and concluding that the "control of price, like
authority in other industrial affairs, becomes a question of general regulation"); see also
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 165-75 (1998) (discussing criticisms
mounted by Hale, Hamilton, and others of the notion that certain businesses were "affected
with a public interest" and thus amenable to price regulation).
80. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
81. Id at 536 ("It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a
public interest . . .. The phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of things,
mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public
good.").
82. See FRIED, supra note 79, at 175 ("After Nebbia, the Court never again interfered with a
legislature's decision about which enterprises were regulable.").
83. FRANKFURTER, supra note 1, at 81.
1638
Public Utility 1639
and maintain.84 Together, these characteristics facilitated what economists
since the late nineteenth century had referred to as "natural monopoly"-the
basic idea being that because of declining average costs across the relevant
demand curve, the industry was served most cost-effectively by a single firm."
As a result, the antitrust laws were not particularly effective in policing the ex-
ercise of market power and trying to impose remedies that would restore
multifirm competition." Rate regulation thus provided an alternative means
of regulating those sectors of the economy that were seemingly beyond the
full reach of the antitrust laws."
As a species of common carriers, railroads provided the first major op-
portunity to experiment with rate regulation." Over time, it became apparent
that natural gas, electricity, and telephone service exhibited similar character-
istics. During the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, local govern-
ments struggled with how to regulate these emerging network industries-with
84. See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 463-65 (summarizing key features of large regional electric
power systems that emerged in the United States and other western countries during the half
century between 1880 and 1930); JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS
OF OVERHEAD COSTS 318-22 (1923) (discussing distinctive economic characteristics of
utilities, including large investments in highly specialized assets and substantial "economies of size").
85. See PAUL J. GARFIELD & WALLACE F. LOVEjOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 15-19
(1964) (discussing historical understandings of the natural monopoly characteristics of public
utilities); see also JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 31, at 33 ("Traditionally the
production of electric power has been considered to have pervasive natural monopoly
characteristics.").
86. See, e.g., Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17
HARV. L. REV. 156, 163 (1904) (observing that with respect to the "troublesome problem of
the public utilities, . . . experience has shown that . . . many of the public works can be
conducted with advantage only upon the basis of exclusive franchise" and concluding that "it
is necessary for the perpetuity of competitive conditions in general, that, in the particular
instances of monopolistic conditions, the state should proceed to establish a legal monopoly
and then apply to that situation such strict regulation as the exigency demands"); see also
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 158 (1982) (describing the classical
view of regulation as "an alternative to antitrust, necessary when antitrust cannot successfully
maintain a workably competitive marketplace of when such a marketplace is inadequate due
to some other serious defect").
87. Of course, the antitrust laws have long been held to apply to certain forms of anti competitive
behavior engaged in by regulated public utilities. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1972) (concluding that the Federal Power Act did not
immunize Otter Tail power from regulation under the antitrust laws for its refusal to deal
with municipal utilities).
88. SeeJohn R. Commons, The Wisconsin Public- Utilities Law, 36 AM. REV. REVIEWS 221, 221
(1907) [hereinafter Commons, Wisconsin Public- Utilities Law] (discussing the importance of
the Wisconsin Railroad Law of 1905 in establishing "the principle of regulation through a
commission appointed by the Governor" that was subsequently applied in 1907 to "other
public utilities"); Dimock, supra note 2, at 266 ("[T]he regulation of railways ... furnished
the real institutional foundation for both British and American public utility regulation.").
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some opting for competition among firms for limited municipal franchises
and others seeking outright public ownership.89 State regulation emerged
around the turn of the century as a third alternative, gaining momentum with
the establishment of state railroad commissions in several states.90
Beginning with New York and Wisconsin in 1907, regulation by state
commission spread rapidly across the country in a "veritable epidemic of
laws."91 Ten years later, twenty-four states had enacted public utility legislation.92
By 1930, every state but Delaware had a public utility statute that charged
some type of administrative entity with responsibility for regulating public
utilities such as water, gas, and electricity.93 These were quintessential Progressive-
era laws, built on principles of scientific management and regulation by experts.94
Statutory mandates were typically broad and open-ended, founded on the
goal of ensuring that rates were just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in or-
der to strike the appropriate balance between ratepayers and investors.95 Given
89. See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development ofElectric Potoer Regulation, in THE
END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 43, 46-61 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003)
(discussing the municipalization movement at the turn of the century and the move to
regulation by state commissions); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL
POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 130-59 (1998) (discussing the Progressive era
movement for municipalization).
90. See Bradley, supra note 89, at 48-50; Forrest McDonald, Samuel Insull and the Movement for
State Utility Regulatory Commissions, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 241, 247-51 (1958).
91. Mosher, A Quarter-Century of Regulation, supra note 70, at 35, 36 (1930); Massachusetts
established its own independent Gas and Electric Commission in 1885, more than twenty
years before the Wisconsin and New York statutes. See MARTIN G. GLAESER, OUTLINES
OF PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 235 (1927) (discussing Massachusetts Gas and Electric
Commission established in 1885). See also RODGERS, supra note 89, at 155 (describing
spread of public utilities laws during early twentieth century as a "legislative fad"). It is
important to recognize, however, that there was considerable diversity regarding jurisdiction
and substantive authority to regulate various types of public utilities across the different
states. See generally William E. Mosher, Defects of State Regulation of Public Utilities in the
United States, 201 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCl. 105 (1939) [hereinafter Mosher,
Defects of State Regulation] (discussing the differences among states regarding the regulation
of public utilities).
92. See GARFIELD &LOVEJOY, supra note 85, at 33.
93. See id at 32-33. But see Mosher, Defects of State Regulation, supra note 91 (discussing the wide
variation among state public utility laws regarding scope and authority of the state commissions).
94. See, e.g., FINLA G. CRAWFORD ET AL., ELECTRICAL UTILITIES: THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC
CONTROL 35 (William E. Mosher ed., 1929) ("When it was inaugurated, commission
regulation was hailed as the introduction of 'scientific' methods and as the beginning of an era
of control which would be definite, precise and eventually almost automatic.").
95. See, e.g., Eugene A. Gilmore, The Wisconsin Public Utilities Act, 19 THE GREEN BAG 517,
517-18 (1907) ("The object of the [Wisconsin Public Utilities Act] is to secure adequate
service from all public utilities under conditions which are fair and reasonable, not only to the
public, but also to the corporations concerned .... ).
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the existence of widespread corruption in many municipal governments and
constant logrolling in the state legislatures, independent commissions staffed
with experts were viewed as the most effective means of achieving this balance
and securing the benefits of natural monopoly for consumers.9 6
Widely considered the strongest of the early public utility statutes, the
Wisconsin law was drafted by John R. Commons, a student of Richard Ely
and a leading scholar in the field of institutional economics.9 7 Key features
included mandatory universal service at reasonable rates, protected local fran-
chises, delegated powers of eminent domain, a cost-based "used and useful"
standard for valuing assets as part of rate base, a uniform system of accounting,
and commission powers of investigation and adjudication.98 Together with
96. See RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS, supra note 89, at 155 ("It was the experience of
democratized corruption that ultimately made the expert regulatory commission idea so
attractive-beyond its handiness and familiarity, beyond the utility companies' sub-rosa
promotion of it, beyond the dynamics of a legislative fad."); John R. Commons, How
Wisconsin Regulates Her Public Utilities, 42 AM. REV. REVIEWS 215, 215 (1910) [hereinafter
Commons, How Wisconsin Regulates Her Public Utilities] (noting the "elasticity" or
"adjustability" of the Wisconsin law which "[i]nstead of laying down rigid rules, as has been
customary, . . . creates a commission and staff of scientific investigators . . . [who] are
commanded to 'investigate and ascertain' for each public utility what is the 'reasonable value'
of the service which it renders to the public" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
97. Commons and others viewed public utility as one of the core concerns of institutional
economics. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 327-
29 (1924) [hereinafter COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM] (discussing
broad concept of public utility, its relation to "the public," and its application to particular types of
businesses); John R. Commons, Institutional Economics, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 237, 242 (1936)
("[I] nstitutional economics is the field of the public interest in private ownership .... ). For
an earlier statement on institutional economics and its attention to problems of social control
in modern industrial society, see Walton H. Hamilton, The InstitutionalApproach to Economic
Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309, 312-14 (1919). See also Malcolm Rutherford,
Understanding Institutional Economics: 1918-1929, 22 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 277, 299
(2000) ("Public utilities, including issues relating to the valuation of utility property and the
proper basis for rate regulation, were major areas of institutionalist research.").
98. See Commons, How Wisconsin Regulates Her Public Utilities, supra note 96, at 216 (discussing
Wisconsin approach to valuation of utility assets, described as "physical valuation," which he
defines as "nothing more or less than the cost of construction or reconstruction of the
physical property"); Commons, Wisconsin Public- Utilities Law, supra note 88, at 222-24
(discussing key features of the Wisconsin law); George B. Hudnall, The Public Service
Commission Law of Wisconsin, 4 PROC. AM. POL. SC. ASS'N. 316 (1907) (elaborating on key
features of the Wisconsin law). In a 1923 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, drawing
on the work of Robert Lee Hale, interpreted the statute as requiring an approach to rate base
valuation that gave controlling weight to the "prudent investment" standard. Waukesha Gas
& Elec. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 194 N.W. 846, 854 (1923) ("In determining the
present fair value of a public utility operating under our public utility law, it is our view that
justice as well as sound economic practice requires that controlling weight should be given in
the valuation of the plant of a public utility to the investment cost where the investment has
been prudently made."). Hale wrote his dissertation on Wisconsin's approach to valuation
and ratemaking. See MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, THE INSTITUTIONALIST MOVEMENT IN
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California and New York, Wisconsin was seen as a leader in public utility
regulatory practice and a model for other states. The commitment to a pro-
fessional regulatory effort in other states, however, was not always taken as se-
riously as the Progressive architects of the Wisconsin and New York laws
would have hoped.99 All too often, "regulatory commissions served as dumping
grounds for political hacks and cronies of the governor."0 0
For their part, industry executives and managers generally supported
regulation by commission as a means to avoid municipal ownership, which
was gaining momentum at the turn of the century, and to secure capital on favora-
ble terms.0 ' This last point is particularly important and has recently been
elaborated by economic historians.0 2 Because of the capital-intensive nature
of the electricity industry, utilities were historically unable to finance new cap-
ital investment through the equity markets or their annual cash flow, forcing them
AMERICAN ECONOMICS, 1918-1947: SCIENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL 234 (2011). On
the importance of a uniform system of accounts as a basis for effective regulation in the
Wisconsin law, see CHARLES MCCARTHY, THE WISCONSIN IDEA 192 (1912) ("We
cannot attempt to regulate railroads or great public utilities unless our public service is in itself
so organized that it has a thorough understanding of the intricate systems of cost accounting
and efficiency used by these great economic units."); see also Jay H. Price, Jr. et al., Accounting
Uniformity in the Regulated Industries, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 824, 830-36 (1965)
(discussing the history of efforts to establish a uniform system of accounts as a basis for public
utility regulation).
99. Many Commissions were plagued by lack of financial support, inadequate personnel, and an
ongoing judicialization of basic tasks. See Mosher, Defects ofState Regulation, supra note 91,
at 107 (detailing problems with PUC regulation and concluding that "probably no commission in
the United States is adequately financed to carry on the broad range of duties prescribed in the law").
100. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 243 (1984); see also Felix Frankfurter
& Henry M. Hart, Jr., Rate Regulation, in THE CRISIS OF7THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 1,
16 (Paul W. MacAvoy ed., 1970) ("But in the main the public interest has suffered from too
many mediocre lawyers appointed for political considerations, looking to the Public Service
Commission not as a means for solving difficult problems of government but as a step toward
political advancement or more profitable future association with the utilities. As a result,
there has been inequality in expertise, in will, and in imagination between the utilities and the
regulatory bodies.").
101. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 23-24 (discussing utility industry support for regulation by state
commissions and its importance in lowering financing costs); FORREST MCDONALD,
INSULL: THE RISE AND FALL OF A BILLIONAIRE TYCOON 113-32 (1962) (discussing
Samuel Insull's leadership in mobilizing support among utility executives for regulation by
state public utility commission).
102. Cf William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State
Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1069 (2002)
("The historical record of the process that culminated in state regulation of electric utilities
suggests that reduced borrowing costs was a primary reason utility companies, with
prominent leaders such as Samuel Insull leading the way, came to embrace regulation."). But
see Thomas P. Lyon & Nathan Wilson, Capture of Contract? The Early Years ofElectric Utility
Regulation, 42 J. REG. ECON. 225, 239 (2012) (finding no support for the conclusion that
state regulation resulted in a stronger propensity to invest on the part of electric utilities).
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to rely instead on long-term debt financing.103 The threat of municipalization
on the one hand and the lack of a protected franchise on the other made it
difficult for utilities to access the capital markets on favorable terms. Rate
regulation, with its promise of guaranteed rates and protected franchises, provided
a new level of certainty that allowed them to do so.104
At its core, public utility regulation thus provided a means for utilities to
secure capital at lower cost and to channel it into very large technological sys-
tems.'o In short, it was a way to socialize the costs of building and operating
a centralized electricity grid while protecting consumers from the potential
abuses associated with natural monopoly. In return for an exclusive franchise,
the right of eminent domain, and an ability to sell electricity at reasonable
rates, electric utilities would provide reliable, universal service and forgo some
of the profits that might be attainable in the absence of regulation.06
Regulation of these private enterprises was therefore seen, at least in
part, as an antidote to the market failures that were associated with the natural
monopoly characteristics of these industries. The objective of cost-based reg-
ulation was to mimic as closely as possible the outcomes (that is, the prices)
103. See Hausman &Neufeld, supra note 102, at 1053 (noting that electric utilities could not fund
investments out of retained earnings).
104. Id. at 1051 ("Regulation reduced the risk of investing in an electric utility, thus making utility
bonds and stocks more attractive, increasing the availability of capital, and lowering its price.").
105. Id.; see also HUGHES, supra note 16, at 364-65 (discussing substantial demands for capital by
the electric power industry in the 1910s and 1920s).
106. This was the basis for what has sometimes been referred to in more recent years as the
"regulatory compact." See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring) ("The utility business
represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a particular geographical area
(coupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain or condemnation) is granted to the
utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien
to the free market. . . . Each party to the compact gets something in the bargain. As a general
rule, utility investors are provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely to be
attained in the unregulated or moderately regulated sector; in turn, ratepayers are afforded
universal, non-discriminatory service and protection from monopolistic profits through
political control over an economic enterprise." (citation omitted)); see also J. GREGORY
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY
CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 101 (1998) ("State public utility regulation of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution .. . represents a contract between the state and the regulated
company. The economic functions of the regulatory contract, as well as the legal duties and
remedies associated with it, are identical to those of a contract between private parties.").
The concept became an important element of the restructuring debate, particularly with
respect to the ability of utilities to recover stranded costs. See, e.g., James Boyd, The
"Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs Be Recoverable?, 19
ENERGY J. 69, 72-73 (1998) (discussing different views of the "regulatory compact" in the
context of stranded costs).
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attainable in competitive markets in order to ensure that a vital public service
was provided on reasonable terms.0 ' For the supporters of free enterprise,
this form of managed capitalism-public regulation of private business-was
preferable to the model of outright government ownership that European
governments were adopting and that had always operated on the margins in
the United States with municipal utilities and other forms of public power.08
But the practice of rate regulation was easier said than done, and the Su-
preme Court had made it far more difficult than it needed to be with its 1898
decision in Smyth v. Ame.109 By advancing a constitutional duty to determine
the fair value of a utility's assets as a basis for setting rates, Smyth v. Ames put
the courts, rather than legislatures and regulatory commissions, at the center
of the effort to establish rates. For almost fifty years, despite withering criti-
cism of the circularity of the fair value rule, courts struggled to police the
107. As Justice Brandeis put the matter: "The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility,
that its charges to the public shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute for the State
in the performance of the public service; thus becoming a public servant. The compensation
which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of
conducting the business." Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
262 U.S. 276, 290-91 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108. See Dimock, supra note 2, at 267 ("In most countries outside of the United States regulation
is unimportant because the great majority of public service undertakings are owned in whole
or in part by government subdivisions.").
109. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The Court's tortured efforts to police ratemaking and to determine fair
value plunged the judiciary, and the commissions that sought to demonstrate fidelity to the
constitutional directives fashioned by the Court, into what Justice Frankfurter called a "maze
of cobwebbery." FRANKFURTER, supra note 1, at 104. With the Great Depression and the
dramatic decline in the value of utility assets, the futility of trying to articulate the proper
course of determining fair value as a basis for rates began to give way to a focus on the end
result rather than the method used. For, as Justice Brandeis and other prominent legal
scholars pointed out, the notion of fair value was circular: How could one determine the fair
value of the enterprise as a basis for setting rates when the value of the enterprise depended
on the discounted present value of future revenues, which were themselves wholly dependent
on the rates charged? See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The rule of Smyth v.Ames sets
the laborious and baffling task of finding the present value of the utility. It is impossible to
find an exchange value for a utility, since utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not
commonly bought and sold in the market. Nor can the present value of the utility be
determined by capitalizing its net earnings, since the earnings are determined, in large
measure, by the rate which the company will be permitted to charge, and thus, the vicious
circle would be encountered."); Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy, supra note 69, at 716
("[T]here are authorities who admit that the value depends upon the earnings, but insist that
the vicious circle involved (in basing the earnings on the value) can be escaped merely by the
simple expedient of measuring the value by replacement cost or some other 'evidence'! Like
ostriches, they imagine that by blinking the fact they can escape its consequences."); Gerard
Henderson, Raikay Valuation and the Courts (pt. 3), 33 HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (1920)
("[A]s a matter of economic and legal theory the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames is fallacious and
fair value a juristic illusion . . . .").
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methodology of ratemaking.1 o Writing in dissent in a 1935 case regarding tele-
phone rates, Justice Stone described the effort as "the most speculative under-
taking imposed upon [courts] in the entire history of English jurisprudence."1
In 1944, the Supreme Court extricated the judiciary from reviewing the
methodology of ratemaking, relegating the courts to the more appropriate
role of policing the constitutional boundaries of the end result." In embracing a
more pragmatic approach to ratemaking, the Court put the Federal Power
Commission and state regulatory commissions back in control over the specifics
of rate regulation. As Robert Lee Hale observed, the Court had finally "freed
regulation from the obligation to perform the costly and meaningless rituals
of Smyth v. Ames."1 1 3
But even with the fifty-year detour into the "gigantic illusion" that attended
efforts to determine fair value finally at an end, it was still all too easy to get
lost in the technical details of ratemaking and to lose sight of the broader im-
portance of public utility regulation.114 The lingering effects of Smyth v.
Ames, manifest in the judicialization of Commission activity and attention to
the adjudicatory function of PUCs, displaced the more affirmative functions
of planning and creative policymaking.15
Viewed in broader terms, however, rate regulation represented an unprece-
dented experiment in the social control ofbusiness and nothing less than a revision
110. The challenges of determining fair value were widely viewed during the 1920s and 1930s as
one of the major obstacles to effective regulation by public utility commissions (PUCs). See,
e.g., Mosher, Defects of State Regulation, supra note 91, at 108 ("There is no gainsaying the
fact that next to the need for professionalization of commissions and the inadequacy of funds,
the major obstacle to regulation in the United States is the utter unworkability of methods of
determining the fair value of properties for rate making purposes."); Henderson, supra note
109, at 1053 (arguing that utility regulation must be freed from "the vague constitutional
fetters which the courts have woven about the subject").
111. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Baltimore, 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting). The Wisconsin Supreme Court offered a similar lament in a 1923 case on rate
base valuation under the Wisconsin public utilities law. See Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v.
R.R. Comm'n, 194 N.W. 846, 850 (1923) (describing the effort to determine "fair value" as
"one of the most complex and involved subjects with which courts are called upon to deal").
112. Fed. Power. Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("Under the
statutory standard of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the method employed
which is controlling.").
113. Robert L. Hale, Utility Regulation in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM. L.
REV. 488, 530 (1944).
114. See Henderson, supra note 109, at 1051 ("The whole doctrine of Smyth v. Ames rests upon a
gigantic illusion. The fact which for twenty years the court has been vainly trying to find does
not exist. 'Fair value' must be shelved among the great juristic myths of history, with the Law
of Nature and the Social Contract. As a practical concept, from which practical conclusions
can be drawn, it is valueless.").
115. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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of received understandings of property. 'We are experimenting with a legal
curb on the power of property owners," Robert Lee Hale wrote."' "In applying
that curb," he continued,
we have to work out principles or working rules-in short a new
body of law. Those principles will necessarily differ from the ones
upon which the law acts in other fields-for in other fields it acts
on the assumption that whatever income a property owner can get
without fraud by virtue of his ownership is legitimately his. In the
utility field, standards of what is proper for an owner to get out of
his ownership have to be worked out de novo.11 7
Elsewhere, Hale characterized utility regulation as a "regulatory experiment"
that deserved a "fair trial as a substitute for government ownership and opera-
tion.""' John Commons described Wisconsin's public utility law of 1907 in
similar terms; its approach to rates was designed to be "elastic enough to offer
the opportunity for ingenuity and experiments that may combine the princi-
ple of State regulation with that of private enterprise."119 Walton Hamilton
likewise saw the determination of rates as part of a broader program "for
the control of industry" that could hardly be "plucked from the air or conjured
out of any system of accounts."120 Rather, it could only emerge through
116. Hale, supra note 79, at 213.
117. Id Hale went on to note that this experiment could be extended to other fields: "The
revision of property rights worked out within the utility field may very well serve as a model,
wherever applicable, for the revision of other property rights; but what the law still allows
elsewhere is no proper guide in formulating this new code." Id
118. Robert L. Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy, supra note 69, at 717.
119. Commons, Wisconsin Public- Utilities Lazw, supra note 88, at 223. Commons was referring
specifically to provisions in the law that allowed for "'sliding scale,' profit-sharing, or other
devices" to maintain incentives for "enterprise and initiative" on the part of the utility
companies. Id. See also Gilmore, supra note 95, at 523-24 (identifying the provision of the
Wisconsin Public Utilities Act that allowed for sliding scale rates and division of surplus
proceeds between the utility and its customers as "[olne of the most important and
characteristic features of the Act and one which has great possibilities in it for securing
energetic and progressive management of public utilities"). This was an early example of
what has more recently been characterized as incentive or performance-based regulation.
Louis Brandeis was an important early proponent of the sliding scale approach to setting
railroad rates. See GERALD BERK, LOuiS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED
COMPETITION, 1900-1932, at 82-84 (2009) (discussing Brandeis's proposal for the sliding
scale approach to rates).
120. Hamilton, Price-By Way ofLitigation, supra note 14, at 1031. Hamilton was well aware of
the challenges facing rate regulation and the need for innovations to ensure that public
utilities would face the right incentives. See id ('The invention of devices of protection and progress
would, under the most favorable circumstances, tax the intellectual resources of regulatory
bodies to the very limit. Their creation has been almost enjoined by the conventional stress upon
the value of property.").
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"experimentation."' "The way of its making," he continued, "is that of trial and
error."' For Hamilton, utility regulation was part of "a developing pro-
gram" in which the content of the approach would come not "by way of fact and
logic" but instead from "what it is expected to do" as "an instrument of the com-
monwealth."123
Writing at roughly the same time, Felix Frankfurter reflected that public
utility law had "made possible, within a selected field, a degree of experimen-
tation in governmental direction of economic activity of vast import and beyond
any historical parallel."124 More recently, William Novak has argued that the
"legal invention of the idea of the public utility" was "a perfect example of the
creative force of law in the construction of the American regulatory state."2
With this "new political machinery" combining legislative, executive, and judicial
functions in an independent commission, the American experiment in social
control of business entered new territory. 1 2 6
The broad concept of public utility advanced by progressives and legal
realists thus embodied a pragmatic approach to competition and markets in
an era of rapid industrial change-something they shared with institutional
economists such as Clark, Commons, and Veblen.12 ' As Hamilton put it:
The competitive system is no longer to be regarded as an automatic,
self-regulating mechanism; like any other human institution it may
work poorly, indifferently, or well: it produces very different results
in different industries. In its wake may come disorder as well as
order, waste as well as efficiency, unfair as well as reasonable prices.12 8
"A newer and more realistic conception of competition," he concluded, "sug-




123. Id at 1034, 1036.
124. Novak, supra note 2, at 404 (quoting Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Rate
Regulation, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 104,104 (1934)).
125. Id at 399; see also id. at 399-400 ("[P]rogressives viewed the law of public utilities as a vibrant
and expansive arena for experimenting with unprecedented governmental control over
business, industry, and the market."); FRIED, supra note 79, at 160-204 (discussing the
efforts of Hale and others in the area of rate regulation of public utilities).
126. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 1, at 88-89.
127. See Rutherford, supra note 97, at 297-99 (discussing the institutionalist approach to
competitive markets and its dose relationship to views of legal realists such as Hale and Hamilton).
128. Hamilton, supra note 79, at 1108-09.
129. Id at 1109.
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Ordered change in an economy that was under the "joint sovereignty of
market and state" was the goal.130 The idealized vision of competitive markets
that would provide the motive force for the Chicago critique in coming dec-
ades was a myth according to the realists. Put simply, competition was not an
end in itself There was no a priori state of nature in which competitive mar-
kets flourished, no pre-political form of economic organization. Sometimes
competition worked, but other times it did not. Like rate regulation, compe-
tition was a tool that could be deployed by regulators in appropriate contexts
to achieve broader public policy goals.131 This view comported with the more
general idea that legal and economic institutions were all mixed up together,
part of a larger "industrial system" (a favorite phrase of Hamilton's), which
should be directed toward social welfare in the broadest sense. As Hamilton
stated near the end of his career, "[a]ll industries are, in their several degrees, in-
struments of the general welfare; where there is failure in performance, the
call is for statecraft."132
At the heart of the more expansive conception of public utility developed
by the realists and institutionalists was a de-physicalized view of property that
drew directly on the pioneering work of Wesley Hohfeld.13 3 Conceived as a
bundle of entitlements, public utility embodied a set of relationships that
would structure a series of vitally important network industries in the context
of a rapidly changing economy.134 Such "complex [forms of] property" com-
bined public and private in new ways, with no logical, predefined method for
130. Id. at 1110.
131. CLARK, supra note 2, at 131 ("Evidently the public cannot afford to rest upon a simple belief
that all competition is good. The situation requires careful differentiation between types of
competition, coupled with wise restraints temperately exercised."); HAMILTON, POLITICS
OF INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 167 ("As large an area of the industrial system as possible
should be left to the competitive regime. Where it needs to be helped over the hard places or
superseded by another method of control, the case needs to be clear.").
132. HAMILTON, POLITICS OF INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 18.
133. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-30 (1913) (developing analytical scheme of
"fundamentaljural relations" to be used in disaggregating forms of property and other complex legal
interests).
134. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 160-64 (1992) (discussing influence of debates over
rate regulation and valuation on a new, de-physicalized view of property); John R. Commons,
Laz and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371, 375-76 (1924) (discussing Hohfeldian concept of
property "as a complex set of acquired rights, of imposed duties, and of permitted liberties
and exposures" and its central importance to, among other things, the regulation of public
utilities); Hale, supra note 79, at 213-14 (discussing rate regulation in context of Hohfeld's
conception of legal entitlements).
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effecting that combination.135 Pragmatic adjustment defined the overall approach.
"The relation between the public utility and the community," wrote Gerard
Henderson, "cannot be expressed in terms of a simple, quantitatively ascer-
tainable fact, for the relation involves numerous and complex factors which
depend on compromise and practical adjustment rather than on deductive
logic."136 As Walton Hamilton put it: "[the rate-structure of an [sic] utility is
an aspect of public policy; it is an expression of what the community, acting
through the legislature, commission, and court, expects it to do."'3 ' Public
utility was, to use John Commons' terminology, a particular type of "going
concern" subject to special duties precisely because of its distinctive relationship to
the public.138
In practice, of course, the record of public utility regulation was mixed,
and Progressives, realists, and institutional economists were as quick as anyone to
criticize the poor performance of PUCs in carrying out their duties. Understaff-
ing, inexperience, and a lack of adequate financial resources were endemic to
many commissions.13 The ongoing judicialization of public utility regula-
tion, resulting in part from the multidecade struggle to make sense of fair value,
detracted from the more creative and proactive responsibilities of the com-
135. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
See also Henderson, supra note 109, at 1056 ("Property engaged in an enterprise of which the
earnings depend on state regulation is, however, in its nature different from property of the
usual kind. It has voluntarily surrendered its value as ordinary private property.').
136. Henderson, supra note 109, at 1051.
137. Hamilton, Price-By Way ofLitigation, supra note 14, at 1029.
138. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 97, at 327-29 (discussing
complex of rights and duties inhering in public utility and its relationship to "the public");
GLAESER, supra note 91, at 102-25 (discussing public utilities as going concerns). Glaeser
was a student of John R. Commons and, like Commons, a professor of economics at the
University of Wisconsin. Although Commons's writings on the subject of going concerns are
not always clear, Commons employed the concept to refer to various organized forms of
collective action of which the businesses categorized as public utilities could be considered a
particular type. The general aim was to move beyond a view of the economy founded on
individual actors or organizations toward a broader, relational understanding of collective
action as instantiated in particular types of enterprises or undertakings. According to
Commons, "the true unit of economic theory is not an individual but a going concern
composed of individuals in their many transactions as principal and agent, superior and
inferior, employer and employee, seller and customer, creditor and debtor, bailor and bailee,
patron and client, etc." See Commons, Lazw and Economics, supra note 134, at 375.
Commons goes on to note in the same article that Hohfeld's analysis of jural relations "is of
universal application to all going concerns." Id.
139. See, e.g., Mosher, Defects of State Regulation, supra note 91, at 106-07 (discussing problems
confronting state public utility commissions including inexperience of commissioners,
insufficient funding, and lack of qualified personnel).
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missions, forcing them to play the role of arbiter between ratepayers and utili-
ties rather than acting as advocates for the public.140
Still, it is important to emphasize that the underlying concept of public
utility as advanced by Progressives, legal realists, and institutional economists
had certain features that transcended the problems of practical application,
providing a basis for new pathways and possibilities. Specifically, these lawyers
and economists saw public utility less as an object of regulation (a class of
businesses to be regulated) than as a common, collective enterprise directed at
the social control of business. Public utility in this sense was first and foremost a
normative undertaking rather than a technical way of regulating a certain kind
of activity.141 In targeting new forms of economic power-new industries that
provided much of the infrastructure for modern industrial capitalism-public
utility regulation was of a piece with the broader effort aimed at devising
working rules for the social control of business, an exercise viewed as much in
social and political terms as in economic ones.
As part of a positive program of institutional development focused on
devising tools to solve problems of social control, public utility regulation was
thus intended to be open-ended, provisional, and experimental. The connec-
tion with John Dewey's pragmatism was manifest in all of this.142 In fact,
140. See, e.g., Mosher, A Quarter-Century of Regulation, supra note 70, at 43 (discussing major
functions of commissions to protect the public interest and to adjudicate rate cases and noting
that "[t]he judicial function has encroached upon, if it has not practically supplanted, that of
public defender"); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Government Regulation ofPublic Utilities, 30 PROC.
ACAD. POL. SCI. 44, 45 (1971) ("The Public Service Commission, therefore, was created in
the days of Governor Hughes to act not as a court between the public on one side and the
utility companies on the other, but to act definitely and directly for the public, as the representative
of the public and of the Legislature, their sole function being to supervise the utilities
themselves under definite rules."). See also ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 2 at 86-92 (1988 [1971]) (discussing
ways in which the increased adjudicatory role of regulatory commissions undermines broader
legislative and executive functions).
141. See GLAESER, supra note 91, at 216 ("It is an institution not solely of economic significance
but also one of large political importance; for while, on the one hand, it is concerned with the
material needs of individual economic life, it serves, on the other hand, to strengthen and
make possible socioeconomic life. Out of its institutional character arises the public interest
in its maintenance and development. From this point of view, the term public utility does not
refer to any specific industry but is used as a collective name for an entire group of industries.
It becomes a highly abstract conception of certain relationships, embracing certain definable
rights and duties.").
142. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 202-03 (1954) ("[P]olicies and
proposals for social action should be treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly
adhered to and executed. They will be experimental in the sense that they will be entertained
subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they entail when acted
upon and subject to ready and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences."); see
also William H. Simon, The Institutional Configuration ofDewveyan Democracy, 9 CONTEMP.
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Dewey himself made recourse to Hale's writings on rate regulation in work-
ing out his own understanding of judgment and experimental knowledge.143
And it is in this sense as well that public utility represented a legal and policy
innovation of the first order. There was no fixed set of understandings or re-
ceived wisdoms regarding how it would or should evolve. It was, and always
would be, a work in progress. By necessity, it would change and adapt over
time in response to new circumstances.
B. Economic Critiques of Public Utility
Although the public utility concept had its critics from the beginning
(on both the left and right),144 professional economists and a few economically
minded lawyers mounted a vigorous and sustained critique of public utility
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s that transformed the concept. To these
critics, many of whom were affiliated with the University of Chicago, rate
regulation, or what was sometimes broadly construed as economic regulation,
was considered anathema to the principles of market competition. The technical
criticisms that stemmed from the rigorous application of marginalist econom-
ic principles and early conceptions of public choice complemented a broader
ideological agenda that sought to stop a rapidly growing regulatory state from
extinguishing economic liberty.145
Boiled down to its essentials, the critique consisted of several key points.
First, these critics challenged the theory of natural monopoly as an ongoing
PRAGMATISM 5, 12 (2012) (discussing Dewey's commitment to a provisional, experimental
approach to policy and governance).
143. See John Dewey, Valuation and Experimental Knozledge, 31 PHIL. REV. 325, 341-42 (1922)
(discussing rate regulation as example of "experimental" judgment and citing Hale's article,
Rate Regulation and the Revision ofthe Property Concept). Dewey and Hale were colleagues at
Columbia University.
144. See, e.g., Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB.
UTILITY ECON. 8, 12-13 (1940) (arguing public utility regulation had created an effective
means for regulated electricity companies to block municipal ownership and rural
cooperatives).
145. See, e.g, MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM28 (1962) (concluding "reluctantly"
that of the three alternatives available to deal with natural monopoly-private monopoly,
public monopoly, or public regulation-"private monopoly may be the least of the evils");
ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION 152-85 (2012) (discussing the historical
development of Friedman's views on regulation and their relationship to earlier views of
Hayek and other members of the Mount Pelerin society); DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF
FRACTURE 60-62 (2011) [hereinafter RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE] (discussing the
Chicago school critique of public utility regulation).
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rationale for regulation.146 Changing economic and technical conditions
made the category itself inherently unstable, if not altogether useless. And
even for those firms operating in industries with natural monopoly characteristics,
it was not dear that they would be able to capture monopoly rents on a sustained
basis.147 Second, in contrast to the notion that utility regulation emerged in
response to the public interest, economists such as George Stigler advanced a
public choice, or capture, explanation, which held that regulated entities ac-
tively sought regulation and used it for their benefit.148 Public utility regulation was
thus a product of rent-seeking behavior on the part of regulated firms; the idea of a
general public interest was tenuous at best.149 Third, economic models and subse-
quent empirical research indicated that firms operating under regulatory con-
straints had an incentive to overinvest in their rate base, thus raising costs and
destroying consumer welfare (the so-called Averch-Johnson effect).50
146. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 59 (1968) ("The
natural monopoly theory provides no logical basis for monopoly prices. The theory is
illogical. Moreover, for the general case of public utility industries, there seems no clear
evidence that the cost of colluding is significantly lower than it is for industries for which
unregulated market competition seems to work. To the extent that utility regulation is based
on the fear of monopoly price, merely because one firm zill serve each market, it is not based on
any deducible economic theorem."); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation,
21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 635 (1969) ("Our analysis of proposals for reforming public utility
regulation confirms our preliminary conclusion that its contribution to social and economic
welfare is very possibly negative. The benefits of regulation are dubious, not only because the
evils of natural monopoly are exaggerated but also because the effectiveness of regulation in
controlling them is highly questionable.").
147. See Posner, supra note 146, at 636 ("But natural monopoly conditions are quite likely to be
transient. . . . To embrace regulation because an industry is today a natural monopoly and
seems likely to remain so is to gamble dangerously with the future. To impose regulation on
the basis of a prophecy that the industry will remain monopolistic forever may be to make the
prophecy self-fulfilling."); id. at 643 ("In the long run, there may be few natural monopolies,
perhaps none, such is the pace of change in consumer taste and in technology in a dynamic
economy.").
148. See George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3,
3 (1971) ("[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit."); see also Jim Rossi, Public Choice, Energy Regulation and
Deregulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 419,
421-22 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (discussing the capture
theory of regulation advanced by Stigler and others and its applicability to electricity
regulation).
149. See Greg A. Jarrell, The Demandfor State Regulation ofthe Electric Utility Industry, 21 J. LAW
& ECON. 269, 271-72 (1978) (criticizing public interest theory of state public utility
regulation and arguing instead that regulation emerged to serve the interests of utilities).
150. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint,
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962) (concluding that firms operating under rate-of-
return constraint of price control have an incentive to substitute capital for other factors of
production "in an uneconomic fashion that is difficult for the regulatory agency to detect").
Their thesis has since been memorialized as the Averch-Johnson effect.
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The general conclusion that emerged from these critiques was straight-
forward and devastating: Regulation did more than harm than good."' Even
in cases of natural monopoly, it was preferable to leave the market alone rather
than try to correct for market failure or remedy the abuses of market power
with regulation.5 2 In fact, according to one study, there was no evidence that
regulation actually had any demonstrable positive effect in reducing electricity
prices when compared to the alternative.153 Moreover, the pathologies of rate
regulation-as manifest in the Averch-Johnson effect and the inevitably of
capture-meant hat even if the regulatory enterprise itself was born of noble
intentions, it was sure to result in diminished social welfare.154
151. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 146, at 625 ("[T]he social gain from public utility and common
carrier regulation is quite possibly negative.").
152. Demsetz advocated subjecting monopoly franchises to competitive bidding, with the
franchise awarded to the bidder offering to provide service at the lowest price. See Demsetz,
supra note 146, at 56-62. But, as has been pointed out by Oliver Williamson and others,
Demsetz's proposal ignores many crucial details regarding utility assets (physical and human),
the contracting arrangements necessary to facilitate his scheme, and the asset valuation
problems that inhere in any scheme to transfer utility property. As Williamson argues,
because of the inefficiencies associated with building duplicate utility systems (one of the
features of natural monopoly in the utility sector), the transfer of utility assets between
successive franchisees would devolve into a process that resembles public utility regulation,
specifically in the valuation of assets necessary to facilitate the transfer. See Oliver E.
Williamson, Franchise Biddingfor Natural Monopolies-in Generaland With Respect o CATV, 7
BELL J. ECON. 73, 78, 85 (1976) (taking Demsetz to task for dismissing as "irrelevant
complications" the issues of equipment durability and uncertainty and noting that "franchise
bidding for public utility services under uncertainty encounters many of the same problems
that the critics of regulation associate with regulation"); id. at 85-87 (discussing the asset
valuation problems with the franchise bidding scheme and concluding that "the valuation of
physical assets is predictably more severe under franchise bidding than under regulation"); see
also JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 31, at 31 (following Williamson and noting that
"in most situations the administration of long-term contracts negotiated as a result of
franchise bidding degenerates into a process that resembles public utility regulation. This is
more likely to happen the more important are the supplier's long-lived investments that
cannot easily be transferred to other uses. Such investments are important in the electric
power industry."). Posner advocated for removal of restrictions on entry and lifting of rate
controls combined with a tax on excess profits to mitigate against monopoly rents. See
Posner, supra note 146, at 639-40. But see Harry M. Trebing, Realism and Relevance in Public
Utility Regulation, 8 J. ECON. ISSUES 209, 219 (1974) (criticizing Posner's excess profits tax
proposal on grounds that "[i]f the excess profits tax is set too high, it will produce all of the
waste and inefficiency attributed to cost-plus regulation; if it is set too low, it will have only
salutary effects. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that such a tax ultimately would be
shifted forward to the consumer and that the rate would be either too low to be bothersome
or high enough to be the subject of continuous adjudication and revision.").
153. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, Wfat Can Regulators Regulate? The Case ofElectricity, 5
J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1962) (concluding that regulation of electric utilities had no detectable
effect on the average level of electricity rates).
154. See, e.g., Paul M. Hayashi &John M. Trapani, Rate of Return Regulation and the Regulated
Firm's Choice of Capital-Labor Ratio: Further Empirical Evidence on theAverch-Johnson Model,
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Little of this critique was especially new. Much of the early twentieth-
century writing on public utilities discussed the problem of capture."' Insti-
tutional economists and legal realists such as Commons and Hamilton were
well aware of the problem, but were nuanced enough in their appreciation for
the complexity of the real economy and the role of government therein that
they would never have proposed this as a single overarching explanation for
the experiment of public utility law, much less as a reason to abandon the ef-
fort."' During the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, several left-leaning historians
argued that Progressive era legislative reforms such as public utility regulation
epitomized the corporate control of government."' To be sure, by the middle
decades of the twentieth century, anecdotal evidence suggested that capture
did in fact represent a semi-stable end state for all too many commissions.5
Nonetheless, such evidence could hardly be considered the single explanation
for why regulation emerged when it did and took the form that it did.159 Nor
42 S. ECON. J. 384, 397 (1976) (using a cross-section sample of electric utility firms to
provide empirical support for Averch-Johnson effect that firms operating under ate of return
regulation will produce with a capital-labor ratio greater than the cost minimizing one);
Robert M. Spann, Rate ofReturn Regulation and Efficiency in Production:An Empirical Test of
the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 38, 50 (1974) (reporting results
of empirical study of regulated electric utilities confirming Averch-Johnson thesis that firms
subject to rate of return regulation will "overcapitalize"). But see Paul L. Joskow & Roger C.
Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION
1, 10-14 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981) (criticizing assumptions of Averch-Johnson model and
studies purporting to demonstrate empirical support for the model); JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 31, at 86 (noting lack of empirical support for the Averch-Johnson effect and
observing that during late 1970s and early 1980s rate-of-return regulation was having the
opposite effect with utilities "avoiding making socially desirable capital expenditures" because
expected rates of return were below their costs of capital).
155. See, e.g., Edwin C. Goddard, The Evolution and Devolution ofPublic Utility Law, 32 MICH.
L. REV. 577, 619 (1934) (discussing the common charge "that commissions have gradually
developed into utility-owned bodies").
156. See, e.g., HAMILTON, POLITICS OF INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 59-62 (discussing general
problem of "regulation in captivity"); Commons, Wisconsin Public- Utilities Law, supra note
88, at 222 ("Nearly every State commission created in other States to regulate corporations
has sooner or later fallen under the control of corporations supposed to be regulated.").
157. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 3 (1963) ("It is business control over politics (and by
'business' I mean the major economic interests) rather than political regulation of the
economy that is the significant phenomenon of the Progressive Era."); see also William J.
Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 26-32 (Daniel
Carpenter &David A. Moss eds., 2014) (discussing intellectual history of the "capture thesis").
158. See, e.g., James W. Fesler, The Independence ofState Utility Commissions, II, 3 J. POLITICS 42,
66 (1941) (reviewing state utility commission behavior and concluding that "[i]ndependence
of utility commissions ... is an illusory will-o'-the-wisp").
159. George Priest made this point in his critique of the Stigler/Posner thesis advancing a
"capture" theory as the explanation for utility regulation. See George L. Priest, The Origins of
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could it be taken as the inevitable result of any such effort to regulate these
types of businesses.
Likewise, the perverse incentives that resulted from the actual practice of
rate regulation were well known to the realists and others. Robert Lee Hale,
for example, identified the problem of "extravagantly incurred" costs as part of
a more general criticism of an "actual cost" approach to rate base valuation,
arguing instead for a prudent investment standard that, however imperfect,
provided a possible check on the utility incentive to overinvest in rate base.'60
John Commons, too, had long supported a cost-based approach to assessing
rate base, a uniform system of accounting for utility assets, and full public dis-
closure of utility investments.' Many public utility statutes, including Wis-
consin's, had also adopted a "used and useful" requirement for assets placed in
rate base.' Thus, even if the tendency to overinvest was not modeled with
the authority of Averch-Johnson, most people understood that rate-regulated
utilities sometimes had an incentive to "gold plate" their rate base and thereby
inflate the rates they could charge. Regulators, too, were hardly unaware of
Utility Regulation and the "Theories ofRegulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 323 (1993)
("The search for a single theory of regulation ... does not illuminate regulatory behavior....
[T]he assertion that an agency has been 'captured' by a utility or is serving that utility's
economic interests necessarily is too crude a depiction of the regulatory relationship."). For a
more recent critique of public choice theory, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 3 (2008)
(arguing that public choice theory "rests on a seriously incomplete and undertheorized
understanding of regulatory government, and . . . that its empirical predictions are not
supported by careful consideration of the evidence about how regulatory agencies operate or
what they do").
160. See Hale, The 'Physical Value" Fallacy, supra note 69, at 720-21; Hamilton, Price-By Way of
Litigation, supra note 14, at 1035 ("The attention of management has been riveted upon the
problem of the rate-base; its augmentation has become a conscious end of policy. The
energy, thought, and initiative which in many another industry is directed to the elimination
of waste, the advancement of technology, and the enlargement of markets is in the utilities
spent in a continuous act of pecuniary creation.").
161. See, e.g., Commons, Wisconsin Public-Utilties Law, supra note 88, at 222 (discussing the
"physical valuation" basis for establishing rates under the Wisconsin statute that, when
combined with a system of uniform accounting and full public disclosure, would allow "every
person in the State [to] know at the end of each fiscal year exactly the rate of profit which
each company has made on its actual property invested").
162. See, e.g., Sec. 1797m-5, Wisconsin Public Utilities Law, 1907 LAWS OF WISCONSIN 448, 450
(1907) ("The commission shall value all the property of every public utility actually used and
useful for the convenience of the public."); Gilmore, supra note 95, at 519 ("The expression
'actually used and usefil for the public convenience' was selected after much consideration.... [T]he
purpose of the clause is to require the Commission to ascertain the existing valuation of all
property actually used for the public, and the requirement of 'useful' for the convenience of
the public was designed to eliminate from the valuation losses due to economic inefficiency,
extravagant or bad management, improvident construction or excessive original cost, superceded
or antiquated equipment.").
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this problem and endeavored (albeit unevenly and with varying degrees of
success) to develop principles and practices to mitigate such tendencies.163
What was different about Averch-Johnson and the other criticisms
mounted by the economists, however, was the normative force that lay behind
them. By making the pathologies of rate regulation seem like the inevitable
outcome of the regulatory model itself rather than the more mundane result
of how well the regulators did their job, they reinforced a naturalized view of
markets as superior to government regulation. In effect, the conceptual models
developed to understand certain aspects of firm behavior under a set of highly
stylized constraints came to be taken as accurate representations of what was
actually going on with regulated utilities in the real world.164
This is not the place to rehearse every feature of these critiques. And
even if some of the criticisms were exaggerated, it is clear that many of them
had merit and comported with long-standing concerns. The point here is to
emphasize the effects of the overall critique on the general understanding of
public utility. More than anything else, what resulted from the sustained
economic criticisms of public utility was a substantial thinning of the concept.
By taking public utility out of the broad normative context that legal realists
and early institutional economists investigated, and by and stripping it down
to its bare-boned economic features, the post-1960 economic critique made it
into something that could be modeled under the strict parameters of neoclas-
sical economics and held up by lawyers and economists as an example of the
endemic problems afflicting government regulation and the concomitant su-
periority of markets.
As part of a broader trend that elevated idealized conceptions of com-
petitive markets by detaching them from their historical and institutional
contexts, the economic critique worked to redefine public utility as a perverse and
wasteful economic form that almost inevitably resulted in the destruction of
163. See Joskow & Noll, supra note 154, at 14 ("Recent efforts by state utility commissions to
monitor utility supply decisions more closely recognize implicitly that rate-of-return
regulation may produce incentives that lead a firm to depart from least-cost production in a
variety of ways, especially in the current economic environment.").
164. See Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation and its Application to Electricity Netzoorks, 7 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 547, 549 (2008) (This theory [(the Averch-Johnson model)] ignores many attributes of real
regulatory institutions and it has little if any empirical support, but for many years it was 'the'
positive theory of regulation."); Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291, 293 (1974)
[hereinafter Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern] ("[the Averch-Johnson model]
does not capture the essence of the regulatory process and as a result may lead to incorrect
predictions of static and dynamic efficiency. More importantly it is useless for predicting
changes in regulatory techniques and their associated effects.").
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consumer welfare."' Of course, comparing an ideal view of markets to real-
world regulation was never going to go in regulation's favor and, as noted,
there were plenty of problems with existing practices of utility regulation to
provide fodder for these critics.'66 It is somewhat puzzling, nonetheless, that
the reductionism and resulting separation of economics from history, institutions,
and the exercise of social power that allowed the economic critique to stand
up has been able to exert such influence for so long.' Gone was any appreci-
ation for the challenge of engaging with the complexity of the real economy,
with all of its legal and institutional nuances, that an earlier generation of
economists and lawyers had taken as their starting point.' Lost, perhaps
165. See RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 145, at 47 ("By the end of the 1970s, a new
idea of the market, cut free from the institutional and sociological relationships constitutive of
earlier economic analysis-from Ricardo's great economic 'classes,' from Marshall's tangibly
imagined Manchester cotton exchange, from Samuelson's government macroeconomic
stabilizers-was being called on to do unprecedented amounts of thinking. Under the skin of
an old word, something quite new had indeed emerged."). Rodgers goes on to note that the
"most dramatic instance of the new authority of market models came in public utility law"
and elaborates on how the economists embrace of competitive markets led to a broad
deregulatory movement. Id at 60-63.
166. Cf Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern, supra note 164, at 292 (discussing Averch-
Johnson and other studies seeking "to compare the 'regulated' world with an ideal competitive
world" and noting that such "work often suffers because of an incomplete development of the
actual process of regulation that is being evaluated, comparisons with competitive ideals
which are not actually feasible alternatives, and a failure to deal with the distributional
consequences of regulation in a satisfactory fashion").
167. See RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 145, at 43, 76.
168. See COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 97 at 387 ("Economic
theory, in avoiding ethical notions of purpose, has usually assumed that it is the business of
those working rules which we name 'the law,' to eliminate the unethical attributes of
transactions, such as fraud, violence, coercion, deception, and has then operated with the
abstract notions of utility and exchange.... Yet in a science of human transactions there is no
clear dividing line between utility, sympathy and duty, between economics, ethics and law.");
Hamilton, supra note 97, at 311 ("'Institutional economics' alone meets the demand for a
generalized description of the economic order. Its claim is to explain the nature and extent of
order amid economic phenomena, or those concerned with industry in relation to human
well-being. . . . Such an explanation cannot properly be answered in formulas explaining the
processes through which prices emerge in a market. Its quest must go beyond sale and
purchase to the peculiarities of the economic system which allow these things to take place
upon particular terms and not upon others. It cannot stop short of the study of conventions,
customs, habits of thinking, and modes of doing which make up the scheme of arrangements
which we call the 'economic order.' It must set forth in their relations one to another the
institutions which together comprise the organization of modern industrial society.").
Although the theoretical project of institutional economics certainly did not have the
elegance or simplicity of formal neoclassical theory, criticisms of the "institutional school" as
hostile to theory seem a bit unfair. George Stigler, for example, was unsparing in his critique:
"I would say the institutional school failed in America for a very simple reason. It had nothing
in it except a stance of hostility to the standard theoretical tradition. There was no positive
agenda of research, there was no new set of problems or new methods they wanted to
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forever, was any sense of the creative force of law and the potential for inno-
vative forms of public utility regulation as part of a broader agenda aimed at
harnessing the power of private enterprise to public ends. Henceforth, com-
petitive markets would be viewed by advocates of deregulation as the goal toward
which reform of public utility regulation should aim.
C. Technical Limits, Energy Crises, and Environmental Concerns
At the same time that the Chicago School economists were mounting
their critique of public utility regulation, the electric power sector was undergoing
a fundamental technological shift and facing a series of external crises that
raised very real questions about the viability of the investor-owned utility
(IOU) business model. First, by the 1960s, economies of scale in power gen-
eration had been exhausted.169 This meant that the industry would no longer
be able to build ever-larger plants to capture these economies and deliver de-
clining prices to consumers. Second, the oil embargos and associated energy
crises of the 1970s translated into higher fuel costs, which meant higher elec-
tricity prices, a growing emphasis on conservation and efficiency, and slower
growth in electricity demand.170 Third, mounting concerns about the envi-
ronmental impacts of power generation combined with the new environmental
laws of the 1970s made it easier for opponents of large power generation facil-
ities to slow or stop new projects and to impose expensive new pollution control
requirements, creating additional, unanticipated costs for many utilities.
Together, these three developments put enormous strain on electric util-
ities. For the first time in years, electricity rates started to rise and utilities
invoke." See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth.:A Remembrance ofLazo and Economics at
Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J. LAW ECON. 163, 170 (1983) (quoting Stigler). One is reminded
of Ronald Coase's response to an earlier and somewhat similar criticism of "the baleful
influence of American institutionalists" on the state of economic theory: "I would like to say
that we have less to fear from institutionalists who are not theorists than from theorists who
are not institutionalists." Ronald H. Coase, Discussion: Regulated Industries, 54 AM. ECON.
REV. 192, 196 (1964).
169. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 55-58 (discussing exhaustion of economies of scale in power
generation in the 1960s); Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 151 (noting that by
1970 "productivity growth resulting from fuller exploitation of economies of scale, better
coordination, and technological innovation stagnated").
170. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 58-63 (discussing impacts of the energy crisis on the electric
power industry); Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 149-50 (discussing economic
shocks of the 1970s and their impact on fuel costs for the power industry).
171. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 63-68 (discussing impacts of environmental movement on the
electric power industry); Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 149 (noting that "new




found themselves in a defensive posture with respect to ratepayers and a larger
environmental movement that was gaining momentum."' As a result of the
energy crises of the 1970s, which translated into rising costs and an increased
emphasis on conservation and efficiency, utilities could no longer count on
the consistent demand growth that they took for granted during the long
post-World War II economic boom.173 The world had changed.
It soon became apparent that the declining costs of previous decades had
worked to hide past sins."4 In a world where prices kept going down, regula-
tors and ratepayers did not need to worry as much about the details of utility
investments and the specifics of rate cases. But as costs rose and prices began
to increase, heightened regulatory scrutiny and increasing advocacy on the
part of ratepayers uncovered problems of overbuilding, the perverse incentives
of rate design, and the lack of sustained attention to smaller scale and even
non-generation alternatives in evaluating utility investments. This was per-
haps most apparent in the abandonment of several high-profile nuclear power
plants and subsequent battles during the 1980s over the disallowance of bil-
lions of dollars of utility investments.1
Of the policy responses to these developments, none would prove to be
more influential (though not without controversy) in the ensuing decades
than the obscurely named Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). 6
As a central component of President Jimmy Carter's response to the energy
crisis of the 1970s, PURPA did several important things. It directed state
PUCs to consider replacing declining block rates, in which rates decline as
electricity use increases above certain thresholds, with new rate designs that
172. See Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 152-55 (discussing rising prices and
increased regulatory scrutiny of utilities in 1970s).
173. Id, at 150-51 (discussing significant reductions in the rate of growth in electricity demand
during the 1970s, resulting in substantial excess generating capacity and adding to growing
demands for regulatory reform).
174. See, e.g., Lave et al., supra note 12, at 11 (noting that the defects of rate-of-return regulation
"had been hidden by rapidly evolving generation technology that continually lowered
generation costs").
175. See BINZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 26 ("Between 1981 and 1991, U.S. regulators disallowed
about $19 billion of investment in power plants by regulated utilities. During this time, the
industry invested approximately $288 billion, so that the disallowances equated to about 6.6
percent of total investment. The majority of the disallowances were related to nuclear plant
construction, and most could be traced to a finding by regulators that utility management was
to blame." (citation omitted)); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of
Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 497-98,
500-02 (1984) (discussing problems of overbuilding in the electric power industry in the 1970s).
176. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (Nov. 9, 1978)
[hereinafter PURPAl.
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would incentivize conservation and efficiency."' It established rules for the
interconnection and wheeling of wholesale power over neighboring sys-
tems."' And, most significantly, it required utilities to purchase power at
their "avoided cost" from certain qualifying facilities (QFs), namely small co-
generation and renewable energy facilities. 179
One historian has argued that PURPA's QF requirements and wheeling
provisions were the seeds that blossomed into full-blown competitive wholesale
power markets in the 1990s, which in turn hastened the end of the older
"public utility consensus" in favor of a new regulatory model that embraced
competition."so What PURPA did most fundamentally, however, was to
harness the power of the public utility model to advance a larger set of policy
objectives. Indeed, each of the innovations noted above, as well as those that
were enacted in later years (such as integrated resource planning and net me-
tering..) depended not on getting rid of public utility regulation but on
channeling it in new directions. These were exactly the kinds of innovations
in regulatory design that the earlier realists and institutional economists
would have celebrated, and they are better seen as extensions of the public
utility model rather than as inadvertent moves toward deregulation.
There was also considerable innovation in the responses of state legisla-
tures and PUCs to the events of the 1970s. Specifically, a number of states
adopted conservation and efficiency programs and initiated integrated re-
source planning exercises to replace the older approach to evaluating generation
alternatives with a broader effort that assessed non-generation alternatives
such as conservation and demand-side management.' Certain states, such
177. Id §§ 111-112.
178. Id §§ 202-204.
179. Id § 210.
180. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 119 ("Through its mostly unintended consequences, PURPA
inaugurated the process by which the traditional structure of the utility system disintegrated.").
181. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) amended PURPA to encourage Integrated
Resource Planning (IRP) processes that would count investments in non-generation
alternatives on an equal footing with new generation. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-486, § 111(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 2795 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
2621(d)(7)-(9) (2012)); see also discussion infra Part III.A. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct 2005) established net metering standards. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-58, § 1251(a), 119 Stat. 594,962 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(11)-(13) (2012)).
182. See Cynthia Mitchell, Integrated Resource Planning Survey: Where the States Stand, 5 ELEC. J.
10, 13 (1992) ("A fundamental premise of IRP [integrated resource planning] has been that
DSM [demand side management] represents both a cost effective and underutilized resource
alternative."); Ralph C. Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and
their Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 299, 327-28 (1986) (discussing efforts by U.S.
states to integrate conservation in resource planning exercises).
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as California, also adopted generous contract provisions to compensate QFs
pursuant to PURPA, which gave the nascent renewable power industry in
that state a boost.183
And yet, notwithstanding the innovations that PURPA embodied and
the efforts by various states to adapt utility regulation to new circumstances,
the concept of public utility continued to suffer in the face of an ongoing econom-
ic crisis that some blamed on overregulation-all of which served to reinforce
the general criticisms advanced by the Chicago School economists and other
advocates of regulatory reform.184 In fact, it is at least arguable that these crit-
icisms benefited as much from these external developments as from the force
of the criticisms themselves. In matters of critique, timing can sometimes be
as important as substance. At a minimum, it seems doubtful that these criti-
cisms would have gained as much traction as they did had economies of scale
not been exhausted, the energy and environmental crises of the 1970s not oc-
curred, and prices continued to come down.
D. Deregulation and the Uneasy Embrace of Competition
By the 1990s, in the wake of several successful efforts to deregulate other
sectors of the economy (trucking, airlines, banking, natural gas, and tele-
communications), there was a concerted move at federal and state l vels to in-
troduce competition to various parts of the electric power industry.8
Building on the forces unleashed by PURPA (both in stimulating independ-
ent power producers through its QF requirements and in taking the first steps
toward open access transmission), Congress and, more importantly, FERC
moved to further unbundle power generation from transmission and to estab-
lish an open-access, common carrier regime for interstate transmission that
183. See HIRSH, supra note 39, at 96-98 (discussing California qualifying facilities contracts);
Ryan Wiser et al., Renewable Energy Policy and Electricity Restructuring: A California Case
Study, 26 ENERGY POL'Y 465, 469 (1998) [hereinafter Wiser et al., California Case Study]
("In response to [PURPA], California developed several 'standard offer' contracts that were
open to renewable and cogeneration powerplants. Because of high fuel costs forecasts at the
time, some of these contracts proved very lucrative in hindsight.").
184. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 175.
185. Two legal scholars concluded that the move to deregulate common carriers and public
utilities, which they described as "[t]he great transformation in regulated industries law,"
marked a shift from "hostility to competition to the maximum promotion of competition[,]"
with regulatory agencies moving from a posture of industry oversight to "ensure reliable and
uniform service[]" to a "primary role ... as the facilitator of competition." See Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1408-09 (1998).
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would allow competitive wholesale power markets to flourish."' Although
FERC ultimately failed in its effort to extend this model to the whole country,8
large sections of the country did embrace the general model, while others (notably
the Southeast and much of the West) stayed with the traditional vertically in-
tegrated cost-of-service model. Writing at the time, two law professors
framed the choice confronting the country as nothing less than one between
markets and central planning,' and it is surely somewhat ironic that many of
the states that have stayed with the "central planning" model are those with
popular majorities that are generally skeptical of government regulation.
Perhaps the road to serfdom is not always apparent o those who are traveling
on it. 189
186. See e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905
(establishing an exemption under PUHCA for "exempt wholesale generators," defined as
entities engaged exclusively in the sale of electricity at wholesale, in order to facilitate the
growth of independent power producers); id. § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915 (amending section
211 of the Federal Power Act to allow wholesale generators to apply to FERC for an order
requiring that transmission owners provide transmission service to applicants); id. § 722, 106
Stat. 2776, 2916 (amending section 212 of the Federal Power Act to require that rates,
charges, terms, and conditions for transmission service provided under section 211 are just
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential); FERC Order No. 888,
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541-543 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (summarizing final rules designed to require open access non-
discriminatory transmission service in order to promote competitive wholesale power
markets).
187. See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). This came to be known as Standard Market Design (SMD)
rulemaking. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) terminated the rulemaking in
2005 in response to pressure form Congress, which was considering multiple draft provisions
as part of EPAct 2005 that would have prohibited or delayed finalization of the SMD
rulemaking. See Order Terminating Proceeding, 70 Fed. Reg. 43, 140 July26, 2005).
188. See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Betwueen Markets and Central
Planning in Regulating the US. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1341-42
(1993) ("We must choose between two revolutionary visions of the future of the electricity
sector of the U.S. economy. The first vision . . . relies where possible on markets, private
incentives, and decentralized decisions to produce optimal pricing and consumption of
electric power and least-cost pollution control. . . . The second vision . . . distrusts consumer
choice and relies on central planners, housed in regulated utilities, state utility commissions,
and federal regulatory agencies, to correct perceived large-scale imperfections in the electricity
market. This vision's faith in central planning ('integrated resource planning' is the new
phrase) bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the system previously used to govern the
economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.").
189. Cf FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). It is worth recalling that
Hayek did in fact recognize that planning was an important response to some of the problems
and complexities generated by modern industrial society, including public utilities. See id. at
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Notwithstanding these broader ideological overtones, at the core of these
new wholesale markets were important new organizational forms: independ-
ent system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission organizations
(RTOs).190 These entities grew out of the so-called tightpower pools that had
emerged in the Northeast and elsewhere to coordinate dispatch among
neighboring IOU systems.191 As elaborated in various FERC Orders, notably
Orders 888 and 2000, RTOs and ISOs would operate the transmission sys-
tems of member utilities in an independent manner under a single open ac-
cess transmission tariff.19 2 Regulated as public utilities by FERC, RTOs and
ISOs are nonprofit entities governed by their members.193 Key functions in-
clude tariff administration; congestion management; dispatch and scheduling
of generation; administration and oversight of various markets for energy, ca-
pacity, and ancillary services; planning; and interregional coordination.194
In operating day-ahead and real-time markets for wholesale power, as
well as related markets for capacity and ancillary services, RTOs and ISOs
play a crucial role in matching electricity supply with demand in a manner
that maintains reliability. Unlike typical markets for goods and services,
where demand and supply can vary freely with respect to price, these wholesale
power markets are highly constrained and carefilly designed around a uniform or
48 (noting that problems associated with town planning and "pubic utilities" were of the type
"not adequately solved by competition").
190. For a map of current regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system
operators (ISOs), see Regional Transmission Organizations, upra note 56.
191. SeeJEREMIAH D. LAMBERT, CREATING COMPETITIVE POWER MARKETS: THE PJM MODEL
23 (2001) (discussing early history of Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) RTO in
"tight power pool" agreement of 1927 between three Pennsylvania and New Jersey utilities);
JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 31, at 66-77 (discussing interutility coordination
and power pooling arrangements including the "tight power pools" in New England, New
York, and Pennsylvania-NewJersey-Maryland (PJM)).
192. See FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21, 591 to 21,597 (encouraging formation of ISOs as
vehicle for administering open access transmission and elaborating principles for ISO
governance and operation); FERC Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations,
65 Fed. Reg. 810, 876-77 (Mar. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing
function of RTOs in designing and administering open access transmission tariff).
193. FERC Order 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 841-911
(identifying key characteristics and functions of RTOs). There is no legal prohibition on
RTOs operating as for-profit entities, but to date all RTOs and ISOs operate as non-profit
entities.
194. Id; see also Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the
Public Interest in the Governances andAccountability ofRegional Transmission Organizations, 28
ENERGY L.J. 543, 554-57 (2007) (discussing various functions of RTOs and the challenges
of fitting them into traditional categories or definitions); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J.
Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (describing RTOs as
hybrid institutions). One could, of course, consider the entire history of public utility
regulation as an effort to create and sustain various types of hybrid institutions.
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single clearing price auction structure.195 Under this design, generators bid in
various blocks of supply that, under sufficiently competitive conditions,
should be priced at their short-run marginal cost.196 In an effort to police
against the exercise of market power, the RTOs and ISOs have adopted strict
market monitoring procedures and eploy independent market monitors to
ensure that generators do not strategically withhold generation to increase
prices.197 The bids are then stacked by price, and the last unit of generation
necessary to meet demand (the last unit needed to clear the market) provides
the uniform clearing price that all other generators who bid below that price
will receive.198
195. There is an extensive technical literature on auction design, including the merits of specific
designs for electricity markets, that is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Par Holmberg
& David Newberry, The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale
Electricity Auctions, 18 UTILITIES POL. 209, 211-13 (2010) (surveying economic literature
regarding wholesale electricity auctions). In the U.S., the ISO and RTO markets all employ
some version of the "uniform-price" auction for day-ahead and real-time electricity markets.
Specific rules with respect to bidding formats, schedules, and settlements vary across the
RTOs and ISOs, but the basic framework is the same. See MATHEW J. MOREY, POWER
MARKET AUCTION DESIGN: RULES AND LESSONS IN MARKET-BASED CONTROL FOR
THE NEW ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 8, 70-76 (2001) (discussing basic design features of
electricity auctions in U.S. regional power markets).
196. See MOREY, supra note 195, at 42 ("In principle, so long as generators receive the market-clearing
price, and there is a sufficient number of competitors so that each generator assumes it will
not be able to influence the determination of the marginal plant (and hence, the marginal
cost market-clearing price), each generator's optimal bid should be based on short-run
marginal cost. For a generator to submit a bid significantly above its short-run marginal cost
would only lessen the chance ofbeing dispatched without changing the market clearing price.").
197. See Udi Helman, Market Power Monitoring and Mitigation in the US Wholesale Power Markets,
31 ENERGY 877, 888-92 (2006) (discussing rules and practices in RTOs and ISOs for
monitoring and mitigating market power); see also MONITORING ANALYTICS, STATE OF
THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM, Vol. 1, 7-9 (2013) (discussing role of the PJM market
monitor in reporting on the state of the PJM market, monitoring market behavior, and
evaluating existing and proposed market design rules); FERC Order 719, Wholesale
Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 FED. REG. 64,100, 64,137-154
(2008) (codified at 18 CFR Part 35) (amending rules to enhance the independence and
functioning of market monitoring in RTO and ISO markets); FERC, Policy Statement on
Market Monitoring Units, Docket No PL-05-1-000,1-4 (May 27,2005) (providing guidance
on market monitoring in RTO and ISO markets).
198. This differs from a "pay-as-bid" auction design that would compensate ach generator based
on the bid that it submitted rather than the single clearing price. There is an ongoing debate
about whether this design produces more efficient results than the uniform-price design. See,
e.g., Natalia Fabra et al., Designing Electricity Auctions, 37 RAND J. ECON. 23, 23-25 (2006)
(developing model to compare uniform-price and pay-as-bid auction designs); Alfred E.
Kahn et al., Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for Calfornia and Beyond, 14
ELECTRICITY J. 70, 71-76 (2001) (comparing uniform-price and pay-as-bid auction
designs).
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The stacking of bids also creates the so-called merit order for dispatching
generation, determining the order (from lowest bid to highest clearing bid) in
which power plants will be dispatched by the RTO or ISO to meet load.199
Thus, the lowest-cost units will be dispatched first but will receive the same
higher price that the marginal clearing bid receives.200 By allowing low-cost
generators to capture infra-marginal rents (the difference between their costs
and the prices they receive), the uniform-price auction design should incen-
tivize generators to price their bids at short-run marginal cost, and allow
those who bid below the clearing price to cover some of their fixed costs with
the infra-marginal rents that they receive.20 ' This differs from the traditional
cost-of-service model used in rate regulation, where each generation asset is
(at least in theory) included in rate base on the basis of its particular cost
structure.202
The great advantage of the uniform-price auction design is that it facili-
tates efficient dispatch-that is, it ensures that, absent congestion constraints
and the exercise of market power, low-cost generation is bid in at its short-run
marginal cost and dispatched ahead of more expensive generation.203 This is
one of the reasons why operating efficiencies (capacity factors) at low-cost,
older nuclear power plants have increased in the competitive markets.204 One
possible disadvantage, however, is that the benefits or savings from these effi-
ciencies are captured by the merchant generators rather than being passed on
to consumers.205
199. See MOREY, supra note 195, at 36-37 (discussing merit ordering of generation bids ranked
from least to most expensive unit).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., PAUL L. JOSKOW, MIT CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. POLICY RES., COMPETITIVE
ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND INVESTMENT IN NEW GENERATING CAPACITY 9 (2006)
("Inframarginal generating units earn net revenues or quasi-rents that contribute to the
recovery of their fixed operating and capital costs whenever the market clearing price exceeds
their own marginal generation costs.").
202. The phenomenon of "regulatory lag," which refers to the time between rate cases, means that
rates are not adjusted in cost-of-service regimes on a continuous basis, creating situations of
temporary over- and under-recovery. See Joskow, Regulatory Failure, supra note 39, at 137
(discussing the problems of regulatory lag).
203. See Peter Cramton & Steven Soft, Why We Need to Stick with Uniform Price Auctions in
Electricity Markets, 20 ELECTRICITYJ. 26, 27 (2006) (noting that the "clearing-price plays a
critical role in the least-cost scheduling and dispatch of resources")
204. See Lucas W. Davis & Catherine Wolfram, Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence
From US Nuclear Power, 4 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 194, 194 (2012) (finding that
deregulation and consolidation are associated with a 10 percent increase in operating
efficiency at nuclear power plants, primarily as a result of reduced frequency and uration of
reactor outages).
205. See Lave et al., supra note 12, at 17, 19 (finding that improved operations and lower costs at
generating plants as a result of electricity restructuring did not result in lower electricity prices
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A potentially more fundamental problem, discussed in more detail in
Part III.A infra, is that the uniform-price auction design does not provide
sufficient incentives for long-term investments in capacity. Because of the
uncertainty regarding future prices and the fact that the clearing prices are not
tied in anyway to the fixed costs associated with particular technologies, some
analysts and commentators have argued that "energy-only" markets do not
provide sufficient incentives for generators to invest in new capacity.206 As a
result, several ISOs and RTOs have created mandatory forward capacity mar-
kets that provide additional payments to generators for future capacity.207 By
increasing the incentives to build new generation via additional payments for
future capacity, these markets work to maintain sufficient reserves, thereby
ensuring reliability.208
In sum, the wholesale power markets are still works-in-progress.
FERC, together with the RTOs and ISOs, continues to develop and refine
to consumers and concluding that electricity restructuring in general has not delivered
benefits to consumers).
206. The "energy-only" market refers to day-ahead and real-time wholesale power markets in
which generators sell electricity to load-serving entities. This differs from markets for future
generating capacity, which some RTOs and ISOs have embraced as a means to incentivize
investment in new generation. See, e.g., FERC, Centralized Capacity Market Design Elements,
Commission Staff Report, AD13-7-000, 2 (Aug. 23, 2013) (discussing concerns with early
market-based capacity constructs and the implementation of centralized capacity markets in
the eastern RTOs and ISOs "to provide more lead time and certainty for investment in new
capacity resources, including an adequate opportunity for all resources to recover both their
variable and fixed costs over time"); Dominique Finon & Virginie Pignon, Electricity and
Long- Term Capacity Adequacy: The Quest for Regulatory Mechanism Compatible vith Electricity
Market, 16 UTILITIES POL. 143, 143 (2008) ("Insufficient attention was paid to the issue of
investment in generating capacity during the period of designing the competitive electricity
reforms."). As discussed in Part III.A, the challenge of creating sufficient incentives for new
investment is particularly important in the case of certain renewable and low-carbon generation
technologies, which have a higher capital intensity than traditional fossil generation and thus are
more sensitive to the cost of capital.
207. See Elise Caplan & Patrick E. McCullar, Markets in Name Only: Mandatory Capacity Markets
and TheirAdverse Impact on Load-Serving Entities, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 52 (2013) (discussing
efforts to create capacity markets in PJM and the New England Independent System
Operator (ISO-New England)); Joseph E. Bowring, The Evolution of the PJM Capacity
Market: Does it Address the Revenue Sufficiency Problem?, in EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL
ELECTRICITY MARKETS: NEW PARADIGMS, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW APPROACHES
227, 232-42 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., 2013) (discussing efforts to design and implement a
capacity market in PJM); Daniel Breslau, Designing a Market-Like Entity: Economics in the
Politics of Market Formation, 43 SOC. STD. SC. 829, 836-41 (2013) (providing a detailed
case study of the design of the PJM capacity market, including fights over the shape of the
"administratively determined" demand curve for the capacity market auctions).
208. See FERC, supra note 206, at 2 (noting that although RTOs and ISOs have flexibility in
designing capacity markets, "the primary goal of these markets is the same: ensure resource
adequacy at just and reasonable rates through a market-based mechanism that is not unduly
discriminatory or preferential as to the procurement of resources").
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the rules for design and operation of these markets, with the different RTOs
and ISOs taking different approaches to various design elements.209 Without
question, there has been considerable learning over the last couple of decades,
with many improvements in basic design and operation. As suggested previ-
ously, moreover, the diversity of experiences across these different markets
has been an important source of policy innovation. But there is still much
work to be done, particularly in the face of growing imperatives to decarbon-
ize the power sector and accommodate the growth of variable and distributed
energy resources.
In parallel to the federal effort to establish wholesale power markets,
several states also moved ahead uring the 1990s with electricity restructuring
efforts. Most notably, California initiated an ambitious effort in 1996 to re-
structure its electric power markets.2"o In addition to creating an independent
system operator (the California ISO or CAISO) that would manage the
transmission systems of the larger California IOUs, the California restructur-
ing plan required that the three IOUs divest much of their generation capaci-
ty, prohibited them from entering into long-term power contracts, and forced
them to purchase their power in the spot market (the California Power Exchange
or Cal PX). California's restructuring plan also provided for retail choice,
stranded cost recovery, and a transitional rate freeze (set at 10 percent below
then-current rates) that would stay in effect for four years or until the utilities
recovered their stranded costs."'
Although the California market functioned relatively well for the first
couple of years, by the middle of 2000 the market was in crisis. During the
209. See, e.g., MONITORING ANALYTICS, supra note 197, at 9-11 (summarizing current recom-
mendations for changes to PJM market design and market rules); FERC Order 719,
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 FED. REG. 64,100
(2008) (codified at 18 CFR Part 35) (amending regulations to improve operation of
organized wholesale electric markets).
210. See A.B. 1890, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
211. See James Bushnell, Calfornias Electricity Crisis.A MarketApart?, 32 ENERGY POL'Y 1045,
1046-47 (2004) (discussing key elements of the California restructuring plan).
212. There is a voluminous literature on the California electricity crisis. See, e.g., Frank A. Wolak,
Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 11, 20 (2003) (noting "that
average market performance during the first two years of the market, from April 1998 to
April 2000, was close to the average competitive benchmark price" and compared favorably to
performance in the eastern ISOs); CHRISTOPHER WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA
ELECTRICITY CRISIS: CAUSES AND POLICY OPTIONS 1-2 (2003) (describing the severe
malfunctioning of the California electricity market beginning in the late spring of 2001);
Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's
Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 198-200 (2002) (discussing substantial
increases in California wholesale power prices in summer of 2000).
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summer of 2000, California's wholesale power prices increased by 500 percent
relative to a year earlier, while retail rates remained capped.213 In the first four
months of 2001, wholesale spot market prices averaged ten times what they
had been in 1998 and 1999.214 Forced to buy high and sell low, the large
California IOUs teetered on the edge of insolvency, with Pacific Gas and
Electric (PG&E) filing for bankruptcy in April 2001.215 Subsequent investi
gations pointed to a host of factors that contributed to the crisis, including
shortages of generation capacity, faulty market design, market manipulation,
and a lack of enforcement.16 One estimate put the total cost of the crisis to
the California economy at $40 to $45 billion.217 As of early 2014, the State
had recovered more than $5 billion through litigation and enforcement actions.
The lessons of the California experience were not lost on other states.219
Whereas in the years preceding the crisis roughly half of the states had initiat-
ed restructuring, by the mid-2000s, in the wake of the California crisis, many
of these states had suspended or abandoned their efforts.220 Today, some fif-
teen states allow for some form of retail electric choice.2 While switching
rates have varied across states, they have generally been quite low for residen-
213. See Paul L. Joskow, Calfornia's Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. 365, 365, 377-78
(2001) (discussing increases in wholesale electricity prices in California) [hereinafter Joskow,
Calfornias Electricity Crisis].
214. Id at 365.
215. See David Lazarus, PG&E Files for Bankruptcy $9 Billion in Debt, Firm Abandons Bailout Talks
With State, S.F. CHRON., April 7, 2001, at A-1.
216. See WEARE, supra note 212, at 15-50 (discussing various factors that contributed to the
California electricity crisis); see also Joskow, Calfornia's Electricity Crisis, supra note 213, at
386-87 (discussing key contributing factors and lessons learned from the crisis).
217. See WEARE, supra note 212, at 3-4 (estimating $40 billion in added energy costs as of 2003
and $40-45 billion in total costs, which include added costs from blackouts and reductions in
economic growth, which at the time was around 3.5 percent of the state's total annual
economic output).
218. See Energy Unit, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. OFF. ATTY GEN., http://oag.ca.gov/cfs/energy
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
219. See David B. Spence, The Politics ofElectricity Restructuring, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417,
417 (2005) ("California's disastrous experience with restructured electricity markets has given
pause to restructuring's proponents and ammunition to restructuring's opponents."); Joel B.
Eisen, Regulatory Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric
Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 557-58 (2005) ("In the aftermath of
competition's disastrous failure in the early 2000s in California, states are beginning to slow,
alter, or even reject progress toward restructuring, even where it had been embraced earlier.").
220. See Joskow, The Dt/icult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States,
supra note 54, at 32 (reporting that after 2000 no additional states had announced plans to
pursue electricity restructuring and nine states that had planned to implement reforms had
"delayed, canceled, or significantly scaled back their electricity competition programs").
221. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure elect.htrnl (last updated Sept. 2010).
Public Utility 1669
tial customers, with higher rates of switching for larger industrial and commercial
customers.
The move to introduce competition into various segments of the electric
power sector also raised concerns that these new markets would undermine
existing programs favoring more expensive forms of renewable energy and invest-
ments in efficiency.223 In response, several states adopted renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs) in conjunction with their efforts to restructure, in order to
ensure that renewables would continue to grow in the newly-created electricity
markets.224 Considerable attention was also directed to the challenge of
maintaining and expanding existing utility programs to support energy effi-
ciency and conservation in the context of restructuring.22s All of these efforts
stemmed from the conviction that markets alone would not be able to promote
low-carbon electricity.
Recognizing that electricity markets are still evolving, several important
lessons can be gleaned from the effort to introduce competition into various
parts of the electricity sector. First, not all markets are created equal, and
222. See State Electric Retail Choice Programs Are Popular With Commercial and Industrial Customers, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 14, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id
=6250 ("While residential customer participation rates are low in almost all of these
[restructured] states, a majority of commercial customers have signed up with competitive suppliers in
9 states and a majority of industrial customers have signed up in 12 states."); see also id ("The highest
participation rates are found in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic states, and Texas where
electricity is supplied through Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and states have
unbundled generation from retail delivery and sales.").
223. See, e.g., JOSEPH ETO ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., RATEPAYER-FUNDED
ENERGY-EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS IN A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS FOR REGULATORS AND LEGISLATORS 1-5 (1978) (discussing challenges
facing efficiency programs in context of electricity restructuring); Nancy A. Rader & Richard
B. Norgaard, Efficiency and Sustainability in Restructured Electricity Markets: The Renewables
Porfolio Standards, 9 ELECTRICITY J. 37, 37-38 (1996) (discussing debates over policy
options for promoting renewables in context of electricity restricting); Ryan Wiser et al.,
Renewable Energy and Restructuring: Policy Solutions for the Financing Dilemma, 10
ELECTRICITY J. 65, 66 (1997) ("Absent the development of new policies, many are
concerned that renewables could be an inadvertent casualty in the transition to competitive
power markets.").
224. The California PUC included a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) as part of its restructuring
order, but the legislature removed the RPS in its subsequent legislation on restructuring (AB
1890) in favor of a surcharge-funded program. In 2002, in the wake of the electricity crisis,
California adopted an RPS. In the meantime, several other states, including Maine, Arizona,
Nevada, and Massachusetts, adopted RPSs as part of their restructuring processes. See Wiser
et al., Calfornia Case Study, supra note 183, at 468-70 (discussing efforts by California and
other states to include RPS as part of the restructuring process).
225. See, e.g., Eric Hirst et al., The Future ofDSM in a Restructured US Electricity Industry, 24
ENERGY POL. 303, 311-13 (1996) (discussing efforts to maintain efficiency and DSM
[(demand side management)] programs in the context of electricity restructuring).
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market design matters a great deal. Given the considerable complexity of
electric power systems and certain characteristics that make electricity markets
very difficult to design and manage, the introduction of competition into the
sector proved to be more challenging than some advocates may have initially
realized." Competition could indeed be an important tool to discipline cer-
tain forms of behavior, but its overall success in doing so would depend upon
careful institutional design.
Second, introducing competition requires quite a bit of regulation and
ongoing oversight. Today's organized wholesale power markets are not ordi-
nary markets where individuals are free to interact as buyers and sellers based
on their own decentralized decision- making. Because electricity flows
through the grid according to the laws of physics and because supply and de-
mand must be balanced in real time, central coordination is necessary to make
these markets work. Such coordination includes central control over dispatch
to meet the requirements of systems operation, carefully designed markets for
capacity and ancillary services, and long-term planning for new investment.
What we have, in other words, are not really markets in any traditional sense,
but an open-access ystem run by a central administrator (an ISO or RTO)
according to a previously- agreed-on set of rules and dispatch algorithms that
govern auctions for power, capacity, and other services-all embedded within
a large, multi- stakeholder process for governance, long-term planning, and
cost allocation. As noted above, moreover, these ISOs and RTOs are closely
regulated by FERC as public utilities, and they have all adopted strict rules to
govern market behavior that are carefully enforced by independent market
monitors. As various commentators have pointed out, this results in multiple
layers of regulation that arguably exceed the overall regulatory burden present
in traditional cost-of-service regulation.2 And the cost of managing these
systems is not trivial. PJM, for example, spends almost $300 million per year
on operational and administrative costs.2
Third, as with any form of regulation, the introduction of competition is al-
ways going to be subject o political compromises. In the same way that real world
regulation never matches the ideals of legal and political theory, real world markets
never live up to the idealized models of economic theory. This was a basic
226. Cf Paul L. Joskow, Hoz Will it End? The Electric Utility Industry in 2005, 9 ELECTRICITYJ.
67, 69 (1996) ("[An electric power system is an integrated physical network that operates as
one large machine, not a set of straws through which electrons flow. While the laws of supply and
demand and the invisible hand are very powerful, they are not more powerful than the laws of
physics and can operate efficiently only by accommodating physical realities.").
227. See, e.g., Lave et al., supra note 12, at 16 ("If anything there are more layers of regulation now.").
228. See PA.-N.J.-MD. INTERCONNECTION, PJM2012 FINANCIAL REPORT 21 (2013).
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lesson that the realists and institutional economists had pointed out decades
earlier. 9 Pure market designs such as the California Power Exchange proved
to be a disaster, not least because they could be manipulated and provided
limited opportunities for hedging by load serving entities. And while there is
ongoing debate about the causes of the California crisis (the transitional rate
freeze was one obvious design flaw that market reform advocates could rightly
point to as an example of a lingering government control that impeded the
price signals necessary to make these markets work), it seems naive to pre-
sume that proper market designs will emerge out of a political process.230
Perhaps we need to think not only about the pathologies affecting the per-
formance of the firm under regulatory constraints, pace Averch-Johnson, but
also about those that arise from the performance of the market under political
constraints.
Fourth, and related to the prior point, in all of these markets the process
of market design has emerged as an intense object of interest for market par-
ticipants. Rent-seeking behavior thus seems to have moved from the more
open, public process of rate cases to the highly technical and possibly less
transparent process of developing rules for how these markets will work.231
229. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also Harry M. Trebing, Changing Nature, supra note 38, at
269 ("[T]he real world differs sharply from the vision of an unfettered free market economy
promoted by the champions of deregulation. This dichotomy between vision and reality can
have profound consequences for the general welfare."); Hamilton, supra note 97, at 311
(concluding that neoclassical or value economics, as contrasted with institutional economics,
suffers from "a failure to recognize the complexity of the relations which bind human welfare
to industry").
230. Cf Wolak, supra note 212, at 11 (concluding that "the California electricity crisis was
fundamentally a regulatory crisis rather than an economic crisis"). Notwithstanding the
merits of Professor Wolak's argument that regulators, particularly FERC, failed to anticipate
and respond adequately to the California electricity crisis, it is also important to recognize
that the effort to assign blame for the crisis either to regulation or to economics simply begs
the question of whether any real-world economic institution can ever be separated from the
regulatory framework that determines how it operates. See Oliver E. Williamson, Why Laz,
Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN REV. LAW. Soc. ScI. 369, 384 (2005) ("In the
California electricity restructuring effort 'good theories' were naively expected to be
implemented without making provision for the realities of the political and regulatory
process. Failing to make ex ante provision for these realities, politics and regulation are
conveniently made the ex post scapegoats for behaving in perverse and unanticipated ways
that, in large measure, were foreseeable and should have been factored into the calculus.").
231. See Marc K. Landy et al., Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of Market Design, in
CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 1, 9-11
(Landy et al. eds., 2007) (discussing pervasive rent-seeking behavior in the context of market
design as part of various deregulation initiatives); Richard O'Neill & Udi Helman, Regulatory
Reform of the US Wholesale Electricity Markets, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS:
THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 128, 132-33 (Landy et al. eds., 2007) (discussing
rent-seeking behavior by various actors in the design of U.S. wholesale power markets).
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The current fights over the design of capacity markets in New England, New
York, and PJM are good examples.232
Fifth, even if economic efficiency was the stated goal of electricity re-
structuring, it was always less important than maintaining system reliability.233
Indeed, in the organized markets, systems operators employ what is known as
"security constrained economic dispatch"-the term for the algorithms used to
dispatch generation (supply) to meet load (demand) in a manner that mimics the
approach taken by the vertically integrated utilities for their own systems, re-
placing engineering estimates of loads and costs with bids and offers for pow-
er in the context of day-ahead and hourly auctions.234 Over time, various
other markets for capacity and ancillary services have been established to
ensure balancing, reserve capacity, and other characteristics necessary to
maintain a high level of reliability. And, as noted, RTOs and ISOs have de-
veloped extensive planning exercises to guide new investments in generation
and transmission in order to maintain reliability and promote certain kinds of
investments.
Finally, while there is evidence of more efficient use of generation and
other nongeneration alternatives in the wholesale power markets, questions
remain regarding who is capturing the benefits of competition.235 Notwithstand-
232. See generally Breslau, supra note 207, at 15-18 (discussing intense conflict over the shape of
the administered demand curve in the PJM capacity market); Caplan &McCullar, supra note
207, at 52-53 (observing that in the RTO capacity markets "complex rules have been
rewritten to create barriers to entry and anti-competitive conditions that provide an optimal
earnings scenario for one group of sellers (incumbent merchant generators) by restricting the
entry of new supply"). See also Electricity Consumers Resource Council v. FERC, 407 F.3d
1232, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge by large industrial customers to FERC
approval of the New York ISO's proposed new demand curve for its capacity market).
233. See William W. Hogan, Electricity Wholesale Market Design in a Lowo Carbon Future, in
HARNESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 115 (B. Moselle et
al. eds., 2013) ("Economic efficiency always played a secondary role to maintaining system
reliability, keeping the lights on. Gold plating the system a little might produce some
inconvenient questions on occasion, but major blackouts or even relatively minor but frequent
local supply interruptions could limit a career and were deemed unacceptable. The common
approach for the wholesale power system was, and continues to be, treating reliability as a
constraint and economic efficiency as a goal to be sought subject to that constraint.").
234. Id
235. There is evidence that capacity factors and operating efficiencies at particular types of
generation plants-notably, nuclear power plants-have increased in the wholesale power
markets. See, e.g., Davis &Wolfram, supra note 204, at 194 (finding that improved operating
efficiencies at nuclear power plants as a result of restructuring produced approximately $2.5
billion in annual savings (at average wholesale prices) and resulted in an annual decrease of
almost 40 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions); Kira R. Fabrizio et al., Do
Markets Reduce Costs?Assessing the Impact ofRegulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation
Capacity, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1250, 1272 (2007) (concluding that restructuring led to gains
in plant-level efficiencies); Alexander Sharabaroff et al., The Environmental and Efficiency
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ing the difficulties of comparing the current restructured world to a counterfactual
world without restructuring, some analysts point to evidence demonstrating
that owners of low-cost baseload generation have been the primary beneficiaries
while residential customers have seen few benefits."'
None of which is intended to suggest that the organized markets do not
provide important benefits and opportunities for innovation, including efforts
to integrate renewables and demand response onto the grid."' The mistake,
this Article contends, is to see these markets as antithetical to a broader un-
derstanding of public utility. In fact, RTOs and ISOs share many of the
characteristics of public utilities and are regulated as such. The markets that
they administer are carefully designed and highly regulated, mimicking in
some respects the actions of systems operators in vertically integrated utilities.
Planning is and always will be a key part of the effort to maintain reliability
and enhance the grid. In many respects, the organized wholesale electricity
markets stand as working examples of how competition can be deployed to
discipline certain forms of behavior and to open up certain components of
formerly regulated industries-a basic insight that realists and institutional
Effects of Restructuring on the Electric Power Sector in the United States:An EmpiricalAnalysis,
37 ENERGY POL'Y 4884, 4892 (2009) (concluding that restructuring has contributed to
improved efficiency and environmental performance of electricity generation). Regardless of
the precise role of the wholesale markets in delivering improved efficiencies, there are still
important questions regarding who is capturing the benefits of those efficiencies. See Lave et
al., supra note 12, at 19 (concluding that restructuring has failed to accomplish its major goals
and has not benefitted consumers).
236. See Lave et al., supra note 12, at 18-19 (observing that the uniform-price auction structure
greatly benefitted low-cost baseload generation and concluding that customers have not
benefitted from restructuring); see also Richard D. Cudahy, Electric Deregulation After
Calfornia: Down But Not Out, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 358 (2002) (asking "whether the loss
of vertical integration and the fragmentation of the electric delivery system, which
competition demands, creates costs that equal or exceed any savings resulting from competition").
237. See, e.g., Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., 134 FERC 1 61,141
(2011) (accepting Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator (MISO) tariff
adjustments for new Dispatchable Intermittent Resources (DIR) program to facilitate
integration of wind and other renewables); FERC Order No. 764, Integration of Variable
Energy Resources, 139 FERC 1 61,246 (2012) (removing barriers to integration of variable
energy resources). Demand response has also increased in some of the wholesale markets, but
there is ongoing debate about the role (and legality) of recent FERC rules in promoting this
growth by allowing for the aggregation of demand response and its compensation as a
resource in these markets. The D.C. Circuit recently vacated FERC Order 745, which
created a framework for the compensation of demand response in the organized markets, on
the grounds that it impermissibly intruded upon the jurisdiction of the States over retail
electricity markets. See Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. May 23,
2014) (vacating FERC Order 745); see also Peter Cappers et al., Demand Response in U.S.
Electricity Markets: Empirical Evidence, 35 ENERGY 1526, 1534-35 (2010) (discussing
growth of demand response in wholesale markets).
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economists advanced in the early twentieth century in their elaboration of
public utility.
Still, despite the challenges of electricity restructuring, the mixed record
of success, and the complex, highly regulated nature of electricity markets,
much of the contemporary policy discussion regarding the power sector tends
to frame questions regarding the future of the sector as a choice between mar-
kets and regulation."' This framing reinforces the narrow economic concep-
tion of public utility, leading to the conclusion that additional deregulation
will be necessary to complete the task of restructuring and to fully realize the
benefits of competitive electricity markets. While there is surely some truth
in that view, it is also the case that framing the matter this way is overly sim-
plistic. "The folklore of deregulation," to use Judge Richard D. Cudahy's
phrase, has shaped for too long the ways that policymakers, regulators, and
various stakeholders think about the introduction of competition into com-
plex, network industries such as electric power.239
As a consequence, we still do not have an adequate vocabulary to talk
about these organized markets and the RTOs and ISOs that administer
them. From one vantage point, they look more like super utilities than mar-
kets-nonprofit versions of the large regional holding companies that were
once viewed by systems engineers and business leaders as the key to building
and operating large regional power grids. From another perspective, they
look like agents of FERC, enforcing just and reasonable rates by promoting
and protecting competition. From still another, they look like voluntary,
multi-stakeholder forms of governance-more formal versions of the tight
power pools that existed in various parts of the country during the middle
decades of the twentieth century.24 0 In all cases, the increasingly prominent
role of the RTOs and ISOs in the organization and management of the elec-
tric power system raises important questions about the appropriate mix of
competition and regulation in the sector and the viability of different forms of
governance in the face of growing decarbonization imperatives.
238. This is perhaps most apparent in ongoing discussions regarding traditional utility business
models and the regulatory frameworks that support them in the face of rapid growth in
distributed energy resources. See discussion infa Part II.E.
239. See Richard D. Cudahy, The Folklore ofDeregulation (With Apologies to Thurman Arnold), 15
YALE J. REG. 427, 428 (1998) ("Reform today means deregulation, competition,
privatization, and the unconstrained reign of the free market. Thus, a wonderful belief system
has emerged around the process of deregulation.").
240. See Dworkin &Goldwasser, supra note 194, at 555-56 (discussing challenges of defning RTOs).
1674
Public Utility
E. Public Utility in an Age of Disruption
During the push to deregulate the electricity industry, the major threats
to the traditional utility business model were on the generation side, starting
with PURPA's QF program and maturing into a fully developed independent
power sector in large parts of the country that took advantage of new genera-
tion technologies (combined cycle natural gas turbines in particular) to chal-
lenge incumbent utilities. Today, the biggest threats are coming from the
customer side in the form of increased demand response, efficiency, and dis-
tributed generation (collectively known as distributed energy resources),
which are reducing load for utilities and raising important questions about
whether the current IOU business model can survive. Indeed, current rends
in load growth, which are well below their historical average, suggest that the
traditional revenue model for these utilities needs to be replaced.241 The con-
siderable and growing interest in revenue decoupling as an alternative model
represents one response to these changes, but it is not clear whether decou-
pling offers a sustainable, long-term solution.24 2
Like the previous debates over restructuring, moreover, the contempo-
rary discussion is often framed as a battle between old and new, with en-
trenched monopolies seeking to preserve the status quo pitted against new
entrants and new technologies promising disruptive innovation. Consultants
and industry analysts talk constantly about the forces of disruption and the
need for new, twenty-first- century business models.243 With the phrase
241. See ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, supra note 26, at MT-16 (projecting annual growth
in electricity demand of 0.9 percent for 2013-2040). Growth in electricity demand has
slowed in every decade since the 1950s, from 9.8 percent per year during that decade to 0.7
percent per year during the 2000s. Id.
242. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND DECOUPLING:
A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION (2011) (discussing the concept and practice of
decoupling); PAMELA MORGAN, A DECADE OF DECOUPLING FOR US ENERGY
UTILITIES: RATE IMPACTS, DESIGNS, AND OBSERVATIONS (2012) (reviewing recent
experience with decoupling in US); see also NY DPS, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION,
supra note 66, at 49 (observing that revenue decoupling "provides no positive incentive for
utility bill management and exposes the utility and customers to the risk that as some
customers reduce demand, the cost of service is borne by the remaining customers").
243. See EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 9, at 1-2 (discussing disruptive challenges facing
electric utilities); GREGORY ALIFF, BEYOND THE MATH: PREPARING FOR DISRUPTION
AND INNOVATION IN US ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 3 (2013) ("The electric power
industry could soon be facing its most disruptive period of change since the
commercialization of electricity in the 19' century. The time is ripe for significant
transformation because the potential for dramatic disruption to the existing electricity
operating model is coming not from one direction but from many-demand, technology,
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"death spiral" being bandied about in the popular press, it seems that rhetori-
cal excess may be getting the better of some.244 Nonetheless, significant
changes are in play that pose important challenges to the traditional IOU
business model. One need only look to Germany, which has engaged in a
massive support program of feed-in tariffs and other policies to promote dis-
tributed solar power over the last decade, to see how such pressures may play out.2 45
For U.S. utilities, the standard argument holds that a combination of
limited growth prospects for overall electricity demand (largely as a result of a
slow-growing economy combined with increased efficiency and demand-side
programs) and rapid uptake of distributed generation poses a new type of
threat.246 As more customers take advantage of incentives and support pro-
grams for these various distributed energy resources, system costs are increas-
ingly shifted to nonparticipating customers. With limited load growth,
utilities are left with no alternative but to raise rates, which further incentiviz-
es customers to participate in programs to reduce their electricity use. On top
of this, utilities are facing capital investment requirements close to twice the
rate of depreciation to enhance the grid and meet regulatory mandates, leav-
ing them little choice but to further raise rates, which simply adds to existing
customer incentives to reduce usage or adopt distributed alternatives. Ac-
cording to industry analysts, such a dynamic, if it continues, could lead to a
reduction in utility credit ratings, which would raise utilities' cost of capital
and further increase costs and rates, thereby reinforcing customer incentives
to further reduce demand and adopt distributed generation.247 This positive
feedback loop is what some refer to as the "death spiral."2 48
Although the prospect of disruption applies broadly to the full range of
distributed energy resources, it is most apparent in the case of rooftop solar
photovoltaic (PV) systems, which have enjoyed explosive growth in the U.S.
regulation, new products, and new competitors."); BINZ ET AL., supra note 23, at 5
(summarizing the "tremendous challenges" facing the electric power sector).
244. See, e.g., Denning, supra note 7; Martin et al., Power Grid, supra note 7.
245. See Mario Richter, Business Model Innovation for Sustainable Energy: German Utilities and
Renewable Energy, 62 ENERGY POL'Y 1226 (2013) (discussing the implications of growth in
distributed generation for German utilities); Denning, supra note 7 (reporting that the combined
market value of German utilities E.ON and RWE has declined by 56 percent over the past
four years and in the context of a rising German stock market).
246. See EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 9, at 1 (observing that current "disruptive challenges,"
including falling costs of distributed generation and other distributed energy resources,
limited demand growth, and increased customer participation in demand-side management,
are potential "game changers" for the U.S. electric utility industry).
247. See id at 3, 11, 13.
248. See, e.g., Martin et al., Power Grid, supra note 7.
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over the last five years.249 Given the rapidly declining costs of solar PV panels,
the incentives embedded in net metering programs, and innovative financing
techniques (notably the third-party solar lease), consumers have been able to
put no or very little money down for the installation of these distributed sys-
tems and end up paying less for their electricity than they did before.250 In-
cumbent utilities, in contrast, are left with significant reductions in demand
from their higher-end distributed generation (DG) customers and a shrink-
ing number of non-DG customers left to pay systems costs.2s
In their current iteration, of course, these DG programs are made possi-
ble by the traditional model of utility regulation. Indeed, far from being a dis-
ruptive technology thrown up by unfettered market forces, DG has been a
major beneficiary of utility regulation, principally in the form of net metering
policies, which allow owners of DG to get the full retail price of power sold
back to the grid.5 And although it is surely the case that non-DG customers
stand to benefit from the growth in DG to the extent that it reduces the need
for investments in new generation, transmission, and distribution and to the
extent that it promotes a more reliable and resilient grid, several recent anal-
yses have raised concerns about the implications of DG growth for non-DG
249. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REVOLUTION Now: THE FUTURE ARRIVES FOR FOUR
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2013) ("In 2012, rooftop solar panels cost about 1% of
what they did 35 years ago, and since 2008, total U.S. solar PV deployment has jumped by
about 10 times-from 735 megawatts to over 7200 megawatts."). Advances in energy
storage, when combined with rooftop solar PV systems, have the potential to radically disrupt
the power sector, allowing for the possibility of full grid defection by some customers. See
BRONSKI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION, supra note 32, at 39 (discussing
prospects for solar-plus-battery systems to reach grid parity and to facilitate grid defection).
250. See id.; Easan Drury et al., The Transformation of Southern Calfornias Residential Photovoltaics
Market Through Third-Party Ownership, 42 ENERGY POL'Y 681, 689 (2012) (observing that
"[tlhird-party owned residential PV systems are rapidly gaining market share in the United
States in the regions where they are allowed to enter the market" and concluding that "[p]olicies
that enable third-party PV products to enter new markets ... represent strong opportunities
for stimulating PV demand in concert with traditional incentives that reduce system costs or
increase revenues").
251. See LORI BIRD ET AL., REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
EXPANDED ADOPTION OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 8-17 (2013) (discussing various costs
and benefits associated with increased adoption of distributed solar); CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM'N (CPUC), CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING (NEM) DRAFT COST-
EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION (2013) [hereinafter CPUC REPORT] (analyzing the costs
and benefits of net metering program in California).
252. See BIRD et al., supra note 251, at 29-30 (discussing net metering policies). Nearly all states have
adopted some form of net metering tariff. See Net Metering, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/
solar/solarpolicyguide/?id=17 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (reporting that forty-three states
plus the District of Columbia have established net metering policies).
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customers who are left paying for a larger share of the utility's fixed costs."'
As long as DG accounts for a very small portion of a utility's customer base,
this is not much of an issue. As participation in net metering grows, however,
the cross-subsidy issues become more important and contentious.
The recent and ongoing fights over net metering in several states have
put the cross-subsidy issue, together with the broader question of how to
properly assess the costs and benefits of solar DG, squarely on the policy
agenda. In California, for example, a recent study performed on behalf of the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) estimated that the total
costs of DG with full participation in the state's net metering program
through 2020 would be $1.1 billion, or about 3.5 percent of IOU revenues.254
New legislation enacted in late 2013 requires the CPUC to develop a tariff for
DG customers by the end of 2015 (for offer in 2017) and gives the CPUC
new authority to approve standby charges assessed to DG customers.2 ' The
law also requires that the new tariff be "based on the costs and benefits of the
renewable electrical generation facility" and directs the CPUC to ensure that
the "total benefits of the tariff to all customers . . . are approximately equal to
the total costs."256
In Arizona, the Arizona Public Service Company filed an application in
July 2013 with the state's Corporation Commission, which regulates the
state's utilities, requesting a "cost shift solution" (that is, a new fee for DG
customers) to address the $18 million cross subsidy that the company claims
253. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 251, at 30-38 (estimating systems costs borne by non-
distributed-generation (non-DG) customers); CARL LINVILL ET AL., DESIGNING DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION TARIFFS WELL: FAIR COMPENSATION IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 8
(2013) ("Because bundled rates typically include distribution system costs, costs that exist
with or without the deployment of DG systems, net energy metering (NEM) customers
sometimes make no contribution toward those costs."); NY DPS, REFORMING THE
ENERGY VISION, supra note 66, at 62 ("[A] rate structure that is based solely on volumetric
energy charges could be most favorable to DER [(distributed energy resources)], because it
allows the customer to avoid any distribution charges when operating their own generation;
but the rates for non-participant ratepayers would necessarily have to cover the other costs
not paid by standby customers. Non-participant customers would in effect be subsidizing the
DER customer's rates."). But see ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING,
ZERO NET ENERGY AND THE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE FUTURE: ADAPTING
ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 36, 40 (2012) (noting
that many questions about the net impacts of distributed energy resources remain to be
answered and that "[u]nder current volumetric rate structures, net metering does not
accurately recover the costs of a customer's use of the grid network and, simultaneously, it
may not be compensating the customer for the value of the power they are providing").
254. See CPUC REPORT, supra note 251, at 7 (estimating the net cost of all net energy metering
generation in California in 2020 under current net metering policies).
255. A.B. 327 §11 (Cal. 2013).
256. Id § 11(b)(3)-(4).
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is being provided to DG customers under the state's net metering policy.2 s'
In November 2013, the Arizona Corporation Commission voted (3-2) to ap-
prove a new fixed charge (seventy cents per kilowatt of installed DG capacity
per month) on new solar DG customers starting in 2014.2ss
In Minnesota, legislation enacted in 2013 allows the state's investor-
owned utilities to apply to the PUC for a "value of solar" tariff as an alternative to
net metering.259 Under the new law, the state Department of Commerce has
developed a methodology for calculating the rates and charges under the value
of solar tariff that separates the various components of solar DG, including
delivered energy; avoided generation, transmission, and distribution; and
avoided environmental costs.260 The PUC approved the value of solar meth-
odology in April 2014.61
Although California, Arizona, and Minnesota appear to have resolved
(at least for now) conflicts over net metering in their jurisdictions, fights are
brewing in several other states, including Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Neva-
da, and Vermont.262 One possible consequence of these ongoing fights between
DG advocates and electric utilities is that electricity will no longer be viewed
as a common enterprise but rather one more sector in need of disruption. As
utilities find themselves in the unenviable position of having to take money
from poorer customers to pay for systems costs and, in the process, subsidize
the net metering programs that have fueled the growth of DG, they are seek-
ing to impose additional systems charges or to adjust rate structures to cover
some of these costs.263 In doing so, they reinforce the view advanced by some
257. See Application of Arizona Public Service Company for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift
Solution, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n No. E-01345A-13-0248 (July 12, 2013).
258. See Arizona Public Service Company's Application for Approval of Net Metering Cost Shift
Solution, Decision No. 74202, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n No. E-01345A-13-0248, at 29-31
(Dec. 3, 2013).
259. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, Subd. 10 (2013).
260. See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MINNESOTA VALUE OF SOLAR: METH-
ODOLOGY (2014).
261. See Minn. PUC, Order Approving Distributed SolarValue Methodology, Docket No. E-
999/M-14-65 (April 1, 2014).
262. See, e.g, MarkJaffe, Battle over Rooftop Solar Heads to Public Utilities Commission, DEN. POST,
Jan. 12, 2014, available at http://www. denverpost.com/business/ci 24889841/battle-over-rooftop-
solar-heads-public-utilities-commission (discussing fight over net metering in Colorado); Edward
Humes, Throwing Shade: Fearing Lost Profits, the Nation Investor- Owned Utilities are Moving to Blot
out the Solar Revolution, SIERRA, June 2014, available at http://content.sierraclub.org/new/
sierra/2014-3-may-june/feature/throwing-shade (describing fights over net metering in various
states).
263. See, e.g., Application of Arizona Public Service Company for Approval of Net Metering Cost
Shift Solution, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n No. E-01345A-13-0248 (July 12, 2013) (seeking a new
surcharge to cover systems costs).
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DG advocates that electric utilities are entrenched, anti-innovation rent-seekers
with limited capacity to relate to customers. The IOU business model, according
to these critics, is what stands in the way of efforts to realize the benefits of
disruptive technologies.2 64
As evidence of these potential benefits, critics sometimes point to the
telecommunications sector, where technological disruption has diminished
the power of regulated monopolies, lowered costs, and brought a whole range
of new products and services to consumers. Some observers suggest hat elec-
tricity is now where telecommunications was in the 1990s-on the cusp of a
major transformation.6 ' Maybe. But it is not clear that the telecommunica-
tions analogy is that instructive for electricity. 66 It may be, in other words,
that there are as many differences as similarities between the two and that
those differences matter with respect to how fast competition and disruptive
technologies can change the electric power sector. In particular, it seems un-
likely that electricity will witness the emergence of alternative networks in the
way that wireless and cable networks emerged to challenge the traditional
landline network. Moreover, the prospect of substantial numbers of custom-
ers exiting the grid entirely is likely a decade or more away (if it ever happens),
and, according to one recent analysis, would not allow for optimal utilization
of assets.6 ' Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the growing importance
of policies seeking to reduce the carbon emissions associated with electric
power generation (not to mention other environmental impacts) surely im-
poses an additional layer of complexity that does not exist in the telecommu-
nications sector. Thus, rather than looking to the telecommunications
experience for guidance regarding the potential for disruptive change in the
power sector, it might be more constructive to recognize the distinctiveness of
the power sector and to engage it on its own terms.
264. See, e.g., Humes, supra note 262, (characterizing fights over net metering as effort by utilities
to "blot out the solar revolution"); Martin et al., Power Grid, supra note 7 (discussing IOU
resistance to growth of solar DG).
265. See Martin et al., Power Grid, supra note 7 (analogizing disruption of current electric power
sector to telecommunications); EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 9, at 14-17 (discussing
history of disruption in telecommunications and its implications for the power sector).
266. Joskow and Schmalensee made this point in the early 1980s in the context of discussions over
electricity deregulation and the possible lessons for the sector from the telecommunications
deregulation experience. See JOSKOW & SCHVALENSEE, supra note 31, at 42-43 (discussing key
differences between the telephone industry and electric power and observing that "casual
reasoning by analogy produces sound policy only by chance").
267. See BRONSKI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION, supra note 32, at 39 (concluding




In doing so, it is important to recognize that, despite the rhetoric of dis-
ruption that DG advocates sometimes embrace, the fight over net metering
policies is really just another example of rent seeking (on both sides)-
another effort to shift the system of entitlements embedded in the current
system of utility regulation to favor a particular set of technologies and actors.
Taken on its own terms, moreover, the notion of disruption reflects an uncrit-
ical acceptance of the idea that we are all better off if individual economic ac-
tors are allowed to operate free of the constraints imposed by social norms and
institutions. Celebrating disruptive innovation thus tends to undermine support
for existing institutions-putting in their place a neoliberal faith in individu-
als whose freedom and capacity for creative destruction can only be realized by
breaking down old barriers and habits. No doubt this view of society can bring
about positive and important changes, but a society seen as devoid of institu-
tions makes it difficult to build the forms of social life and cooperation neces-
sary to effect lasting changes in collective behavior. In the specific case of
electricity, the rhetoric of disruption ignores the possibility of any sort of
positive reform agenda attached to the notion of broader public utility. By
emphasizing radical change rather than pragmatic adjustment of existing in-
stitutions, it constrains our ability to think about electricity (and energy) as a
collective, social enterprise precisely at the time when we are becoming more
active participants in that enterprise.6"
Rather than viewing the rapid growth of distributed energy resources
through the lens of disruption, a more positive agenda would recognize the
vital role that these resources can play in a clean energy future and would
work to design rates and systems-integration policies to accommodate these
resources in a fair and open way.2' It would recognize that the effort to ac-
268. The current enthusiasm for disruptive transformation of the power sector also has important
implications for social equity, something that regulators (and public utilities) cannot ignore.
See, e.g, NY DPS, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 66, at 54 ("The threat of
disruptive transformation may be a strong motivator for utilities, but it is not by itself a
constructive way to regulate. The risk inherent in this approach can inhibit financing and
could ultimately lead to higher rates for remaining captive customers. Reliance on this threat,
to motivate utilities, places risk on the most vulnerable customers that lack the means to
participate in the disruptive trends."); LINVILL ET AL., supra note 253, at 6 (discussing
inability of low-income consumers to participate in DG and need to ensure that incentives
and rate designs intended to support DG will protect low-income consumers from being
over-charged).
269. This is the basic position being advanced by the staff of the New York Department of Public
Service in their effort to develop a new framework for New York's electricity system that can
accommodate, among other things, substantial growth in distributed energy resources. See,
e.g., NY DPS, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 66, at 62 ("The central issue
that should be considered is what rate design will reflect the most economic proposition to
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commodate bidirectional power flows across distribution systems will require
significant upgrades that all users should pay for, and that the resulting sys-
tem will be more complex and thus require more careful planning and coordi-
nation.270 It would also acknowledge that distributed generation will not be
enough by itself to get us to a low-carbon future; that any effort to reduce
power sector emissions by 80 percent by 2050 will require a broad portfolio of
approaches-of which distributed energy is just a part.27" Finally, it would
embrace the notion that as the electric power system becomes more participa-
tory, the importance of a broad public utility framework to support planning,
coordination, and innovation only increases. Business models and individual
companies will surely come and go, but some notion of public utility would
seem to be vital, even fundamental, to motivating and sustaining public
commitment to and investment in a grid that can facilitate and sustain sub-
stantial decarbonization by midcentury.
III. PUBLIC UTILITYAND THE Low-CARBON FUTURE
By any account, decarbonizing the U.S. electric power sector will require
large new investments (at multiple scales), sustained technological innova-
tion, extensive reform of regulatory and market structures, and the develop-
ment of new business models. As noted, there are various possible pathways
to such a future and no single, optimal mix of technologies, institutions, and
practices to achieve an electric power system in 2050 with 80 percent fewer
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than the current system.27  Whatever the
DER [(distributed energy resources)] customers without harming non-participant
ratepayers."). California has recently enacted legislation that requires each IOU to submit a
"distribution resources plan proposal" that will "identify optimal locations for the deployment
of distributed resources" and guide future investments in the distribution system. See A.B.
327 § 8 (Cal. 2013).
270. Id. §§ 9-10, 22-23 (discussing enhanced role for distribution utilities as "distributed system
platform provider" in managing advanced distribution systems capable of handling widespread
integration of DER with increasing bi-directional power flows).
271. See NREL, RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: VOLUME 1, EXPLORATION OF
HIGH-PENETRATION RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES 3-11, Table 3.1 (2012)
(reporting rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) as percentage of total 80 percent renewables mix in
2050 as ranging from 2.6 percent in low-demand scenario and 5.2 percent in high-demand
scenario). But see James Newcomb et al., Distributed Energy Resources: Policy Implications of
Decentralization, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 65, 66 (2013) (reporting results from an analysis
finding that "distributed resources could provide half of renewable electricity supply in an 80
percent renewables future").
272. See, e.g., REINVENTING FIRE, supra note 20, at 169 (presenting multiple scenarios for the
power sector including 80 percent renewables by 2050); RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 27 ("At 800/ renewable electricity in
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mix, moreover, the process will take decades, requiring a level of planning,
coordination, and new investment far beyond anything engaged in to date."'
It will necessarily involve actors and institutions at multiple levels, taking
shape out of the diverse array of business models and regulatory frameworks
that mark the current system. Disruptive technologies and practices will
surely play some role, but the prospect of wholesale disruption of the sector
seems unlikely.
If we accept the premise that any future low-carbon electricity system,
however it comes to be organized, will include a more diverse and intercon-
nected set of actors with widely varying assets, behaviors, and motivations, it
seems that a broader concept of public utility has much to offer. Mobilizing
and channeling the investments in generation, transmission, distribution, and
end use needed to reduce emissions across the power sector by 80 percent or
more by midcentury will require a level of certainty regarding cost recovery
that markets alone seem unable to provide. Coordinating an increasingly di-
verse array of supply- and demand-side resources, owned and operated by
thousands (if not millions) of independent actors, will place demands on sys-
tems operators that far exceed anything experienced to date. Creating space
for innovation, experimentation, and demonstration at scale calls for durable
policy supports, a level of public-private cooperation, and a shared commit-
ment that go well beyond current approaches. These three sets of activities-
planning and investment, coordination and systems operation, and experi-
mentation and innovation-are central to the broader concept of public utili-
ty advanced here. This Part discusses each in turn.
A. Planning and Investment
Planning was a core aspect of the social control ofbusiness that animated the
agenda of Progressives, realists, and institutional economists during the first
half of the twentieth century.274 To be sure, discussions of economic planning,
2050, annual generation from both coal-fired and natural gas-fired sources was reduced by
about 80%, resulting in reductions in annual greenhouse gases of about 80% (on a direct
combustion basis and on a full life cycle basis) .... ).
273. See, e.g., Todd Foley et al., Finance Policy: Removing Investment Barriers and Managing Risk,
26 ELECTRICITYJ. 54, 55 (2013) ("In total, moving to an 80 percent renewables future will
require investing roughly $50-70 billion per year over the next decade, increasing to between
$100 and $200 billion per year as we approach 2050. This is roughly two to five times larger
than current levels of investment in new transmission and generation assets in the electricity
sector.").
274. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 2, at 455-72 (discussing various approaches to economic
planning); CHARLES R. MCCANN, JR., ORDER AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN SOCIo-
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particularly during and after the New Deal, were often freighted with the
heavy baggage that came with the seemingly inevitable comparisons to Soviet-
style central planning.275 But there was also a recognition that more modest
forms of planning provided indispensible tools in the larger effort to guide
certain industries, mitigate against economic disruptions, and protect the
public interest. From Henry Carter Adams to John Commons, Louis
Brandeis, Walton Hamilton, and on to James Landis (among others), there
was a shared notion of "statecraft" (Hamilton's phrase) that recognized the
government's affirmative role in providing intelligent guidance to ensure or-
dered change in a dynamic industrial economy.276
That said, it is also true that the actual practice of planning by public
utility commissions (PUCs) was rarely explored in much depth by these
scholars, operating more as a background assumption than an explicit duty in
their conception of public utility regulation.7 To take one example, the pru
dent investment standard, which Hale and others advocated for during the
middle decades of the twentieth century and which remains at the heart of
ECONOMIC THOUGHT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND PROGRESSIVE-ERA REFORM 1 (2012)
(describing the project of American Progressivism as "nothing less than the direction of
human development through systematic, rational planning").
275. For the canonical statement on the perils of central planning and the superiority of markets as
coordination mechanisms, see F.A. Hayek, The Use ofKnozledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 524-26 (1945) (discussing epistemic limitations of central planning and
superiority of price system as a mechanism for coordinating economic activity). As noted
above, Hayek recognized that competition sometimes fell short as an appropriate tool for
coordinating activity in certain areas, including those relating to the services provided by
public utilities. See HAYEK, supra note 189, at 48 (noting that problems posed by public
utilities could not be solved adequately by competition).
276. See HAMILTON, POLITICS OF INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 18 ("All industries are, in their
several degrees, instruments of the general welfare; where there is failure in performance, the
call is for statecraft.").
277. See, e.g., id. at 155-56 (observing that regulatory commissions had generally failed to address
the "larger questions of holding the regulated industry to its function, of improving its
capacity to serve the public, of looking to the hazards ahead and guarding against them, and
of making of it a more effective instrument of the general welfare. . . . Matters of policy get
immersed in the quagmire of detail. The agency fails to direct the activities of the industry to
public objectives . . . ."). Those who might be referred to as part of the second generation of
institutional economists and public utility experts, some of whom were students of John
Commons, embraced a more expansive view of planning and bemoaned the marginalization
of planning and creative policymaking that resulted from the judicialization of the public
utility commissions (PUCs). See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 91, at 252 (emphasizing the vital
role of PUCs in "their capacity as experts to contribute, with a minimum of political
interference, to the solution of long-run problems of the industries"); JOHN BAUER,
TRANSFORMING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: A DEFINITE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROGRAM 296-312 (1950) (discussing problems inhibiting more dynamic forms of public
utility regulation and arguing for a more active role for PUCs as public-planning agencies).
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modern cost-of-service regulation, embodied (in concept if not always in
practice) a commitment to load forecasting and planning for new investments
based on available knowledge."' Likewise, a chief responsibility of the PUC
as elaborated by John Commons and others was to investigate and gather
facts regarding proposed utility investments in order to determine a reasona-
ble or prudent course of action, often in the context of an adjudicatory setting
where utilities, ratepayers, and other stakeholders presented their respective
cases for or against a particular course of action.2 '
Embedded within all of this was a recognition that rate regulation pro-
vided the key mechanism for securing capital on favorable terms and directing
it toward large investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. As
discussed above, the move to monopoly franchises regulated by state PUCs in
the early twentieth century was driven in part by the need to lower the financ-
ing costs of building large electric power systems.so Planning and investment
thus constituted central activities for utilities and their regulators, allowing
them to sequence the financing and building of different projects across the
various components of the system. During the first three quarters of the
twentieth century, the utilities dominated the process, focusing on diversity of
supply (known as "economic mix") and diversity of load ("load factor") in or-
der to maximize the utilization of the system."' Investment projects were
subject to approval by PUCs, with capital budgeting and accounting performed
according to standard procedures, and prudency reviews providing a check
against the proclivity for over-building."2
That many commissions did not always perform their roles with the dili-
gence or creativity that they deserved is not in dispute. During the post-World
War II economic boom-a time of increasing economies of scale in power
generation, sustained growth in demand, and declining real prices-there
seemed to be little reason to consider a future that might turn out differently
278. See, e.g., CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 340-41 (1993) (discussing prudent investment as the exercise of reasonable
foresight based on what the company knew or should have known in the circumstances at the
time the investment was made); JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY RATES 223 (2 nd ed. 1988) ("Prudent investment is the original historical cost minus
any fraudulent, unwise, or extravagant outlays that should not be a burden on ratepayers.").
279. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 91, at 256-58 (discussing PUC responsibilities for investigation and
adjudication).
280. See supra Part II.A.
281. See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 367-70 (discussing concepts of "economic mix" and "load
factor" in the development of regional power systems in the U.S.).
282. See PHILLIPS, supra note 278, at 338-57 (discussing standard practice of determining how
investments should be incorporated into rate base).
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than the past. Deciding when, rather than if, to build ever-larger power
plants and folding them into rate base occupied much of the attention of utility
regulators."' The problems with this approach became all too apparent in the
1970s as the rosy forecasts of prior decades gave way to the realities of techno-
logical limits, lower electricity demand, and environmental challenges.284
The waste associated with overbuilding, particularly with respect to nuclear
power plants, was pinned, at least in part, on the perverse incentives embed-
ded in rate regulation and the general lack of care and foresight regarding future
possibilities."'
While the reactions to the events of the 1970s varied, in many respects it
was this experience, combined with the sustained critique of public utility
regulation mounted by economists and lawyers starting in the 1960s, that
planted the seeds for deregulation in the decades to come. The promise of
deregulation, in short, was that it would allow the market to coordinate in-
vestments through price signals, shifting the risks associated with investments
in new generation from ratepayers to investors. By unbundling generation
from transmission and distribution, a truly open-access regime would facili-
tate competition among wholesale generators sufficient to ensure just and
reasonable prices and deliver cost savings to customers.6
From a climate change perspective, however, the looming question is
whether electricity markets can deliver significant carbon reductions over the
283. See EDWARD KAHN, ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANNING AND REGULATION 12-13 (1991)
("The regulatory procedures developed during the declining-cost period addressed the
politically pleasant task of deciding how much to reduce prices.... Most regulatory attention ...
was devoted to determining the value of capital invested (rate base) and fixing the level of
reasonable earnings. Because of the underlying scale economies, new capital investment
always lowered operating costs.").
284. See supra Part II.C.
285. See Pierce, supra note 175, at 500-07 (discussing forecasts of the early 1970s and comparing
them to the realities of the late 1970s and early 1980s); PHILLIPS, supra note 278, at 341-42
(discussing disallowances under prudency reviews on the basis of excess capacity, cost
overruns, failure to cancel construction, and other factors).
286. See supra Part II.C; Spence, Politics of Electricity Restructuring, supra note 219, at 422
(recounting the rationale for electricity restructuring). As Professor Spence points out, the
question of whether (or when) so-called market-based rates satisfy the just and reasonable
standard under the Federal Power Act is not settled, and the Supreme Court has not yet
spoken directly on the issue. See id. at 429-36 (discussing debates over whether market
based rates satisfy the just and reasonable standard); see also Morgan Stanley Capital Group
Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, 554 U.S. 529, 538 (2008) ("Both
the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have generally approved FERC's scheme of market-
based tariffs. We have not hitherto approved, and express no opinion today, on the lawfulness




next several decades.8 Obviously, in a world where renewables and other
sources of low-carbon generation continue to have difficulties competing on
price with fossil generation (specifically gas-fired generation), such markets
will not promote investment in low-carbon alternatives." This could change
either through the adoption of a robust carbon price or continued technological
advances that allow low-carbon alternatives to compete head-to-head with
fossil generation. In the absence of either of these, GHG regulations under
the Clean Air Act 89 for fossil generators and increased subsidies for renewa-
bles and other low-carbon generation will continue to be the biggest drivers
of new investments in low-carbon alternatives.290 Consequently, much of the
287. Cf David M. Newberry, Reforming Competitive Electricity Markets to Meet Environmental
Targets, 1 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL POL. 69, 71 (2012) (discussing electricity market
reforms in the UK and noting that "[tlhe deeper concern is whether liberalized electricity
markets are compatible with a low-carbon electricity industry").
288. While it is certainly true that fossil hydrocarbons continue to enjoy significant subsidies that
are larger than those for renewable energy in the aggregate (not to mention the issue of
environmental externalities), the subsidy per kilowatt-hour for fossil generation is quite small
(excluding externalities) compared to that for renewables. See Severin Borenstein, The
Private and Public Economics of Renewvable Electricity Generation, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 77
(2012) (reporting estimates of subsidies to fossil generation in the U.S., based on generous
assumptions, of $0.0011 per kilowatt hour). For comparison, the current production tax
credit for wind energy is $0.023 per kilowatt hour. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit (PiU), http://energy.gov/savings/renewable-electricity-production-tax-
credit-ptc.
289. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006).
290. EPA's proposals under section 111 of the Clean Air Act to establish GHG emissions
performance standards for new and existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units are the
most obvious and important examples of such regulations. See Standards of Performance for New
Stationary Sources, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2013); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule,
79 FED. REG. 1430, 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Proposed NSPS Rule for New Power
Plants] (proposing new source performance standards for carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil-fuel fired electric generating units); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 12-13 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter
Proposed NSPS Rule for Existing Power Plants], available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2014-05/documents/20140602proposal-deanpowerplan.pdf ( roposing emission
guidelines for states to follow in developing plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units). If these rules survive the inevitable legal
challenges, they will have a major impact on the generation mix and emissions profile of the
U.S. electric power sector, with significant implications for federal and state electricity
regulation. In particular, the proposed rule for existing power plants, which gives individual
states significant flexibility in determining how to meet the proposed emissions standards,
contemplates an expansive role for PUCs and for RTOs and ISOs in planning for and
guiding the investments and activities that will allow states to achieve the "best system of
emissions reduction" for the power sector in their jurisdictions. See, e.g., Proposed NSPS
Rule for Existing Power Plants, supra, at 22, 271 (discussing PUC integrated resource
planning exercises and RTOs and ISOs as possible vehicles for implementing best system of
emissions reduction).
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ongoing growth in renewable energy in U.S. electricity markets is made possible
by specific policy supports and renewable portfolio standard (RPS) mandates,
with the vast majority of new renewable energy generation sold through fixed
price, long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with utilities rather than
through the spot markets.291
Current auction designs in the wholesale power markets create additional
challenges for efforts to drive investments into low-carbon alternatives. Because
of the uniform clearing price design, which translates into strong incentives
for generators to bid their power into the auction at their short-run marginal
cost, higher levels of renewables in these markets depress prices and make it
difficult to recover capital costs.292 To take the most important example, elec-
tricity generated from wind is being bid into the wholesale auctions at zero or
below. That is, because wind generation (like solar) has no fuel costs, it has a
short-run marginal cost of zero. In fact, at times, wind is being bid into the
auctions at negative prices in order to ensure dispatch and thereby allow wind
generators to capture the non-market revenues available from the production
tax credit (PTC) and sales of renewable energy credits (RECs), both of which
are tied to the actual production of electricity from the wind project.293 These
291. See K. CORY ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., INNOVATIONS IN WIND AND
SOLAR PV FINANCING 1, 3 (2008) (discussing the impact of policy supports on growth of
renewable energy and noting that renewable energy projects are typically financed through
long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs)); RACHEL GELMAN, NAT'L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., 2012 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK 64 (Mike Meshek ed., 2013),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl4osti/60197.pdf; DIPA SHARIF ET AL.,
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, THE RETURN-AND RETURNS-OF TAx
EQUITY FOR US RENEWABLE PROJECTS 2 (2011) (reporting on the importance of tax
credits for growth of renewable energy).
292. See Michael Milligan et al., Bulk Electric Powoer Systems: Operations and Transmission Planning,
in 4 NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY
21-27 (2012) ("During periods when zero-marginal-cost units are on the margin, prices
collapse and there is no ability to recover capital costs. Therefore, cost recovery for installed
equipment that is based primarily on selling energy at its marginal price would be difficult in
such a system where energy prices could be near zero for much of the year-such a market
would not be sustainable because the average price would be less than average total cost. As
such, high levels of renewable electricity generation may require re-examination of market
structures for energy and consideration of a broader range of factors, such as capacity or
others, for cost recovery.").
293. See MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM, supra
note 197, at 30 ("[O]ut of market payments in the form of RECs and federal production tax
credit mean that these units [wind and solar] have an incentive to generate MWh until the
LMP [(locational marginal price)] is equal to the marginal cost of producing minus the credit
received for each MWh. As the net of LMP and credits can be negative, the credits can
provide an incentive to make negative energy offers. These subsidies affect the offer behavior
of these resources in PJM markets and thus the market prices and the mix of clearing
resources.").
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market effects occur even in cases where most renewable energy is sold
through PPAs, because these resources are still self-scheduled into the power
markets and thus suppress the auction clearing prices and affect the merit order
for dispatch.294 During periods of high renewables availability, prices in par-
ticular regional transmission organization (RTO) zones can be zero and even
negative.29
Obviously, such a situation is not a viable model for recovering the large
fixed costs associated with renewable generation. It is also problematic for in-
centivizing investments in fossil-based generation, which has reliability im-
plications because of the need for fossil generation to balance the
intermittency of renewable generation.296 Thus, other means of recovering costs,
whether through new market structures (such as capacity markets), policy supports,
or reregulation, would seem to be necessary to provide appropriate investment in-
centives and to allow for significant penetration of renewables in the wholesale
markets.
In addition to the difficulties of promoting investments in renewables,
the current wholesale power markets also appear limited in their ability to
support investments in large, capital-intensive, low-carbon generation facili-
ties such as nuclear or coal plants with carbon capture and storage.297 The
294. See PHILLIP BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42818, U.S. RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY:
How DOES WIND GENERATION IMPACT COMPETITIVE POWER MARKETS? 10-13
(2012) (discussing the impacts of increased penetration of wind energy on the depression of
prices in wholesale power markets).
295. Because of the additional revenues from tax credits and renewable energy credit (REC) sales,
wind power is sometime bid into these markets at a negative price in order to ensure dispatch,
which is obviously essential to capture the production tax credit and the RECs. During
periods of high wind availability, this structure has created negative prices in some of the
regional transmission organization (RTO) markets. See id. at 13 ("The ability of wind to bid
negatively priced electricity is a result of value received from federal production tax credit
incentives and the potential opportunity to sell renewable energy credits (RECs) to third
parties."). During 2011, in certain locations during periods of high wind availability,
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator's (MISO's) independent market
monitor reported an average price of negative twenty dollars per megawatt hour. See id. at 15.
296. See BROWN, supra note 294 ("[S]hould wind power generation continue to grow, it is
uncertain if current RTO market designs will provide the signals needed to encourage
specific types of generation capacity (e.g., operating and spinning reserves) necessary to
manage the variable nature of wind power."); see also Thure Traber & Claudia Kemfert, Gone
With the Wind?-Electricity Market Prices and Incentives to Invest in Thermal Power Plants
Under Increasing WindEnergy Supply, 33 ENERGY ECON. 249,255 (2011) (concluding, based on a
model of the German power sector, that incentives to invest in flexible natural gas plants are
reduced by increased supply of wind energy).
297. SeeJay Apt et al., Promoting Low Carbon Electricity Production, ISSUES SC. &TECH., Spring
2007, at 37, 41; Tim Laing & Michael Grubb, Low Carbon Electricity Investment: The
Limitations ofTraditionalApproaches and a Radical Alternative 4-7 (Univ. of Cambridge Elec.
Policy Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1032, 2010).
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long time horizons associated with these investments together with the un-
certainty regarding performance, future prices, and regulations translates into
a relatively high cost of capital, which makes financing very challenging in the
market context.298 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that current investments
in new nuclear power units and in advanced coal plants with carbon capture
and storage are taking place in traditional cost-of-service states where cost re-
covery mechanisms provide more certainty with respect to future revenues
sufficient to pay financing costs.299
Put another way, without some ability to socialize the costs of these in-
vestments (whether through rates, subsidies, or some combination of the
two), the capital markets are unlikely to provide financing on favorable terms.
298. This is particularly true in the current environment of cheap natural gas. Witness the words
ofJohn Rowe, former CEO of Exelon Corp., the largest U.S. producer of nuclear power: "As
long as natural gas is anywhere near current price forecasts, you can't economically build a
merchant nuclear plant." Mark Clayton, Nuclear powEer a Viable Competitor in US Energy
Market, Study Finds, CHRIST. SC. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 2010.
299. To date, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued licenses for the construction
of new nuclear reactors in Georgia and South Carolina. See Mathew L. Wald, Federal
Regulators Approve Two Nuclear Reactors in Georgia, NY TIMES Feb., 9, 2012, at B-3
(reporting on NRC decision to issue licenses to Georgia Power for two new reactors in
Georgia); Ryan Tracy, U.S. Approves Nuclear Plants in South Carolina, WALL ST. J., March
30, 2012 (reporting on NRC decision to issues licenses to Scana Corp. for two new reactors
in South Carolina). In addition to various federal incentives, both Georgia and South
Carolina enacted legislation that provides favorable rate base treatment and automatic
prudence determinations for much of the new reactors. See, e.g., Georgia Nuclear Energy
Financing Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 46-2-25 et seq. (2013) (providing prudence determination
and favorable rate recovery for costs of approved new nuclear power plants); Base Load
Review Act, Art. 4, S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210 et seq. (2013) (providing favorable rate
treatment and prudence determinations for costs of new nuclear power plants). The most
ambitious commercial-scale demonstration clean coal plant currently under construction in
the United States is the Kemper Integrated Gasification and Combined Cycle Plant in
Mississippi (owned by the Mississippi Power Company, a subsidiary of the Southern
Company). This facility will include carbon capture and storage technology, with a goal of
capturing 65 percent of the carbon dioxide emissions from the plant, giving it an emissions
profile similar to that of a combined cycle natural gas plant. The Kemper Plant was initially
projected to cost $2.2 billion, but is now expected to cost $5.5 billion. In addition to
receiving $270 million in direct financing and another potential $133 million in investment
tax credits from the federal government, the project will also benefit from favorable rate
treatment for the initial $2.3 billion in costs under Mississippi's 2008 Base Load Act. See
Steven Mufson, The Coal Plant to End All Coal Plants?, WASH. POST, May 18, 2014
(discussing history and status of Kemper plant); Alternate Method of Cost Recovery on
Certain Base Load Generation, Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-101 et seq (2013) (providing
prudence determination and favorable cost recovery for certain baseload generation
investments in Mississippi); Miss. Public Service Commission, Final Order on Remand
Granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, Authorizing Application of
Baseload Act, and Approving Prudent Pre-Construction Costs, Docket No. 2009-UA-014,
at 9-10, 99 (2012) (confirming application of Baseload Act to Kemper Plant and capping rate
recovery for costs associated with the Kemper Plant at $2.4 billion).
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Carbon pricing schemes could shift these incentives, making low-carbon
generation more attractive, but recent analysis suggests that a carbon price
may not be enough by itself to channel large investments into low-carbon
generation.300 In the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),
for example, several recent studies indicate that allowance prices have had only
limited impacts on investment decisions in the power sector.301 While this
may be due in part to historically low allowance prices resulting from, among
other things, a depressed economy, it is the uncertainty with respect to future
prices that makes long-term investments challenging.
In the United States, allowance prices in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative market have only recently moved above their very low floor price of
less than two dollars, and they appear to have had only limited impact on dispatch
decisions, much less investment choices, in that region.302 California's cap-
and-trade program, which has an escalating floor price that started at en dol-
lars per ton of carbon dioxide in 2012, provides more certainty going forward, but
that system faces much more pressing challenges from emissions leakage in
the power sector.303
300. See Laing & Grubb, supra note 297, at 4-7 (discussing challenges of stimulating necessary
investment in low-carbon electricity through liberalized electricity markets combined with
carbon pricing schemes).
301. See, e.g, Karoline S. Rogge & Volker H. Hoffmann, The Impact ofthe EUETS on the Sectoral
Innovation System for Power Generation Technologies-Findings for Germany, 38 ENERGY
POL'Y 7639, 7650 (2010) ("[T]he . . . EU ETS [(European Union Emissions Trading
System)] [is] itself insufficient . . . to decarbonize the power sector."); Karoline S. Rogge et
al., The Innovation Impact of the EU Emission Trading System-Findings of Company Case
Studies in the German Power Sector, 70 ECOL. ECON. 513, 521 (2011) ("[T]he EU ETS by
itself is highly unlikely to lead to RD&D and adoption decisions in line with reaching the
EU's proposed 2050 targets.").
302. See POTOMAC ECONOMICS, RGGI, MARKET MONITOR REPORT FOR AUCTION 23, at 3
(2014) (reporting that Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Auction held on March
5, 2014 was oversubscribed and that the market cleared at the $4.00 per ton cost containment
reserve price for the first time). The current floor price for allowances in RGGI is around
$2.00 per ton. Most previous auctions have traded at or very close to the floor price, but the
decision in 2012 to lower the overall cap under RGGI starting in 2014 has created additional
demand for RGGI allowances. Still, the relatively low prices of RGGI allowances, as in the
EU ETS, have likely had limited impacts on long-term investment behavior. See SEVREIN
BORENSTEIN ET AL., EXPECTING THE UNEXPECTED: EMISSIONS UNCERTAINTY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKET DESIGN 2 (2014), available at httpi//tiger-forum.com/Media/
speakers/abstract/561405pm/borenstein bushnell wolak zaragoza-watkins.pdf (noting the
need for stable and predictable carbon prices to incent long-term investments and observing
that volatile and low average emissions prices in the EU ETS and RGGI "probably do little
to achieve the long-term climate policy goals of significant investments in low-carbon
technologies").
303. Emissions leakage refers to the effect of an emissions reduction program in transferring
emissions outside of the jurisdictional boundaries of the program rather than actually
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In sum, the appealingly simple idea that pricing carbon emissions will
allow liberalized electricity markets to coordinate investment in low-carbon
generation appears to be more challenging than expected. The current itera-
tions of carbon pricing schemes are simply not sufficient to mobilize and
channel the investments necessary to decarbonize the power sector by 2050.304
Making carbon emissions more expensive, in other words, appears to offer
only a partial solution to decarbonizing the power sector, especially when future
prices are uncertain. Given the higher capital intensity of a low-carbon elec-
tricity system compared to the current fossil-based system, and given the
long-lived nature of many of these assets, finding ways to de-risk and thus reduce
the cost of capital for these investments is a critical task for policy.305 This
raises important questions about the relative merits of different coordination
mechanisms as they work in practice rather than in the abstract models of eco-
nomic theory.
The United Kingdom's ongoing electricity market reform effort is in-
structive in this respect. According to one recent analysis, "[tjhese reforms
are widely seen as a watershed for the sector, involving a substantial shift from
a 'pure' liberalized market model to one requiring more centralized direc-
tion."306 In recognition of the inability of electricity markets combined with
the EU ETS to drive sufficient investment in low-carbon generation to meet
the United Kingdom's legally binding GHG reduction target of 80 percent
below 1990 levels by 2050,307 the Government's proposal would adopt a sys-
tem of feed-in tariffs for low-carbon generation, a guaranteed carbon price
floor (developed via a tax that operates in addition to the EU ETS price), an
emissions performance standard, and capacity markets.308 In effect, the United
reducing them. Because imported electricity accounts for about half of power sector
emissions in California, the potential for emissions leakage under the California cap-and-
trade program is substantial. See, e.g., James Bushnell et al., Dowonstream Regulation of C02
Emissions in Calfornia's Electricity Sector, 64 ENERGY POL. 313, 314, 320 (2014) (discussing
leakage problems for electricity sector under California cap-and-trade program).
304. See Newberry, supra note 287, at 71 (concluding that because of the "fundamental" design
flaw of EU ETS in "setting a quota on EU emissions rather than a price, the resulting carbon
price signals that are intended to guide long-term investment decisions are unstable, and
lack[] credibility").
305. See Robert Gross et al., Risks, Revenues, and Investment in Electricity Generation: Why Policy
Needs to Look Beyond Costs, 32 ENERGY ECON. 796, 801 (2010) (emphasizing importance of
policies to reduce investment risk associated with low-carbon generation).
306. See MALCOLM KEAYET AL., OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, DECARBONIZATION OF
THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY-IS THERE STILL A PLACE FOR MARKETS? (2012).
307. See Climate Change Act, ch. 27, § 1.1(1) (U.K. 2008).
308. See U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM:
POLICY OVERVIEW 8, 12-18 (2012) (discussing key features of the electricity market reform
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Kingdom, which pioneered electricity market liberalization in the early
1990s, is moving toward "a system where most new investment will be driven,
and remunerated, by non-market means."309
The dominant motivation behind these reforms is to reduce the invest-
ment risks associated with low-carbon generation, something that liberalized
electricity markets combined with emissions prices have not been able to
do.310 As one commentator put it, these reforms appear to require, at least in
the minds of the policymakers and analysts in the United Kingdom, a return
to the "p word"-planning, that is.311 Thus, the Government's white paper
that launched the reform effort was appropriately titled Planning Our Electric
Future.312
In the United States, as discussed above, planning has long been at the
heart of traditional utility regulation and is a major focus of the RTOs and
ISOs. During the 1980s and 1990s, many state PUCs embraced more formal
planning exercises, largely in reaction to the overbuilding disasters that became
apparent in the late 1970s and early 1980s.313 Known initially as least cost
planning and later as integrated resource planning (IRP), these efforts were
intended to assert more regulatory oversight over the utility-centric planning
proposal); KEAY ET AL., supra note 306, at 11-12 (summarizing main components of the
United Kingdom's electricity market reform initiative).
309. Malcolm Keay, Return of the P-Word: The Government's Electricity White Paper, OXFORD
ENERGY COMMENT 6 (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2011); see also Michael G.
Pollitt & Aoife Brophy Haney, Dismantling a Competitive Electricity Sector: The UK's
Electricity Market Reform, 26 ELEC. J. 8, 9 (2013) ("The upshot of the EMR [Electricity
Market Reform] is to effectively end competitive investments in one of the most competitive
electricity markets in the world and replace it with a system of administered energy and
capacity prices.").
310. See Newberry, supra note 287, at 73-75 (discussing proposed U.K. reforms and overall goal of
"de-risking" investments in low-carbon generation to reduce the cost of capital).
311. KEAY, supra note 309, at 1.
312. UK DEP'T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, PLANNING OUR ELECTRIC FUTURE: A
WHITE PAPER FOR SECURE, AFFORDABLE AND Low-CARBON ELECTRICITY 16 (2011)
("Without reform, the existing market will not deliver the scale of long-term investment, at
the pace that is needed, nor will it be able to ensure that consumers get the best deal. If we
are to meet our long-term carbon and security of supply objectives, we need to reform the
market now, and make investment in low-carbon generation in the UK more attractive.").
313. See David Berry, The Structure ofElectric Utility Least Cost Planning, 26 J. ECON. ISSUES 769,
769 (1992) ("Since the mid-1980s, at least half of the state utility regulatory commissions
have adopted or are developing some form of least cost planning for electric utilities. . . . The
need for least cost planning stems from failure to develop a flexible set of options to deal with
uncertainty, weak coordination among decisionmakers responsible for supply- and demand-
side planning, neglect of cost-effective conservation, inadequate implementation of alternate
generating technologies, and a record of poor load forecasting.").
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exercises that had prevailed in the past.314 More importantly, they were also
meant to widen the scope of such exercises to include assessment and evalua-
tion of alternatives to generation, such as transmission, efficiency, and con-
servation, as well as the use of "environmental adders" and other tools to force
consideration of the environmental impacts of particular investments.315
Although a number of states abandoned IRP requirements during the
push for retail competition in the 1990s and 2000s, PUCs in regulated cost-
of-service states continued to require and even expand the IRP process.316
Even in restructured states, moreover, a number of PUCs are now requiring
long-term procurement planning (LTPP) to ensure that load-serving entities
are considering options on longer time horizons than markets allow. 3 17 Today,
twenty-eight states have formal IRP filing requirements and eleven other
states have LTPP requirements.318
While the actual practice of resource planning varies by state, most of
the planning processes proceed on the basis of three main steps: (1) forecast-
ing load (demand) over the relevant time horizon; (2) determining portfolios
314. See Mark Hanson et al., Electric Utility Least-Cost Planning: Making it Work Within a
Multiattribute Decision-Making Framezoork, 57 J. AM. PLAN. AssoC. 34, 35-36 (1991)
(noting that under least-cost planning the "regulatory focus shifts and the commission
becomes more deeply involved in planning areas traditionally viewed as the prerogative of
utility management"); Eric Hirst, Integrated Resource Planning at Electric Utilities: The
Planning Process, 12 EVAL. &PROG. PLANNING 213, 213, 221-22 (1989) (discussing least-
cost and integrated resource planning and stressing importance of active PUC involvement in
and oversight of the planning process); Berry, The Structure of Electric Utility Least Cost
Planning, supra note 313, at 769 ("Least cost planning is a deliberate attempt by state
regulatory commissions to create new institutions for long-range planning for electric
utilities.").
315. See Berry, The Structure ofElectric Utility Least Cost Planning, supra note 313, at 769; Ralph C.
Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and Their Regulators, 10
HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 299 (1986). This broader set of considerations could be viewed as
an effort to fulfill the promise of prudence reviews in the context of increased economic
uncertainty and new environmental challenges.
316. See Pamela Lesh, Planning for the Future, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 45, 48 (2009) (noting that
while restructuring led some states to abandon or scale back IRP "[t]he last several years ...
have seen a resurgence of IRP, both in states that did not restructure the electric industry and
even in some states that did").
317. Long-term procurement planning (LTPP) requirements are similar to integrated resource
planning (IRP), but typically have shorter time horizons (five to ten years) and are required to
be updated more frequently (every year). Because these LTPPs apply to utilities operating in
deregulated markets, they focus less on building new generation and more on purchases of
energy and capacity as well as demand-side and efficiency programs. See RACHEL WILSON
&BRUCE BIEWALD, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY
INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 8-9 (2013) (discussing LTPP requirements).
318. SeeJordan Wilkerson et al., Survey of Western US. Electric Utility Resource Plans, 66 ENERGY
POL'Y 90, 91 (2014); see also WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 317, at 5 (reporting on states
that have IRP or LTPP requirements).
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of existing and future resources to meet demand; and (3) evaluating the costs
and risks associated with each portfolio.319 All of these planning exercises
generally require consideration of feasible supply-side, demand-side, and
transmission resources.320 Most have time horizons of ten years or more, and
most require updating on a regular (two to four year) basis.321 Many planning
exercises have also embraced more participatory frameworks that include
ratepayer advocates and other stakeholders.22
None of which is to suggest that existing IRP processes cannot be im-
proved, and a number of states, though legislation and regulation, have con-
tinued to adjust and revise their planning exercises.323 But at their best, these
IRP exercises look like the kind of iterative, multistakeholder processes that
new governance theorists often celebrate.324 More importantly, by bringing a
broader set of considerations and constituencies into the utility planning pro-
cess and by taking a long time frame as the planning horizon, with a com-
mitment to regular review and revision, robust IRP processes can play
important roles in guiding utility investments and practices toward a low-carbon
future.
The evidence for this is readily apparent. Given the prospect of future
carbon regulations, IRP exercises in a number of states have for years used
319. Wilkerson et al., supra note 318, at 91 (identifying basic steps in resource planning).
320. See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 317, at 7 (discussing resources evaluated in the IRP
processes).
321. See id at 6 (detailing the IRP planning horizons and frequency of updates for different states).
322. See, e.g., Wilkerson et al., supra note 318, at 90 ("Many utilities are required to publicly
release and defend their integrated resource plans (IRPs) in front of consumer advocates,
Public Utility Commissions (PUCs), and other stakeholders."). Hanson et al., supra note
314, at 36 ("An important difference between the least-cost and traditional processes is the
involvement of the public and of various interested parties in all stages of the planning
process. Under least-cost planning, ... different parties have the opportunity to propose and
evaluate options from the perspective of their explicitly stated preferences. Differences in
these values and outcomes must then be negotiated or mediated in the regulatory decision-
making process."). Colorado's IRP rules require that the utility, Commission staff, and the
office of Consumer Counsel agree upon an "independent evaluator" to review all documents
and data used by the utility in preparing the resource plan and submit a report to the
Commission evaluating the plan. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3612 (2014); see also
WILSON &BIEWALD, supra note 317, at 13 (discussing Colorado planning procedures).
323. See Wilkerson et al., supra note 318, at 91 (reviewing literature on problems of IRPs,
including availability, consistency, and completeness of data and reporting methods);
WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 317, at 9-15 (discussing evolution of IRP rules and
practices in Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon).
324. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 314, at 36 (discussing multi-stakeholder, "iterative" nature
of the utility planning process); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism and
Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEORGETOWN L. J. 53, 80-82 (2011)
(discussing key features of experimentalist governance including dynamic, iterative planning
and multi-stakeholder deliberation).
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"carbon adders" (the incorporation of a shadow price for carbon emissions) in
evaluating and guiding future investments."2 This has allowed utilities, regu-
lators, and stakeholders in the IRP process to look out over multidecade time
horizons and to compare investments under various potential carbon con-
straints."6 Likewise, careful consideration of distributed and demand-side
programs in the IRP process has resulted in decisions to forgo investment in
new generation."' Commitment to a diverse portfolio of resources has also
worked to shift attention away from an exclusive focus on short-term fuel
prices. All of which has made it possible for PUCs and regulated utilities to
consider investments that might not be cost-effective today, but that do make
economic sense over longer time frames that incorporate carbon constraints.
It is no surprise, in this respect, that EPA's recently proposed rule to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants identi-
fies state IRP processes as a possible vehicle for developing the state emissions
reduction plans required under the rule."2
At the federal level, FERC has also pushed for a more expansive ap-
proach to regional transmission planning and cost allocation that explicitly
takes account of the transmission needs associated with public policy objec-
tives such as renewables mandates.329 In accordance with Order 1000, which
325. See, e.g., GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., MANAGING
CARBON REGULATORY RISK IN UTILITY RESOURCE PLANNING: CURRENT PRACTICES IN
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rd811t9
(discussing current efforts to include carbon prices in utility planning); WILSON &
BIEWALD, supra note 317, at 16-25 (describing use of carbon price adders as part of IRP best
practices in Arizona, Colorado, and the six-state territory of PacificCorp.); Jonas J. Monast
& Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility Regulation: Aligning State-Level
Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 40-44
(2013) (discussing the incorporation of possible future carbon dioxide regulations and prices
in long-term planning by various PUCs).
326. See, e.g., WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 317, at 16-25; A.B. 327 § 8 (Cal. 2013)
(requiring California IOUs to develop distribution system plans to accommodate distributed
energy resources).
327. Public Service Company of Colorado, for example, reduced its projected 2018 resource needs
from one thousand megawatts to less than three hundred megawatts as a result of its
demand-side management (DSM) and solar distributed generation (DG) programs. See, e.g.,
1 PUB. SERV. CO. OF COLO., 2011 ELECTRIC RESOURCE PLAN 5 (2011). See also ELECTRIC
POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 66, at 28-29 (discussing importance of integrating
distributed energy resources into transmission and distribution planning).
328. See Proposed NSPS Rule for Existing Power Plants, supra note 290, at 22 (proposing that
states with existing IRP processes "would be able to establish their C02 reduction plans
within that framework").
329. See FERC Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,876 (Aug. 11, 2011)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (calling for regional transmission planning processes that take
account of transmission needs driven by public policy requirements); Tracy C. Davis, FERC's
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establishes a general framework for transmission planning and cost allocation,
regional planning efforts have been established across the country, providing
the basis for new investment (and cost allocation) in high voltage transmission
intended to bring more renewables onto the grid.330 The lVlidcontinent Independ-
ent System Operator (1VIISO), for example, has established a process to identify
so-called multi-value projects for new transmission with particular attention
to wind integration.331 The California ISO (CAISO) has also developed in-
novative approaches in its planning process to evaluate system needs in the
context of high penetration of renewable resources.332
Finally, resource planning at both the federal and state levels has also
emerged as a critical tool in the ongoing effort to manage the impact of new
environmental regulations and cheap natural gas on the existing fleet of coal-
fired power plants. Recent estimates indicate that between 50 and 110
gigawatts of coal-fired generation capacity could be retired between now and
2040.333 Indeed, if EPA's recently proposed GHG rules for new and existing
fossil fuel-fired electric generating units survive the inevitable legal challenges,
there is little question that, barring significant advances in carbon capture and
Regional Transmission Planning Policy Takes Shape, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 22, 25 (2013)
(discussing FERC's Order 1000 and its requirement o consider transmission needs driven by
public policies).
330. See FERC Order 1000, supra note 329, at 49,845-47 (summarizing new requirements for
regional transmission planning processes and cost allocation). A legal challenge to Order
1000 is currently pending in the D.C. Circuit. South Carolina Public Service Authority, et al. v.
FERC No. 12-1232, et al. (D.C. Cir., argued Mar. 20, 2014). In addition to FERC's efforts
under Order 1000 to promote regional transmission planning, the Department of Energy is
supporting several larger interconnection-wide transmission planning processes. See John W.
Jimison and Bill White, Transmission Policy: Planning for and Investing in Wires, 26
ELECTRICITYJ. 109, 115 (2013) (discussing Department of Energy funded interconnection
planning efforts).
331. See MISO, MULTI-VALUE PROJECTS PORTFOLIO (2012) (discussing projects initiated
under MISO's multi-value project (MVP) Tariff intended to increase transmission access for
renewables); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding
key features of MISO MVP tariff); see also Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson,
Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy.A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1801, 1849-55 (2012) (discussing MISO efforts to develop transmission planning and
cost allocation rules to accommodate increasing demand for renewables).
332. See Lorenzo Kristov & Stephen Keehn, From the Brink ofAbyss to a Green, Clean, and Smart
Future: The Evolution of Calfornia's Electricity Market, in EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL
ELECTRICITY MARKETS: NEW PARADIGMS, NEW CHALLENGES, NEW APPROACHES
297, 319-20 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi ed., 2013) (discussing California independent system
operator (CAISO) approach).
333. See ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, supra note 26, at IF-34-IF-35 (projecting
retirement of 50 gigawatts of coal-fired generating capacity by 2020 under reference scenario
and 110 gigawatts by 2040 under accelerated retirement scenario). This compares to 310
gigawatts of installed coal-fired generating capacity at the end of 2012. Id at IF-34.
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storage technology, coal's share of the U.S. electricity mix will decline, perhaps
significantly.334 As a result, the reliability impacts of these expected retire-
ments have become a source of increasing concern among PUCs and FERC
and have led to calls for careful consideration of these retirements in resource
planning exercises.335
In short, planning has been and will continue to be central to the organi-
zation and management of the electric power system. In these contexts at
least, it makes little sense to view it in stark Hayekian terms.336 Rather, plan-
ning is a tool that can complement and even sustain competitive markets and
that, in any event, will be a critical part of the electric power sector under almost
any future organizational form. Instead of viewing it as a misguided quest for
synoptic rationality, in other words, planning in the power sector should be
seen for what it is: a vitally important and fundamentally pragmatic
knowledge practice for dealing with complex, highly interdependent systems
that require intense coordination and management across various spatial and
temporal scales. As current IRP practices indicate, moreover, such exercises
need not be rigid and unaccountable. They can be (and in their best instances
are) provisional, recursive, and participatory-living examples of the kind of
"pragmatic adjustment" that earlier conceptions of public utility embraced.
In his 1960 Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, James
Landis pointed to the general lack of attention to planning and creative poli-
cymaking as among the most important shortcomings of the regulatory agen-
cies."' While his attention was directed to the federal agencies, and although
334. See Proposed NSPS Rule for New Power Plants, supra note 290; Proposed NSPS Rule for
Existing Power Plants, supra note 290.
335. FERC has convened a series of technical conferences and opened dockets to take input from
PUCs, RTOs, ISOs, industry representatives, and others on the potential reliability
implications of coal plant retirements. The most recent conference was held in June of 2014. See
FERC, Reliability Technical Conference, Docket No. AD14-9-00 (April 16, 2014)
(providing notice of technical conference to discuss policy issues related to the reliability of
the bulk-power system). The first such conference was held in 2012 under Docket No.
AD12-1-000.
336. Cf Black & Pierce, supra note 188 at 1341-42 (suggesting that integrated resource planning
in the power sector "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the systems previously used to
govern the economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union"). But see Cudahy,
Electric Deregulation After Calfornia, supra note 236, at 338 ("With due respect to [Professors
Black and Pierce], I cannot imagine central planning coming out ahead in any rhetorical
contest with markets, especially in light of the giddy triumphalism following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. However, the fact is there may be a place for central planning even in
economies where most decisions are left to the market.").
337. See JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT 18 (1960) ("[Mlany of the commissions have neglected their planning or creative
functions. This is due in large part to the burden of routine business thrust upon them and
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his conception of regulatory planning and policy formulation was obviously
broader than the PUC resource planning exercises considered here, Landis's
general admonitions hold for the PUC experience and serve as an important
reminder that planning should be at the heart of what these administrative
agencies do. Problems of judiciailization, lack of qualified personnel, and inade-
quate resources have conspired for too long to narrow PUC responsibilities
and confine the thinking of Commissioners and their staff. In a world of increas-
ing complexity, and in the face of the truly daunting challenge of decarbonizing
the power sector by midcentury, recovering a more affirmative and expansive
approach to planning is a crucial part of any realistic pathway to a low-carbon
future.
B. Coordination and Systems Operation
If planning provides an important tool for managing the electric power
system and sequencing investments over time frames spanning years and dec-
ades, coordination and systems operation are essential to managing the grid
on time scales of milliseconds, hours, days, and weeks.3" Given the distinc-
tive features of the electric power system, specifically the lack of storage and
the need for the system to be perfectly balanced in real time, there are consid-
erable constraints on the kinds of coordination mechanisms that can be used
to maintain balance across these different time scales. As a more diverse and
intermittent set of resources distributed at multiple levels up and down the
electricity supply chain involving many thousands, if not millions, of individ-
ual actors are brought onto the grid, these coordination and systems operation
challenges increase substantially.
Simply put, for a complex network infrastructure such as electricity, reli-
ance on the spontaneous ordering of markets to coordinate such activities
seems nalve.339 With the push to integrate ever-larger amounts of intermit-
also to the caliber of appointment which have been made in recent years."); id. at 22 ("[T]he
greatest gaps . . . are in the planning for foreseeable problems. Absent such planning the
need for ad hoc solutions to the particular manifestations of the problem precede and, indeed,
may preclude any basic policy formulation.").
338. See VON MEIER, supra note 34, at 260-68 (discussing operation and control of power systems
on different time scales).
339. See William W. Hogan, Electricity Wholesale Market Design in a Lowo-Carbon Future, in
HARNESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: THEORY,
PRACTICE, POLICY 117 (Moselle et al. eds., 2010) ("[It is impossible to operate the system
with only decentralized decisions about generation and load. There must be central
coordination of everything and central control of enough of the dispatch to meet the
requirements of system operations.").
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tent renewable generation and a whole suite of distributed energy resources, it
seems positively utopian. To be sure, advances in digital communication
technologies hold great promise for automating many of these coordination
activities (this is part of the promise of the so-called smart grid), but whether
such activities are regulated by previously- agreed-to invisible algorithms, by
human systems operators, or by some combination of the two, they will be
regulated.340
These activities have always been at the heart of the general understand-
ing of electric utilities, even if the details have remained more the province of
power system engineers than lawyers. Managing the transmission and distri-
bution systems, of course, has long been recognized as an activity requiring
regulation given the natural monopoly characteristics of these parts of the sys-
tem.341 Scheduling and dispatching generation to meet load, ensuring suffi-
cient reserve capacity, balancing the grid in real time, and maintaining
reliability clearly require some form of central administration-whether it be
from systems operators in the vertically integrated utilities, regional balancing
authorities, or ISOs and RTOs in the organized markets.
With respect to efforts to decarbonize the power sector, two of the biggest
challenges facing systems operators are the integration of large amounts of
variable utility-scale renewables (wind and solar) and the proliferation of dis-
tributed energy resources that will connect to the grid. Responding to these
challenges will require more rather than less coordination and control as well
as significant increases in investment to modernize and expand the bulk
transmission grid and to build more robust and intelligent distribution systems.
A number of studies have examined the operational challenges in specific
regions associated with efforts to integrate higher levels of renewables, specifically
wind and solar.342 As the costs of electricity generated from wind and solar
340. Cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (discussing
how code serves to regulate cyberspace).
341. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 31, at 60, 65 (noting that electricity transmission
and distribution systems have long been viewed as classic natural monopolies).
342. See, e.g., ENERNEX CORP., EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION AND TRANSMISSION STUDY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND PROJECT OVERVIEW 8-9 (2011), available at http://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy1osti/47086.pdf (investigating a 20 percent wind scenario for the Eastern Interconnection);
GE ENERGY, WESTERN WIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY, at ES-1 (2010),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl0osti/47434.pdf (investigating "the operational
impact of up to 35% energy penetration of wind, photovoltaics (PVs), and concentrating solar
power (CSP) on the power system operated by the WestConnect group of utilities in Arizona,
Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming"); D. LEW ET AL., NAT' RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB. ET AL., THE WESTERN WIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY, at vii (2013), available
at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl3osti/55588.pdf (investigating impacts and costs of higher
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continue to decline and as renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requirements
increase in various states, these analyses provide important perspectives on
how the operation and management of the current grid will need to adjust to
accommodate a growing amount of variable resources. The general conclu-
sion from these integration studies, which is hardly a surprise, is that the balancing
demands associated with higher penetrations of variable resources will require
more system flexibility, more dispatchable capacity, faster ramping rates,
shorter scheduling intervals, increased transmission capacity, and new sys-
tems operation capabilities.343
In short, adding more intermittent, non-dispatchable resources to the
grid increases the overall complexity of grid operation and management,
which in turn requires new rules and procedures to accommodate such com-
plexity and to ensure that such resources will be able to access the grid in a fair
and open manner while also maintaining system reliability. FERC's recent
order on the Integration of Variable Energy Resources (Order 764) repre-
sents an important effort in this respect to modify some of the rules associated
with transmission access and interconnection to accommodate variable ener-
gy resources.344 Various ISOs and RTOs are likewise adopting their own
rules to facilitate renewables integration under existing market structures.345
penetration of wind and solar on the existing fossil fuel generation fleet in the WestConnect
subregion).
343. See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., INTEGRATING VARIABLE
ENERGY: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS (2013) (discussing various renewables
integration studies and key challenges); D. LEW ET AL., supra note 342, at ES-1 (finding no
technical barriers to integrating 35 percent wind and solar energy in the WestConnect
subregion if adequate transmission was available and if certain operational changes were
adopted, including increased balancing authority cooperation and increased use of subhourly
scheduling). The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) has produced two
renewables integration studies, both of which confirmed that significant increases in ramping
flexibility and load following resources would be needed to balance the grid at higher
penetrations of renewables. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTEGRATION OF
RENEWABLE RESOURCES: OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND GENERATION FLEET
CAPABILITY AT 20% RPS (2010); CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, SUMMARY OF
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF 33% RENEWABLES INTEGRATION STUDY 2010 CPUC
LTPP No. R.10-05-006 (2011).
344. See FERC Order No. 764, Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482,
41,482-483 (July 13, 2012) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (summarizing the objective of the
rule to remove barriers to integration of variable energy resources by requiring each public
utility transmission provider to offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling and incorporating
new provisions into the pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement i  order to
better accommodate such resources).
345. See, e.g., LIN XU & DONALD TRETHEWAY, CAL. ISO, FLEXIBLE RAMPING PRODUCTS:
SECOND REVISED DRAFT FINAL PROPOSAL (2012), available at http://www.caiso.com/
Documents/SecondRevisedDraftFinalProposal-FlexibleRampingProduct.pdf (proposing new
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Similarly, increasing the amount of distributed energy resources (dis-
tributed generation, storage, and demand response) on the grid will require
more coordination and control as well as significant upgrades of existing dis-
tribution systems to accommodate bidirectional power flows associated with
increasing amounts of such resources.346 Because many of these resources are
behind the meter, systems operators cannot see them in any direct sense. Instead,
increasing deployment of distributed energy resources looks like increasing
variability in load.34' As more utility customers begin to play a more active
role in generating, storing, and managing electricity-that is, as more cus-
tomers adopt distributed generation, storage, demand-response, or some
combination of these-the distribution system is changing from a one-way
radial network that delivered electricity to meet load to a much more dynamic,
multi- directional network.348
What is perhaps most distinctive today is the highly interrelated nature
of these developments and their growing intelligence. As the power sector
becomes embedded within the emerging "internet of things," what has long
been referred to as the demand side looks less like a collection of individual
activities and behaviors and more like a complex, distributed network of intel-
ligent devices that is connecting behaviors and technologies in new ways.349
CAISO rules for flexible ramping services to accommodate increased penetrations of variable
energy resources).
346. See, e.g., Rick Fioravanti & Nicholas Abi-Samra, Working at the Edge ofthe Grid: Howo to Find
Value in Distributed Energy Resources, 152 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 32, 33 (2014) ("The
mono-directional flow of electricity from centralized generation assets to end-users is
becoming multi-directional."); ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 66, at
28-29 (noting importance of including distributed energy resources in the planning an
operation of distribution systems).
347. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 66, at 29 (noting that at present
most distributed energy resources are "invisible" to grid operators, creating coordination and
systems operation challenges).
348. See NY DPS, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 66, at 22 ("The widespread
integration of DER [distributed energy resources] will present new complexities and challenges to the
continued reliable supply of electricity. Relatively predictable, one-way power flows within
distribution systems required less sophisticated system monitoring and power flow management
tools. In an enhanced grid, however, power flow will be bi-directional. Energy supplies will
come from multiple new technologies, and various sources, of varying sizes and capabilities.
Such changes will cause more complex challenges at the local level relating to network power
flows, electrical constraints, voltage fluctuations, and reactive power characteristics.").
349. See, e.g., David Ferris, Smart Thermostats Join the Internet of Things'to Turn up the Heat on Utilities,
ENERGYWIRE (April 14,2014), available at http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1059997834
(discussing growth of smart appliances and other devices connected through an "internet of
things" and implications for utilities); Neil Gershenfeld &J.P. Vasseur, As Objects Go Online:
The Promise (and Pifalls) of the Internet of Things, 93 FOR. AFF. 60, 61 (2014) (discussing
how the emerging "internet of things" will faciliate smart buildings and houses that will
greatly increase energy efficiency).
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Traditional categories of generation and load (supply and demand) no longer
make sense in the face of these developments. What was previously viewed as
an object of regulation and incentives programs (demand-side management)
is in the process of becoming the most active part of the power sector with its
own generative, emergent properties. Coordinating and enabling these bottom-
up processes will require smarter policies and programs that align business
models and regulatory frameworks at multiple levels and across multiple sec-
tors, that empower consumers to become active participants in the grid, and
that are durable enough to provide the necessary signals for long-term in-
vestments while also flexible enough to accommodate an increasingly dynam-
ic set of activities. 350
There has been a great deal of discussion recently about what this means
for the traditional IOU business model. In some scenarios, IOUs operate like
orchestra conductors, managing and coordinating the system, rather than like
traditional providers of energy. In others, they continue to provide bundled
services. In still others, they are replaced by independent market actors oper-
ating across various segments of the industry.31 But however the grid comes
to be organized, there will be a set of institutions layered on top of it that have
responsibility for regulating and coordinating various transactions, managing
and operating the transmission and distribution systems, and maintaining
system reliability. It is these institutions that must operate in the public interest by
providing an essential public service-that is, managing a shared infrastructure as
part of a larger collective undertaking. It is these institutions that have the
obligations and responsibilities of public utility in its broadest sense.
350. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson & Robert W. Fri, Designing a Durable Energy Policy, 142
DAEDALUS 119, 121-26 (2013) (discussing importance of policies that combine durability
and flexibility in driving the transition to a low-carbon energy system).
351. See, e.g., NY DPS, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 66, at 9 (discussing enhanced
role for distribution utilities as "Distributed System Platform Provider" in coordinating
among customers on the distribution system and between an increasingly active distribution
system and the bulk power system); ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NEW BUSINESS MODELS
FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO VALUE
CONSTELLATION 1 (2013) ("The regulated distribution utility of the future can be an
important partner in helping to coordinate the deployment and integration of distributed
resources-investing in grid infrastructure to support this new and more dynamic system,
conveying signals about system conditions, and integrating disparate resources to harvest the
benefits of diversity for all stakeholders.").
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C. Experimentation and Innovation
If asked to identify those parts of modern government that are particu-
larly innovative, it seems rather unlikely that anyone would put state PUCs at
the top of their list. And yet, if we look at what some of these PUCs are actu-
ally doing, it is clear that they have been and continue to be important sites
for policy innovation as well as key mechanisms for advancing technological
innovation in the power sector. In this respect, it is perhaps not purely a coin-
cidence that Justice Brandeis's famous description of the states as laboratories
of democracy came in a dissenting opinion in a 1932 case involving Oklahoma's
effort to extend a scheme of quasi-public utility regulation to the manufacture
and sale of ice.352
As discussed above, moreover, the idea of public utility elaborated by
Progressives, legal realists, and institutional economists in the early twentieth
century was expressly conceived in experimentalist terms.353 To be sure, the
historical record is not exactly overflowing with examples of Brandeisian ex-
perimentalism by PUCs. But neither is it dominated entirely by the kind of
anti-innovation, rent-seeking behavior that public choice critics and others
have pointed to as the default for PUCs.354 While more research is needed to
understand the role of PUCs in policy innovation and in advancing new tech-
nologies, anecdotal evidence from across the country suggests that PUCs are
actively engaged in various policy experiments and are playing important roles
in the effort to demonstrate the viability of various low-carbon generation options.
Ongoing PUC efforts to experiment with new rate designs and other in-
centive programs are important examples in this respect. Specifically, a num-
ber of PUCs have moved away from traditional cost-of-service rate making to
toward various types of performance-based rates in order to provide better in-
centives for utilities to adopt certain practices and improve their performance.355
352. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.")
353. See discussion supra Part II.A.
354. See discussion supra Part II.B.
355. See Sonia Aggarwal & Hal Harvey, Rethinking Policy to Deliver a Clean Energy Future, 26
ELECTRICITY J. 7, 16-19 (2013) (discussing role of performance-based regulation in the
effort to decarbonize the power sector); Jeff D. Makholm et al., North American Performance-
Based Regulation for the 21 Century, 25 ELECTRICITYJ. 33, 37-45 (2012) (discussing various
examples of performance-based regulation of electric utilities in the United States and
Canada); MIT, supra note 15, at 186-87 (reporting that as of 2005, sixteen states had some
form of performance-based regulation and an additional twenty-three states had established
service targets); Joskow, supra note 164, at 552-56 (discussing use of price cap mechanisms
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Likewise, PUCs across the country have adopted programs that allow utilities
to offer more dynamic rates, including so-called time-of-day or time-of-use
rates as well as real-time pricing, that provide price signals to retail customers
that more accurately reflect the wholesale costs of electricity during different
periods."' Finally, some PUCs have embarked on broad reform of rate designs
and regulatory frameworks to accommodate the growth of distributed energy
resources. In New York, for example, the Department of Public Service has
initiated an ambitious effort to reform its current regulatory framework and rate
designs to facilitate a robust, "transactive" platform that allows for high levels
of distributed energy resources."'
A handful of PUCs have also worked with regulated utilities to develop
policies and programs to test the deployment of new technologies. Smart
grid demonstration projects of various types, for example, have been initiated
in multiple jurisdictions, with PUCs playing important roles in some cases.5
and service quality incentives in utility regulation in the U.S. and other countries). As
discussed above, performance-based or incentive rates have a long history in public utility
regulation. The Wisconsin Public Utilities Act of 1907, for example, expressly contemplated
the use of "sliding-scale" rates to incentivize "progressive" performance by utilities and
revenue sharing with customers. See Gilmore, supra note 95, at 523-24 (discussing sliding-
scale provisions in Wisconsin's public utilities law).
356. See, e.g., Theresa Faim et al., Pilot Paralysis: Why Dynamic Pricing Remains Over-Hyped and
Underacheived, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 8, 10-17 (2013) (reviewing results of recent pilots and
large scale field trials of dynamic pricing). Dynamic rates also have a long, though largely
forgotten, history in public utility regulation. See, e.g., William J. Hausman & John L.
Neufeld, Time-of-Day Pricing in the US. Electric Powoer Industry at the Turn ofthe Century, 15
RANDJ. ECON. 116, 118-23 (1984) (discussing debates over rate structure and time-of-day
pricing during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). The more recent push for
dynamic pricing (that is, retail prices that reflect the time-varying marginal costs of
generating electricity) can be traced to the seminal work of Alfred E. Kahn. See ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 63-122
(1988) (providing detailed discussion of the theory and application of marginal cost pricing).
Kahn served as Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission from 1974 to 1977,
during which time he initiated regulatory proceedings to reform electric utility rates to better
reflect marginal cost pricing principles. See Alfred E. Khan, Applications of Economics to an
Imperfect World, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1979) ("One of my proudest accomplishments [as
Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission] . . . was the progress we made in
requiring the electric and telephone companies to introduce marginal cost-related prices.");
see also Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM.
ECON. REV. 381, 381-83 (2012) (discussing Kahn's work on marginal cost pricing and status
of efforts to expand dynamic pricing).
357. See NY DPS, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 66, at 50-54, 58-65
(discussing potential changes to "ratemaking paradigm" and rate design to facilitate a more
"transactive grid" with high levels of distributed energy resources).
358. SeeJoel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation andFederalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
17-20 (2013) (discussing limited PUC involvement in smart grid pilots); Paul L. Joskow,
Creating a Smarter US. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (2012) (discussing federal
and state support for smart grid pilot projects and investments). Currently, twenty-four
1706 61 UCLA L. REv. 1614 (2014)
PUCs across the country have developed specific initiatives to promote and
test the deployment of plug-in electric vehicles.359 And the California Public
Utilities Commission has recently issued an order establishing an energy storage
target and procurement framework for the state's three largest IOUs. 0
At the same time, other PUCs are also working with utilities to support
large investments in commercial- scale demonstration projects of advanced
low-carbon technologies.361 To take an important example discussed previously,
the Mississippi Public Service Commission, together with the federal govern-
ment, has been actively involved in the Mississippi Power Company's Kemper
plant, a commercial scale demonstration project that combines an advanced
coal-fired power plant based on integrated gasification combined cycle technology
with carbon capture and storage.362 Although a significant portion of this
project is being financed through rates, the Mississippi Commission has also
capped ratepayer exposure to cost overruns.363
Regardless of the individual merits of this project (and others like it), it
will clearly have broad social benefits. No one knows how much it will cost to
build a "clean coal" plant because no one has ever done it at scale. No one knows
how well such a plant will work once it is operational because no one has ever
states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation or adopted policies authorizing
smart metering. See States Providing For Smart Metering, National Council of State Legislatures,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/researcb/energy/states-providing-for-smart-metering.aspx. For
two examples of ongoing state efforts to monitor and promote smart grid development, see
Missouri Public Service Commission, Missouri Smart Grid Report, EW-2011-0175 at 34-
39 (Feb. 14,2014) (discussing smart grid demonstration projects and investments by investor-owned
utilities in the state); CPUC, California Smart Grid-2012, Report to the Governor and the
Legislature, 5-9 (May 2013) (discussing status of smart grid efforts in California).
359. See ENERGETICS INC., COMPILATION OF UTILITY COMMISSION INITIATIVES RELATED
TO PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES AND ELECTRIC VEHICLE SUPPLY EQUIPMENT 1-2
(2013) (discussing policies and initiatives adopted by utility commissions across the country
to promote the deployment of plug-in electric vehicles).
360. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Decision Adopting Energy Storage Procurement Framework
and Design Program, R.10-12-007 (Oct. 17, 2013) (establishing a framework for energy
storage procurement and directing the state's investor-owned utilities to procure 1,325
megawatts of storage by 2020 with installations required no later than 2024); see also Elliot Hinds &
Jonathan Boyer-Dry, The Emergence ofan Electric Energy Storage Market, 27 ELECTRICITYJ. 6, 8-10
(2014) (discussing features of California energy storage procurement order).
361. SeeJonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation Cycle: The View from
the Public Utility Commission, HAST. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript on file with
author) (discussing important role of PUCs in commercial scale demonstration projects for
new energy technologies).
362. Id. at 21-24 (discussing Mississippi Public Service Commission's involvement in Kemper
plant); Mufson, supra note 299 (discussing history and status of Kemper plant).
363. See Miss. Public Service Commission, supra note 299, at 9-10, 99 (2012) (summarizing
regulatory treatment of Kemper plant and capping rate recovery for costs associated with the
plant at $2.4 billion).
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operated one at scale. The only way to find out whether this technology will
work at scale is to build one at scale. Thus, rather than view such a project as
yet another example of the excesses of rate regulation, it would seem more
productive to view it instead as a crucial experiment with a technology that
could be a vitally important part of a low-carbon future. This is especially
true in cases where the venture in question fails. Although such failures will
surely be expensive, they could also prove invaluable in terms of the learning
experience that they provide.
Innovation in the power sector poses a different set of challenges (both
in kind and degree) than those confronting most other sectors. Proof-of-
concept activities and demonstration projects often run well into the hun-
dreds of millions and even billions of dollars.364 Cost estimates for widespread
deployment of advanced technologies to upgrade the transmission and distri-
bution systems in the United States are typically in the hundreds of billions of
dollars.365 Without question, software and new digital technologies will play
(and are playing) important roles in modernizing the grid and facilitating innova-
tion across the power sector, but the ongoing digitalization of the grid will
hardly be enough by itself to decarbonize the electricity system.
Given the highly interdependent nature of the power sector, it is unlikely
that a single disruptive innovation will usher in the kind of creative destruc-
tion that technological enthusiasts celebrate in other sectors. Rather, innovation
is more likely to come in clusters of technologies, practices, and regulatory
frameworks. Creating space for that to happen will require a broader platform to
support and test new technologies and approaches at multiple scales and a
regulatory framework that views the overall innovation system as part and
parcel of the enterprise of public utility.
Decarbonizing the U.S. electricity system by 2050 is a daunting prospect
to even the most optimistic observer. Even if the technology and financing
were readily available, the political and institutional challenges are im-
364. As noted, the current estimate of the total costs necessary to complete the Kemper plant in
Mississippi is $5.5 billion. See Mufson, supra note at 299 (reporting current cost estimate of
Kemper plant).
365. See, e.g., EPRI, ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE SMART GRID: A
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE RESULTANT
BENEFITS OF A FULLY FUNCTIONING SMART GRID 1-4-1-6 (2011) (estimating range of
total investment necessary to enable a fully functioning smart grid, including investments in
transmission, distribution, and consumer segments of the grid, as $338 billion to $476
billion).
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mense.366 The chances of reducing power sector emissions by 80 percent by
midcentury are slim at best. But rather than bemoan the difficulties and ar-
gue in the abstract about the optimal mix of technologies and institutions
needed to achieve this, it would seem prudent to look for promising activities
that are underway and find ways to leverage them. PUCs have great potential
in this respect. They are actively pursuing all kinds of different initiatives
across the country, albeit unevenly and all too often without much coordina-
tion, and they have the capacity to do much more. Rather than viewing them
as obstacles to be overcome, it is perhaps better to see PUCs as institutional
resources that could be harnessed and redirected to meet the demands of a
low-carbon future.
How individual utilities respond to all of this-whether they see it as
threat or opportunity-is obviously important, but hardly the whole story.
Individual companies will come and go; business models will inevitably
change and adjust. But the notion of public utility is much broader, contain-
ing within it generative possibilities that its early proponents may not have
emphasized-the germ of new insights and ways of thinking about possible
pathways to a low-carbon future. A more active form of public utility regula-
tion that combines broad responsibilities for planning and coordination
across the whole system with a capacity for policy experimentation and learn-
ing offers a critical set of tools and resources that could play a major role in the
effort to realize that future. As John Maurice Clark noted many years ago, a
good system of public control must be democratic, powerful, wisely experimental,
and adaptable.367 Finding ways to realize and nurture those capabilities in the
context of public utility is at least as important as the effort to mobilize the
technology and financial resources that will be needed to realize a low-carbon
future.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that a revitalized concept of public utility has
much to offer for any effort to decarbonize the electric power sector. A key
task is to recover the public in public utility as we confront the challenge of
collectively building a low-carbon future. In saying this, it is important to
recognize that we cannot simply adopt the older concept of public utility that
366. See, e.g., Milligan et al., supra note 292, at 27-5 ("[Elxpanding the use of renewable electricity
poses institutional challenges that are often more formidable, and less studied, than the
technical challenges.").
367. See CLARK, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing various features of a good system of public control).
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Progressives, realists, and institutional economists elaborated. Today's econ-
omy (our industrial system) together with our politics and legal arrangements
are vastly different from those of the first half of the twentieth century. But
neither should we assume that the diminished notion of public utility be-
queathed to us by the economic critique represents the last word on the sub-
ject. As we set forth on the truly massive effort of building a low-carbon
future, we will surely need new ideas and conceptual innovations, a new "public
vocabulary," that make creative use of the concepts and institutions that we
have used to build our current society.368
As a quintessential Progressive effort aimed at the "social control of
business," public utility was oriented toward progress and innovation-a
means for ensuring ordered change in a dynamic industrial economy and di-
recting it toward the general welfare.369 Today we seem to have abandoned
the idea of ordered change in favor of disruption. But many of the invest-
ments we are making today in the electric power system will be with us for a
generation or more, and the emissions that are embedded within those in-
vestments will determine in part whether we can realize a low-carbon future.
It may be that in some sectors such as electric power, we still need a fair
amount of "statecraft" to channel those investments in ways that promote the
general welfare.370 None of this will be easy, of course. As Justice Frankfurter
noted many years ago, "[njo task more profoundly tests the capacity of our
government, both in nation and state, than its share in securing for society
those essential services which are furnished by public utilities."3
Public choice and the broad economic critique of utility regulation have
taught us to be wary of the Progressive faith in expertise and regulation by inde-
pendent commission. Surely some skepticism is warranted, and there is plen-
ty of evidence to support the public choice view of regulation. But if we push
this to its limits, if we allow it to wholly replace any sense of the public interest, it
will corrode our faith in institutions that we have built, however imperfectly,
to provide a framework for policy innovation and action in our ongoing effort
to manage a vital infrastructure that provides so many essential services to our
economy and way of life.
368. See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental LaZw, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1139 (2010) (discussing how environmental ideas and
arguments become embedded within broader public vocabularies).
369. CLARK, supra note 2.
370. HAMILTON, POLITICS OF INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 18.
371. FRANKFURTER, supra note 1, at 81.
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Public utility is not a thing or a single type of enterprise, but an ongoing,
open-ended project; a collective undertaking that is distinctively American
and one that, even now, well past its hundredth birthday, is still very much up
for grabs. The choice of making a low-carbon future can only be realized if it
is approached as a shared, political choice-a choice that will require a significant
amount of statecraft, public participation, and private enterprise, a choice that
calls for a revitalized understanding of public utility.

